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INTRODUCTION

Dispute settlement has been integral to the operation of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)1 and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO).2 Through the use of an
arbitral panel system, the GATT, and now the WTO, have interpreted the GATT and WTO Agreements and resolved a large body
of disputes between trading nations. 3 While the general form of
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATI.
2 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1125, 1144 (1994) [hereinafter Final
Act].
3 For the most comprehensive review of GATT dispute settlement, see
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dispute resolution in the GATT/WTO has remained the same, the
process has evolved over time.4 Since the 1970s the participating
states have refined, amended and reworked the dispute settlement
process.5 One major achievement of the Uruguay Round (19861994) was the adoption of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU). 6 There is general agreement that the GATT Contracting
Parties 7 designed a more adjudicative system 8 when they adopted

ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993). For a current overview of the litigation under the WTO's dispute settlement system, see WTO Secretariat, Update of INTO

Dispute Settlement Cases, WT/DS/OV/27 Uune 9, 2006) [hereinafter Dispute Update].
4 See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure:An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 4-11 (1999) (describing the
evolution of the dispute resolution process) [hereinafter Three Year Overview].
5 Id. at 7-11.
6 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
7 In the text of the GATT 1947 the countries are referred to as Contracting
Parties. It was not until the completion of the Uruguay Round that the WTO was
set up as a membership organization. Final Act art. XI(1). The Agreements attached to the Final Act in Annexes 1 through 3 are the Multilateral Trade Agreements and bind all Member States of the WTO, as do the revisions of GATT 1947
now denominated as GATT 1994. Id. art. XI(2), (4). The DSU is one of the multilateral agreements binding all WTO Member States. See DSU art. 1.
8 The following explanation should lead to an understanding of the DSU and
why it is more adjudicative than the GATT system. The DSU system has been described as "an obligatory and exclusive, quasi-judicial system of adjudication."
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, INTO Dispute Settlement and Competition
Law: Views from the Perspective of Appellate Body's Experience, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1505, 1511-12 (2003). The DSU allows a WTO Member State, which believes that
another State has violated a GAT[/WTO Agreement (or has nullified or impaired
its expected benefits under such an agreement) to seek redress. See GATT art.
XXIII(1)(a), (b). The two categories of claims before the DSU are referred to as violation and non-violation claims. The DSU expressly adopts the GATT practice
developed to deal with disputes under Article XXXII of the GATT 1947, see DSU
art. 3, to trigger a consultation process, see id. art. 4. If consultations fail to resolve
the dispute, the complaining party can seek creation of a panel for the timely review of the issues. Id. arts. 4.7, 6. Upon completion of the panel process and the
issuance of its report, a complaining party that prevails is entitled to compliance
with that report and its recommendations by the responding state. Id. arts. 16, 21,
22. The negative consensus rule of the DSU keeps the losing party from being
able to interfere with the adoption of the panel report by the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB). Id. art. 16.4. The DSB is comprised of all of the Member States of the
WTO. The DSB has "authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate
Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under the

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 28:2

the DSU. The "new" system 9 was designed to resolve disputes between parties based on the rules and what they meant rather than
on power of the States conducting the dispute. Since the adoption
of the DSU, scholars have examined how it operates and what role
it plays in the WTO. A growing literature exists concerning the
covered agreements," id. art. 2.1, unless all WTO Member States concur. Consequently the losing state must either comply with the panel's recommendations or
inform the DSB of its intentions within a reasonable period of time. Id. art. 21.3.
A losing Member State that cannot comply immediately is given "a reasonable period of time in which to do so." Id. That time period can either be mutually agreed upon by the parties to the dispute or determined by an arbitration.
The guideline for the arbitration is "that the reasonable period of time to implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months
from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report." Id. art. 21.3.c.
"However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular circumstances," id., or depending upon the nature of the appeal. Id. art. 16.4.
The DSU also created the Appellate Body (AB) -one of the great innovations
of the DSU -as a standing body. The Appellate Body is comprised of seven members chosen by the WTO Member States. Each appeal is heard by a panel of three
of the Appellate Body members. The entire Appellate Body, however, confers on
all appeals, see Appellate Body Report, Working Procedures for Appellate Review,
WT/AB/WP/5, Rule 4 (Jan. 4, 2005), and if the losing party is still found to be in
error, it must comply with the AB recommendations. DSU art. 1. When a Member State loses, it is expected to bring its measure into conformity with its
GATI'/WTO obligations. Id. art. 19.1. The losing state, however, is not the judge
of whether or not its actions -withdrawal of the offending measure, or its alteration or replacement with a consistent measure-are sufficient. If there is disagreement between the parties about compliance, there is a procedure for review
by a panel of the new or altered measure. Id. art. 21.5.
In real terms the DSU provision makes it possible for countries to delay implementation. Raj Bhala & Lucienne Attard, Austin's Ghost and DSU Reform, 37
INT'L LAW. 651, 661 (2003) (noting that, in practice, Member States "believe they
can go three years before having to worry about compliance."). This provision
exposes the losing party to an attempt by the prevailing party to seek authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions, i.e., to retaliate. DSU art. 22.2.
There are four phases of dispute settlement: consultations, the panel process,
an appellate process, and the implementation and surveillance process. The DSB
keeps under surveillance the implementation of all adopted panel and Appellate
Body recommendations. Id. art. 21.6-are all overseen by the DSB. The consultations and panel process were part of the GATT system for resolving disputes. The
GATT system also authorized the suspension of concessions as a possible response by the GATT Contracting Parties. In operation, however, GATT disputes
were successfully completed if the panel report was adopted and unsuccessful if
the panel decision was blocked and not adopted. Some protracted disputes resulted in negotiated settlements. A clear hallmark of the GATT system was that it
rested on the political will of the parties to accept panel judgments or to resist
them.
9 See Three Year Overview, supra note 4, at 3-15 (tracking the evolution of the
GATT system into the DSU system and stressing that the DSU is not as innovative
as many have suggested).
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cases decided under the DSU, how Member States have responded
to these cases, and what all of this means for the WTO. There are
still questions, however, about whether the more adjudicative system creates different kinds of disputes or different results than the
GATT system. Does the DSU create cases that are impossible to resolve?
Three new structural features of the DSU have proven instrumental in changing how Member States resolve their disputes. The
DSU requires appellate review and thereby specifies the setting up
and operation of an Appellate Body (AB). The DSU also subjects
the political adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports to the
negative consensus approach, thereby making adoption of reports
"automatic" rather than truly political. Finally, the DSU adds a
surveillance and implementation phase to the process to ensure
that some action will be taken by the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) in response to non-compliance.
How do the older and newer aspects of the dispute settlement
system mesh? As in the GATT system, the beginning and end of
all WTO cases remain highly political. In its first decade of operation a majority of all cases filed with the DSB were settled during
consultations. 10 These cases are settled between the disputing
Member States, and that settlement is reported to the DSB. Consequently, in such cases no pronouncement about GATT/WTO law
is made. If the parties fail to settle, however, a dispute usually
goes before a panel (or panels) of arbitrators. A large majority of
all cases that reach the panel level are appealed." The operation of
panel and appeal phases has created the more adjudicative dispute
settlement process. With its two levels of arbitral review, the DSU
requires the parties to spend most of their time contending over
the procedures for resolving the dispute and the substance of the
rules. The quasi-automatic adoption of a panel-or Appellate
Body-report by the DSB assures that the system will resolve all
procedural disputes and determine what the rules mean.12 The
10 See Carlos M. Vazquez & John H. Jackson, Some Reflections on Compliance
with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 555, 566 n. 54
(2002) (explaining that less than half of the cases in which consultation was requested went forward to panel consideration).
11 See Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, IATO Dispute Settlement From 1995 to
2005--A Statistical Analysis, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 226 (2006) (calculating the percentage of panel reports appealed at 70.48% as of the end of 2005).
12 DSU art. 19.1. Joost Pauwelyn has described the legalization of the DSU
process: "The discourse is set out in very long submissions and statements, and in
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Appellate Body has self-consciously set out to issue clear, coherent,
and legitimate decisions.' 3 It must do so with compulsory jurisdic15
tion 14 and limited powers for managing cases.
The system answers all questions raised about what the law
means. However, it cannot guarantee when or how the panel or
Appellate Body recommendations will be followed. The panel and
Appellate Body recommendations tend 16 to suggest that the losing
party bring the offending measure(s) into conformity with obligations under the agreement at issue and usually do not provide any
guidance on how this should be done. The DSU process thus re17
turns a dispute to the political systems of the disputing parties.
even longer panel and Appellate Body reports, going into and explaining in detail
the most intricate legal findings." Joost Pauwelyn, The Limits of Litigation: "Americanization" and Negotiation in the Settlement of WTO Disputes, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 121, 125 (2003).
13 See Proceedings of the 99th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, IATO Appellate Body Roundtable, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 175 (2005)
(presenting views from three of the first seven AB members on how the AB set out
to operate); see also Three Year Overview, supra note 4, at 30 (noting that the AB panels heavily relied on the interpretation methods of Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (as authorized by the DSU art. 3.2) in order to be
prudent and to give the "legal rulings the greatest possible appearance of objective legal authority"); Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1, 26 (2005) (noting that the AB "like more conventional judicial
bodies, has opted for a rigorous, impartial, and strictly legal approach to analyzing trade complaints").
There has been concern that the Appellate Body has engaged in judicial activism. See Richard H. Steinberg, JudicialLawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints,98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 247-57 (2004) (noting the literature on the alleged judicial activism and explaining the ways in which there
has been more expansive judicial lawmaking in the DSU system as opposed to the
GATT system).
14 The Appellate Body has compulsory jurisdiction over all claims raised by
contending Member States. DSU art. 7.2; see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Tensions
Between the Dispute Settlement Process and the Diplomatic and Treaty-Making Activities of the WTO, 1 WORLD TRADE REv. 301, 305 (2002) (noting that neither a panel
nor an AB panel "is entitled to refuse to address a claim because the panelists or
the Appellate Body members want to avoid a legal question that has delicate political consequences").
15 See Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the VTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 53 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 861, 862 (2004) (arguing that unlike other
courts and tribunals, the AB is limited in its ability to manage cases that are inappropriate for dispute settlement proceedings).
16 Parties to a dispute are entitled to ask the panel or Appellate Body to make
specific recommendations about how the losing party should implement the
panel/AB recommendations. DSU art. 19.1. Member States have rarely asked
panels or the AB to do this.
17 See Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences,
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The surveillance and implementation phase gives governments the
time and leeway to arrive at compliance. In other words it was designed by the Member States to produce indeterminate outcomes.' 8
The losing state must decide how and when-with only limited
guidance and oversight-it will comply. The prevailing state, in
turn, must keep the losing party and the DSB engaged on the issue
of whether compliance is forthcoming or adequate. The DSB oversees compliance through several methods: keeping the dispute on
the DSB agenda; requiring the losing state to report on the steps it
is taking towards compliance; establishing a compliance review
panel (under Article 21.5) when the losing state is accused of failing to take adequate steps to comply; and authorizing the suspension of concessions (under Article 22) for states that have failed to
comply. Commentators have noted that DSB oversight, apart from
compliance reviews and sanctions requests, has not affected how
the losing party responds.' 9 In addition, the existence of the compliance review and sanctions phases also allows additional chances
to litigate and draw out the time for full compliance. While most
losing parties comply without forcing the dispute to the compliance review stage or retaliation, there are disputes that have resulted in sustained non-compliance.
During the transition from the GATT dispute settlement system towards the DSU, several scholars theorized what it would
mean to shift towards a more adjudicative system. Robert Hudec,
writing at a time when the GATT panel process was being
strengthened, noted that efforts to force greater compliance
through a tightening of the rules would create what he labeled

38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 405, 415 (2003) (noting that the WTO dispute settlement system is
political "both at its inception and at its end").
18 Id. at 415 (arguing that the design was not a sign of lack of political will but
was chosen because it allowed for maneuvering).
19 Steve Chamovitz, An Analysis of Pascal Lamy's Proposal on Collective Preferences, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 449, 458-59 (2005) (noting that there really is no connection between the surveillance carried out by the DSB and the domestic parties'
process for considering how and whether to come into compliance); see also Christopher Arup, The State of Play of Dispute Settlement "Law" at the World Trade Organization, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 897, 902 (2003) (noting that what happens to disputes
still remains within the control of the Member States and the DSU uses soft methods- monitoring and reporting on implementation and discussions in WTO meetings- to encourage compliance.).
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"wrong cases" 20 -disputes that would resist resolution. In the
lead-up to the negotiations for the DSU, William Davey 21 and Kenneth Abbot 22 followed up on the "wrong cases" idea in light of the
forthcoming DSU. All of these scholars believed the GATT (and
the later WTO) process would spin off "wrong cases," 23 which
would pose very difficult problems for the organization. 24 Now
that the DSU has been in place for over a decade 25 and countries
have been actively pursuing cases under its terms, 26 it is time to revisit the idea of "wrong cases" and determine whether the phenomenon exists in the WTO. The appellation chosen by Professor
Hudec, "wrong cases," 27 suggests that some cases pursued and decided should never have been brought before the dispute settlement system. 28 In reality, "impossible cases" - cases that begin,
20 Robert E. Hudec, GAT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 159-163 (1980) [hereinafter Unfinished
Business].
21 William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 7376 (1987).
22 Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a
Private-InterestsSystem of Justice, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 111.
23 Unfinished Business, supra note 20, at 159-63; Davey, supra note 21 at 73-76;
Abbott, supra note 22, at 124-25, 138-42.
24 Unfinished Business, supra note 20, at 166-67; Davey, supra note 21 at 73-76;
Abbott, supra note 22 at 141-42.
The number of disputes
25 The DSU began operating January 1, 1995.
brought under the DSU in the first nine years exceeded the total number of disputes brought under the GATT system operating from 1947-1994. WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2004 2.
26 Since the DSU began operating, there have been 344 complaints brought
before the DSB. The WTO reports that there have been fifty-one mutually agreedupon solutions and twenty-nine other settled or inactive disputes. See Dispute
Update, supra note 3, at ii (providing a statistical overview of WTO dispute settlement cases). It is not possible to divide this number of complaints by the reported settlements to arrive at a percentage because not all complaints that are
filed turn into a WTO dispute. The DSU system allows for the formation of a single dispute with multiple claimants. See Leitner & Lester, supra note 11, at 219-22
(finding that in the first decade of complaints, from 1995-2005, 335 complaints
were filed, but there were only 249 "matters" or actual disputes).
27 The DSU does require Member States to contemplate whether bringing a
dispute is well considered. See DSU art. 3.7 (announcing that "[blefore bringing a
case, a Member shall exercise its judgment as to whether an action under these
procedures would be fruitful. The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to
secure a positive solution to a dispute."). This article suggests that Member States
should not bring every dispute to the DSU system; however, it does not provide
criteria for determining when a dispute would be fruitful.
28 According to Hudec, the Tokyo Round negotiators refining the panel process identified three different categories of wrong cases and decided "that 'wrong'
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proceed and/or end by being overly contentious, difficult, or complex - is a better term of art because "impossible cases" are a natural part of the GATT/WTO process and arguably any international
dispute settlement process. Throughout this article, therefore, the
term "impossible cases" will be used.
1. A THEORY OF IMPOSSIBLE CASES
There is no theory about why the GATT and now the WTO dispute settlement systems produce impossible cases. The factors or
elements that predict which cases will prove overly difficult have
never been fully catalogued and analyzed. Robert Hudec wrote
about "wrong cases" as a descriptive exercise. He established
29
three categories of cases that would tend to become legal failures.
Later scholars adopted these categories and then offered their own
perspectives. 30 Consequently, now seems the time to offer such a
theory and to isolate the factors that make an impossible case. In
analyzing the phenomenon, this article will answer two critical
questions: first, does the DSU create "impossible cases" or create
them more often? Second, how do impossible cases affect the DSU
system and the WTO?
1.1. What are "Wrong Cases" and are They "Impossible Cases?"
In his article, GATT Dispute Settlement, After the Tokyo Round:
An Unfinished Business, 31 Hudec described the worries of the GATT
Contracting Parties in the late 1970s as they contemplated making
32
the GATT panel process more legal and less diplomatic in nature.

complaints can lead to 'wrong' decisions that lower respect for GATT law." Unfinished Business, supra note 20, at 166.
29 Unfinished Business, supra note 20, at 159-63. Hudec also offered his solution for cases such as the U.S. Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC)
case, which served as his illustration of a "wrong case." Id.
30 See, e.g., Davey, supra note 21; Abbott, supra note 22 (analyzing various aspects of dispute settlement systems).
31 Unfinished Business, supra note 20.
32 The Tokyo Round debate focused on "improving the enforcement machine" for GATT disputes. There were framework negotiations on dispute settlement that resulted in the adoption of the Understanding Regarding Notification,
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance (Nov. 28, 1979) GATT B.I.S.D.
(26th Supp.) at 210, 215 (1980). Some countries were supporters of strengthening
enforcement, but anti-legalist countries were opposed to it. According to Hudec,
the anti-legalists were against alterations because they believed governments
would not comply and that the cases of non-compliance "would become con-

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 28:2

The shift towards an adjudicative system began when the Contracting Parties refined the GATT panel process. 33 The adoption of
the DSU further codified this shift by eliminating most of the political limits to the adjudicative power of the older system. 34 Therefore, any analysis of "wrong cases" should apply to the WTO as
well as the GATT dispute settlement system.
According to Hudec's analysis, there were three categories of
"wrong cases": 1) cases involving "ordinary non-compliance;" 35 2)
cases involving "inoperative rules;" 36 and 3) cases capable of "overtaxing the GATT procedure." 37 Each category will be discussed in
turn.
1.1.1.

OrdinaryNon-Compliance

Instances of "ordinary non-compliance" would inevitably occur, Hudec reported, because governments would respond to political pressures (coming from some industry or particular economic situation)38 to flout a GATT rule. According to Hudec, they
would do so even in instances where the Contracting Party knew
that it would lose any GATT dispute brought to challenge the

spicuous failures for the GAT, diminishing both its own prestige and that of its
rules." Unfinished Business, supra note 20, at 159.
33 See Three Year Overview, supra note 4, at 8-11 (discussing the success of the
GATT dispute settlement procedure during the 1980s).
34 The United States complained about two aspects of the GATT system prior
to the DSU negotiations: 1) the blocking of panel reports by the losing parties of
the disputes and 2) the lengthiness of GATT proceedings. THE GATT URUGUAY
ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 2792, 2730-35 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1993).
Given the political nature of the GATT dispute settlement system, Contracting
Parties could block or delay a dispute at the time the panel was established, at the
time when the terms of reference for the panel were being adopted, and also when
the final panel report had to be adopted by the GATT General Council.
The DSU establishes clear time frames for establishing a panel and determining the terms of reference. See DSU arts. 6, 7. Most importantly, the DSU reversed
the GATT requirement that all panel reports be adopted by consensus and instead
instituted the negative consensus approach. See DSU arts. 2, 3 n.1, 16.4. See generally C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 246-50
(1997) (addressing, among other issues, the effectiveness of the dispute settlement
system under the DSU).
35 Unfinished Business, supra note 20, at 159-60.
36 Id. at 160-62.
37 Id. at 163-65.
38 Id. at 159.
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measure. 39 Hudec's name for this category -"ordinary noncompliance" -encapsulated the political aspect of GATT dispute
settlement.
Nothing has changed since the creation of the WTO. Member
States pass laws and regulations, intentionally or not, which violate
GATT/WTO obligations because it is in their political interests to
do so. It is the intervention of the dispute settlement process that
labels such conduct as violative. As noted earlier, the political
process-the ultimate resolution of any dispute-lies within the
control of the parties. 40 If the industry or situation facilitated by
the prior conduct is regarded as crucial, the losing government
may decide to refuse to comply, to delay compliance, or to comply
inadequately (and thus achieve much-needed delay) with the decision of the dispute settlement body.41 The prevailing country
would then have to decide how it could best achieve its goal of
forcing the removal of the measure or its ill effects.
The political will of states, Hudec argued, was the determinative element in the success and effectiveness of the system.42 Con39 Id.
40 See Pauwelyn, supra note 12, at 126 (noting that "the fact remains that before
and after [the panel and AB process] (i.e., in pre-panel consultations and when it
comes to inducing compliance with reports) there is 'not enough law'").
41 Such cases have been resolved through the DSU process. The best illustration of this is the Hormones case. The United States and Canada prevailed before a
WTO panel and the Appellate Body in 1998 on the issue of whether the European
Commission ("EC") could justify its ban on hormone-fed cattle. The EC always
took the position that it could not resolve the case by simply removing the ban on
hormone-enriched beef products. Instead the EC kept the ban in place until it had
created a new directive justifying the ban after a "thorough and independent risk
assessment." Press Release, European Commission, EU Requests WTO to Confirm That There Is No Justification for U.S./Canada to Continue to Apply Sanctions (Nov. 8, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/
dispute/pr081104_en.htm. The EC completed the new risk assessment in 2003
and then requested that the United States and Canada remove their sanctions. Id.
Both countries have refused. Now the EC has initiated cases against both countries for refusing to lift the sanctions and a panel has heard the dispute. Id.; see
infra Section 2.3.2.4.
42 Hudec merits quoting at length:

A third lesson suggested by the GATT's experience is that political will is
really more important than rigorously binding procedures- that strong procedures by themselves are not likely to make a legal system very effective if they do
not have sufficient political will behind them. More specifically, it may be
suggested that the new WTO procedure is not likely to be significantly
more successful than its GATT predecessor unless the adoption of this
reform is supported by significantly stronger political will on the part of
leading WTO governments.
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sequently, he was skeptical of whether strengthened GATT procedures, or the later the adoption of the DSU, would be enough to resolve ordinary non-compliance problems. 43 Moreover, Hudec did
not believe political will to comply could be gauged by the new
rules adopted by Member States. Adopting the more adjudicative
DSU, therefore, did not prove that Member States had developed a
stronger commitment to submitting to unfavorable dispute settlement decisions. 44 Rather, Hudec believed that the DSU was
adopted primarily to constrain the unilateralism of the United
45
States.
Writing early on in the Uruguay Round negotiations, William
Davey acknowledged the real possibility of this first category of
"wrong cases" set out by Hudec. 46 However, Davey believed that
the panel's declarative power to rule government measures as violative of GATT law would lead to compliance by countries. 47 Writing after the completion of the draft of what later became the
DSU,48 Kenneth Abbott also agreed with Hudec that wrong cases
would be created. 49 Abbott opined that compliance would be

Three Year Overview, supra note 4, at 11 (emphasis added).
43 See id. at 14 ("[I]t must be anticipated that there will be defeats when governments cannot, or will not, comply with some legal rulings-just as they did
under GATT.").
44 See id. at 12 (arguing that the political will of major states in the WTO was
"not strong enough to deter occasional outbreaks of noncompliant behavior, particularly among its leading citizens"). As Hudec stated:
The new WTO System asks for a stronger political commitment because
it sets the bar higher. Yet it is difficult to identify any major charges in
national political life in the major WTO countries that will make their political systems more receptive to WTO legal discipline then they were in
the decade or two before the WTO came into being.
Id.
45 Id. at 13-14; see Taylor, supra note 34, at 248-49 ("Eventually, the views of
most negotiators shifted toward the view of the United States regarding the abandonment of positive consensus for the dispute settlement system, but only after
the United States had made aggressive use of Section 301."); infra Section 2.2.2
(discussing the American use of the Section 301 statute prior to the Uruguay
Round).
46 Davey, supra note 21, at 74.
47 See id. ("[I1t may help [a] respondent's government counteract domestic
pressures if that government can honestly argue that condemnation by GATT is
likely and retaliation by trading partners is possible.").
48 See Abbott, supra note 22, at 111. Kenneth Abbott's draft was not altered
significantly when the DSU was adopted.
49 Id. at 142.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss2/2

20071

IMPOSSIBLE CASES IN THE WTO

aided by the new implementation procedures such as automatic
adoption of the panel/appellate reports and more available access
to retaliation.50 Like Hudec, however, Abbott expressed doubts
about whether "the underlying problem of political cohesion in the
GATT" had been underestimated.5 ' Even with the new implementation features of the system, Abbott contended there would still be
cases that would cause political problems. Abbott characterized
one group of such cases as those where powerful countries would
52
refuse to comply even after exhausting all available procedures.
Hudec was correct not only about the political aspect of dispute
settlement but also about the fact that some non-compliance would
be "ordinary." Any system could produce such legal failures,
given the proper background. One way to assess this is to see
whether the case has exhausted all procedures available under the
system. Seven disputes have resulted in this type of legal failure in
the WTO. Countries failing to implement Appellate Body recommendations have provoked retaliation. DSB suspension of concessions has not resolved all of these cases, although the pressure it
creates may have assisted some.5 3 In the most extreme case, Hormones,5 4 retaliation lasted over eight years without dispute resolution. Instead, the non-compliance and sustained retaliation, along
with a late claim of possible compliance, spawned yet another dispute. 55 In another of the seven cases, Bananas III, retaliation lasted

Id. at 137.
51 Id. at 142.
52 Id. It is now clear that several cases of the particular type identified by Abbott have already been brought into the WTO system. See infra Sections 2.3.2,
2.3.3, and 2.3.8.
53 See infra Section 2.3.2.
54 Appellate Body Report, European Communities -Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb.
13, 1998) [hereinafter Hormones AB Report]. The dispute went through the panel
and Appellate Body process. The EC then allowed the deadline for compliance to
pass. The United States and Canada requested the suspension of concessions in
June 1999. Sanctions brought upon by both countries commenced in July 1999
and continue to remain in place as of 2007. See Dispute Update, supra note 3, at
228-29.
55 See infra Section 2.3.2. The new cases are against the United States and
Canada for maintaining the WTO authorized sanctions. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/6 (Jan. 14, 2005);
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, CanadaContinued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS321/6
(Jan. 14, 2005). A panel was established to review both cases in February 2005.
50
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for two years before there was a settlement of the dispute involving action by the entire WTO membership. 56 Even that settlement,
however, has not resolved the underlying problem posed by the
case. In the other five cases, the losing state did not comply, and
consequently retaliation was authorized.5 7 In two of those, the
winning state used the authority to retaliate. 58
The panel heard arguments in September 2005. The chairman of the panel has
announced that the final report will be issued to the parties in June 2007.
56 Bananas III is a short-form name for Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) (adoptedSept. 25, 1997). The name BananasIII was
adopted to distinguish it from two prior GATT disputes involving the EC banana
regime. The Bananas III dispute resulted in sanctions authorized against the EC in
April 1999 and May 2000; the first was requested by and granted to the United
States and the second was granted to Ecuador. The United States used its sanctions authorization; Ecuador did not. The U.S. sanctions were not terminated until January 2002, after the United States and the EC negotiated a settlement. The
DSU was notified of the settlement in two Understandings in April 2001. The
Understandings required that the EC obtain two waivers from the WTO. The
waivers were granted by the WTO General Council in December 2001, thus paving the way for the termination of sanctions. See Dispute Update, supra note 3, at
224-28. The Latin American countries that pursued Bananas III along with the
United States remain dissatisfied with market access and are now pursuing consultation with the EC. See infra Section 2.3.1.
57 The five other DSB authorizations to the winning party to suspend concessions came from the following: Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada- Export Credits
and Loan Guaranteesfor Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/ARB (Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Canada-Aircraft]; Appellate Body Report, United States -Continued Dumping
and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R Gan. 16,
2003) [hereinafter U.S. - Byrd Amendment]; Appellate Body Report, United States Antidumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000)
[hereinafter U.S. - Anti-Dumping Act]; Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax
Treatmentfor "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24 2000) [hereinafter FSC]; and Appellate Body Report, Brazil- Export Financing Programmefor
Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Brazil- Aircraft].
In Brazil- Aircraft, the DSB authorized suspension of concessions in August.
Brazil implemented new legislation; Canada continued to insist that Brazil was
not in compliance. Dispute Update, supra note 3, at 222-23.
In FSC, the DSB authorized the EC in May 2003 to suspend concessions after
the United States had attempted and failed to implement legislation to solve its
WTO violations. The EC used that authorization beginning in March 2004. The
United States adopted legislation to comply, but the EC sought another compliance review panel regarding transition provisions contained in the legislation. An
AB panel found those provisions violative, and the United States faced reimposition of sanctions until it took action. See infra Section 2.3.6 for a more complete discussion of FSC.
In Canada-Aircraft, the DSB authorized Brazil to suspend concessions in
March 2003. Id. at 194-95. In U.S. - Byrd Amendment, eight member states (Brazil,
Chile, the EC, India, Japan, Korea, Canada, and Mexico) requested the DSB to authorize concessions in January 2004 because the United States had failed to with-
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InoperativeRules (Non-Consensus)

The second category of "wrong cases" was identified as disputes over GATT rules that had become "inoperative." Several
GATT rules -notably the discipline on regional economic integration arrangements (art. XXIV) and the escape clause (art. XIX)59reached this status by the end of the 1960's.60 Hudec noted that
there was "tacit acceptance" by the GATT Contracting Parties of
widespread violations of these rules, but that not all states approved of this acquiescence. 61 The concern was that if the panel
process was toughened to compel compliance, there would be an
"avalanche of . . .complaints" by states troubled that others ig62
nored the rules.
The rules at issue in the 1970s were inoperative because most
states no longer would or could apply them. Thus this category of
draw the measure. In August 2004, the arbitration appointed to review the issue
reported to the DSB. The DSB authorized the suspension of concessions in November 2004. In February 2006, the United States argued to the DSB that it had
enacted legislation to repeal the measure. Most of the complainants, however,
disagreed with the argument that this action brought the United States into compliance. Dispute Update, supra note 3, at 197.
In U.S.-Antidumping Act, the United States announced its intention to comply
in 2000, but took another three years to repeal the legislation. Dispute Update,
supra note 3, at 211-13.
58 In the other two disputes where retaliation was authorized, the prevailing
party did act on that authorization. In FSC, the DSB authorized the EC to suspend
concessions in May 2003 after the United States had attempted unsuccessfully to
solve its problem by passing new legislation, which was found GATT-violative.
The EC used that authorization in March 2004 and kept the sanctions in place until the United States adopted new legislation that allegedly eliminated the violation. See infra Section 2.3.7. In U.S. - Byrd Amendment, eight member states (Brazil, Canada, Chile, the EC, India, Japan, Korea, and Mexico) requested that the
DSB authorize the suspension of concessions in January 2004. The DSB gave that
authorization in December 2004, and the EC and Canada began using that authorization in April 2005. Dispute Update, supra note 3, at 197. The United States
passed legislation in February 2006 to repeal the legislation but left in place a transition period until October 2007. The EC expressed dissatisfaction with the transition period, claiming that it would affect imports for a number of years. The EC
sanctions thus remain in place. Press Release, European Commission, EU Welcomes Repeal of Byrd Amendment and Regrets Transition Period (Feb. 2, 2006).
59 GATT, supra note 1, arts. XXIV, XIX.
Article XXIV sets out the
GATT/WTO discipline on regional arrangements. Article XIX, the "Escape
Clause," sets out the discipline on emergency action for imports of particular
products.
60 Unfinished Business, supra note 20, at 160-62.
61

Id. at 160.

62

Id.
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"impossible cases" should be characterized as one in which there is
no overall consensus by states on certain norms (i.e., a nonconsensus case). Any adjudicative dispute settlement system
would allow such cases to be heard and decided and thus inevitably produce results that the losing state, and perhaps other states,
would not regard as legitimate. The GATT/WTO has always had
problems of this type because of its tradition of drafting openended and often ambiguous rules.63 Davey believed that this second category - non-consensus about the rules - was inevitable and
would sorely test but not destroy the system. 64 Abbott opined that
the negotiation of new agreements in the Uruguay Round might
lessen the problem of panels applying rules that no longer commanded support. 65 In other words, there was hope that the Uruguay Round negotiations would be used to clarify existing rules
and craft new ones which were clearer. Even with that hope, however, Abbott argued that the new system, complete with appellate
review, could still produce cases where the respondent and other

63 See Arup, supra note 19, at 910 ("The WTO agreements may expose the system to difficulty because they lack the precision and compulsion for the tribunals
to be able to say they are 'only applying the rules."'); Robert E. Hudec, The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement, in IN WHOSE INTEREST? DUE PROCESS AND
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 23 (Michael M. Hart & Debra P. Stegar
eds., 1992) (asserting that GATT law was "full of gaps, omissions, inconsistencies
and outmoded provisions."); see also Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in
Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L. L. 478, 489 (2000), stating that:

[tirade policy increasingly implicates the clash, or potential clash, of liberal commercial values with regulatory or other nontrade aims. Negotiators often find it more expedient to gloss over these nettlesome issues
than to take the time to resolve them explicitly in WTO codes, particularly where the resolution could provoke political resistance at home.
See generally Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 333, 336-37 (1999) (discussing the complex determination of the application of law in WTO dispute resolution).
64 Davey, supra note 21, at 74-76. Prior to the Uruguay Round Davey found
that procedural aspects of the GATT system -the possibility of a political solution
by the disputing parties through the seeking of a waiver and the required adoption of panel reports by the GATT Council -could mitigate the effects of such
cases. Id. at 75.
65 Abbott, supra note 22, at 125, stating:
In particular, the agreements being negotiated would revise-if not replace-a broad range of existing rules in sensitive areas, while adding
newly negotiated rules in areas like services and intellectual property.
The problem of panels applying rules that no longer command support
in the community, then, should be greatly reduced.
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countries would see the rule applied to its dispute as "obsolete or
66
counterproductive."
The DSU has seen non-consensus cases. Some of these have
been predicted by Hudec, involving rules that have long been 67 regarded as problematic. But there have also been non-consensus
cases arising under the new WTO agreements, such as the GATS,

Id. at 142.
There have been controversial decisions by the Appellate Body involving
both article XXIV and article XIX. The cases are somewhat different, however,
from what the Contracting Parties envisioned in 1980. During the Uruguay
Round, these particular inoperative GATT rules were made operative for the
WTO system. See The Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1161 (1994) (adopted by the Contracting Parties with regard to Article XXIV. The Understanding settled several
outstanding issues about the formation of free trade areas and customs unions. In
addition, the Understanding made it clear that WTO States would have the right
to pursue Article XXIV disputes in the dispute settlement system. Id. at 1163. In
Turkey -Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/AB/R
(Oct. 21, 1999), the Appellate Body rendered the first decision about whether a
Member State's actions regarding a regional arrangement could be justified by invoking Article XXIV as a defense.
With regard to Article XIX, the Contracting Parties negotiated an additional
agreement. See Safeguards Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments -Results
of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1161 (1994). There has been substantial
litigation involving the Safeguards Agreement. Most of the cases have involved
the use of such measures by the United States. See U.S. -Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2003)
[hereinafter U.S. - Steel]; U.S. - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular
Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe From Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R (Feb. 15, 2002);
U.S. - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb from New Zealand, WT/DS177/AB/R (May 1, 2001) and U.S. - Safeguard Measure on Imports of
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb from Australia, WT/DS178/AB/R (May 1, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. - Lamb]; U.S. - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten
from the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000). None of the
safeguards actions challenged before the WTO have been upheld. One of the major reasons for this has been the Appellate Body determination that actions taken
under several different Member State statutes are flawed because of the failure of
decision-makers to consider a factor required in Article XIX of GATT - the failure
to make a finding that the surge of imports leading to a safeguards measure was a
result of "unforeseen developments." See U.S. -Steel, supra 278; ArgentinaSafeguard Measure on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R
88-89 (Dec. 14,
1999); Korea- Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Dairy Products,
WT/DS98/AB/R
90 (Dec. 14, 1999). The "unforeseen developments" requirement was one of several elements of Article XIX that many GATT Contracting
Parties had ignored in the period before the negotiation of the Safeguards Agreement.
66

67
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TRIPs, SPS and SCM Agreements, 68 that have more concrete or
tightened types of problematic obligations. Given the GATT/WTO
tradition of negotiating and adopting open ended obligations, such
69
cases will likely continue to happen in the DSU system.
1.1.3.

"Overtaxing the Procedure" Cases

The third category of "wrong cases" includes those that would
"overtax the panel procedure" 70 - cases that would prove for various reasons to be beyond the "decision-making capacity" of the
GATT panel procedure. 71 Hudec conceded that this type of case
could only be determined subjectively and that would require "invoking standards that are difficult to define." 72 Hudec's example
was the Domestic International Sales Corporation ("DISC") case 73
68 Several major agreements with new and different types of rights and obligations were adopted in the Uruguay Round. See General Agreement on Trade in
Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,Legal Instruments- Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 (1994) [hereinafter SCM
Agreement]; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments -Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867
U.N.T.S. 493 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. Of these four agreements, only
the SCM Agreement had a precursor, the Subsidies Code, adopted as part of the
Tokyo Round negotiations. See Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1
CFI. J. INT'L L. 401, 404-05 (2001) (describing two of the new Uruguay Round
Agreements: TRIPs as "noteworthy for the degree of its positive, regulatory focus" and SPS as going well beyond the concept of non-discrimination); see also
Claire R. Kelly, Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The IWTO as an InternationalActor and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 79, 107
(2006) (noting that with regard to TRIPs and the SPS Agreement, the "WTO has
reached beyond the norm of non-discrimination to achieve some level of proactive
harmonization").
69 One illustration is the Hormones case. The panel and Appellate Body in
that case were asked to interpret the new SPS Agreement. See infra Section 2.3.2
for an extended discussion of the Hormones decision.
70 Hudec, supra note 20, at 163.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 163. The Tokyo Round negotiators argued, however, that they had
experienced or could identify such cases. Id. at 165-65.
73 Id. Report of the Panel, United States - Tax Legislation (DISC), L/4422 (Nov.
2, 1976), GATT B.I.S.D. (23rd Supp.) (1977).
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which went on for four years in the GATT before it was settled by
the involved parties. 74 Many countries viewed the DISC case as illustrative of the proposition that "'wrong' complaints can lead to
'wrong' decisions that lower respect for GATT law." 75
If the DISC case is illustrative, then third category cases involve
an attack on a major regulatory policy that would require the losing country to either alter the policy or replace it. Such an effort
would require a large shift in ideology or resources by the losing
country. Another characteristic of overtaxing cases is that they require a great deal of expertise and data on the offending measure(s) and their consequences for the panel to resolve. 76 Hudec
contended that in such cases an arbitral panel would be hard
pressed to sort through and establish the facts while creating what
the governments would find to be acceptable interpretations of the
relevant GATT obligations. If presented with such cases panelists
might go beyond their proper limits. 77
Cases that look like third category cases have also been created
by the WTO's more adjudicative dispute settlement. In fact a
variation on the DISC case, the Foreign Sales Corporations ("FSC")
case, 78 resurfaced in the WTO. The FSC case recreated the controversy between the original participating states in the earlier dispute. 79 The United States resisted true resolution,80 even after sanc-

74 Hudec, supra note 20, at 163. The DISC case involved a challenge to the
United States tax system used for foreign income earned by U.S. corporations and
a corresponding counterclaim by the United States against the tax systems of three
EC member countries.

75
76

Id. at 166.
Id.

77 Id. at 164. Hudec's solution for such cases at the time was for GATT panelists to take a particular type of activist role as creative interpreters of GATT rules.

Id.
FSC, supra note 57.
The EC pursued the United States arguing that the United States' creation
and maintenance of Foreign Sales Corporations provided illegal export subsidies.
See infra Section 2.3.6 for an extended discussion of the FSC case.
80 The United States lost before a panel and the Appellate Body. In response
the United States quickly adopted legislation, the Extra-Territorial Income Act
("ETI"), that it claimed satisfied its obligations to comply. The EC argued that, in
fact, the legislation simply recreated the problem. Upon review the original panel
also found the ETI to be non-compliant because the United States also included
transition provisions that would have allowed a holdover of the old system. The
United States then struggled over how to implement its obligations until October
13, 2004, when the House and Senate passed a corporate tax bill. Edmund L. Andrews, Tax Measure, and Its Breaks, Passes Senate, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2004, at C1.
78

79
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tions had been authorized, in part because Congress was of the
opinion that any resolution was going to require a complete rethinking of how to tax all foreign earned income. 81 Ultimately the
United States opted to remove the entire system. However, even in
adopting this solution the United States was unable to (or believed
it could not afford to) avoid GATT violations. 82 Other WTO disputes (Hormones, Shrimp/Turtle, Film, and GMOs) have posed similar factual 83 and legal quagmires for WTO panels and the Appellate
Body.
Two points are worth noting. First, the WTO/DSU has produced cases that fit into more than one of Hudec's three categories
of "wrong cases." His hypothesis that such cases would be created, and perhaps more frequently, by a more adjudicative dispute
settlement system is correct. Second, the categories of cases are not
self-contained. The WTO cases that look like "impossible cases"
straddle several of the categories. It is this very characteristic that
makes them "impossible."
1.2. Why Are There Impossible Cases?
Impossible cases occur whenever the limits that exist in any international dispute settlement system -the willing participation of
states, the substance of the rules and obligations, and the design

See infra pp. 131-42 for an extended discussion of the protracted path the United
States took towards implementation in the FSC case.
81 One prospect for resolving the dispute would have been to drop the entire
concept of foreign sales corporations and do a major revision of the tax code.
82 The United States' different and arguably much simpler solution was to
eliminate Foreign Sales Corporations and instead offer corporations that manufacture in the United States a ten percent tax deduction. The EC argued successfully
in an art. 21.5 compliance case and appeal that even this legislation was not fully
GATr-compliant because the United States also included transition provisions
that would have allowed a holdover of the old system. See infra Section 2.3.8.
83 See Hormones, supra note 54; Appellate Body Report, United States -Import
Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998)
(adopted by the DSB, Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle]; Panel Report,
E.C. - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
WT/DS291/23 (Aug. 8, 2003) [hereinafter GMOs] (Request for Establishment of a
Panel by United States fact patterns that create similar difficulties). Like the Hormones case, one of the time-consuming aspects of the GMOs case has been taking
expert testimony regarding EC measures taken to ban genetically modified organisms from being imported, processed or used in the EC. The panel postponed issuing its decision several times, citing the deluge of scientific materials presented
to it by the parties. See infra Sections 2.3.2.4, 2.3.5.2, and 2.8.3.3, for a discussion of
each case.
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and operation of the dispute settlement system itself -are put under severe stress. If more than one of these limits is pushed too far
in a particular case, then it is even more likely to become "impossible."
The first category -non-compliance cases -illustrates the importance of the willing participation of States. States choose which
disputes to bring-to the DSU and how to conduct those disputes.
The DSU obligates Member States to use good faith in deciding
whether to bring a case 84 and how to pursue one.85 Willing participation becomes even more crucial once the losing state has to implement the decision rendered by the dispute settlement body.
The WTO/DSU, and any other international dispute settlement
system, cannot operate successfully if states bring poorly formed or
argued cases or have insufficient political will to internalize its decisions.
The second category - non-consensus cases -highlights the
importance of the content of the rules. If an international organization seeks rule adherence it must create and then interpret the rules
so that they are perceived as legitimate. The operation of the dispute settlement system itself cannot fix or improve the rules. In
fact, the DSU expressly disclaims any power to "add to or diminish
86
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."
The panels/Appellate Body must determine what rules mean even
when they are ambiguous, vague or contain gaps. Only the WTO
membership, however, has the power to determine definitively
what a rule means. 87 The WTO Member States have a decisionmaking and a rule negotiation process to resolve ongoing disagreements about the nature of WTO obligations. 88 One reason
84 DSU art. 3.3. Member States are counseled to exercise their judgment
about whether an action under its procedures would be fruitful before bringing a
case.
85 DSU art. 3.10. Using the procedure is not contentious, procedures are to be
used in good faith and complaints should not be linked to non-related complaints.
86 DSU art. 3.2.
87 The Member States have the authority to determine what a GATT/WTO
rule means. According to the DSU its provisions are "without prejudice to the
rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered
agreement through decision-making under the WTO Agreement or a covered
agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement." DSU art. 3.9.
88 The GATT/WTO has a long established system for negotiating and, if necessary, revising the rules-the system of negotiating rounds. The WTO is currently in the midst of the ninth set of such rounds and many aspects of existing
GATT rules are subject to negotiation. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial
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why some of the impossible cases have occurred, and others will
occur, is that to date the Member States have been unwilling or unable to use the political power of the WTO system to interpret or
alter rules that no longer compel consensus.
The third category - overtaxing cases - will always come to any
dispute settlement system. Even if a system's procedures are well
designed and generally workable -not an assumption that can be
completely applied to the DSU 89 - they may not always provide an
acceptable answer for the problem posed in a dispute. For example, the DSU procedures have gaps, such as the sequencing problem 90 and the lack of a post-retaliation procedure, 91 that have been
revealed during litigation. 92 Another procedural limit is the DSU's
Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002)
[hereinafter Doha Declaration]. The Doha Declaration indicated that there would
be negotiations on new regulations on the supply of services, on agriculture,
trade-related intellectual property rights, subsidies and countervailing measures
and dispute settlement. One of the widely shared concerns is that the rule negotiation powers of the WTO are not as strong as those of the DSU. See Claus-Dieter
Elhermann & Lothar Ehring, The Authoritative Interpretation Under Article IX: 2 of
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization: Current Law, Practice and
PossibleImprovements, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L 803, 812-14 (2005) (discussing the potential
power of asserting authoritative interpretation); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Inconsistency Between Diagnosis and Treatment, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 291, 295-96 (2005) (discussing the concept of consensus).
The WTO can adopt new or revised rules only when it reaches consensus on
such rules. In the past, reaching consensus has taken quite a long time. The Uruguay Round negotiations went on from 1986 to 1994. The Doha Round began in
2001 and has now been suspended by the WTO's General Council due to irreconcilable differences among Member States over crucial issues -the reduction of agricultural subsidies and tariffs and industrial tariffs. Press Release, World Trade
Organization General Council, General Council Supports Suspension of Trade
Talks, Task Force Submits "Aid for Trade" Recommendations (July 27-28, 2006),
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/newsO6_e/gc_27julyO6_e.htm (last visited
Mar. 28 2007)
89 See Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Implementation Procedures: A System in Need of Reform, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
709, 712 (2000) (describing the systemic flaws of the DSU).
90 See Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Prevention and Settlement of InternationalTrade
Disputes Between the European Union and the United States, 8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
233, 247 (2000) (explaining that the sequencing problem reveals a design flaw the
parties did not have time to clarify when they adopted the DSU).
91 Another gap is a procedure that must be followed after the DSB has authorized a suspension of concessions; after its use, there has been disagreement
over later compliance. See infra Section 2.3.2 (discussing this issue in the Hormones
dispute).
92 Once highly contentious cases began to be litigated under the new DSU, it
became clear that one such procedural gap was the "sequencing problem." One
of the major changes from the GATT panel system to the DSU was the adoption of
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lack of certain powers and rules regarding fact-finding. 93 As a result, the disputing parties can and do spend a large amount of time
arguing about what actually happened in a case. With regard to its
delivery of remedies, the DSB also lacks the power to specify how
the losing party must implement the general recommendations a
panel or the Appellate Body makes. 94 Consequently a WTO dispute can end in a number of ways- with very different implementation results.
2. THE DSU AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE CASES: WHICH ONES ARE, WHY
THEY ARE, AND WHAT HAS HAPPENED

2.1. The WATO's Impossible Cases
The WTO/DSU system created impossible cases from the beginning - cases that fall into one or more of the three categories.
The cases that most clearly fit are: Hormones,95 Bananas 11196 Helmsan extensive system of surveillance of Member State implementation activities.
The two major DSU provisions dealing with this are articles 21 and 22. Article 21
contemplates that a losing party could attempt but fail to comply. According to
art. 21.5, if the parties to a dispute end up in a "disagreement as to the existence or
consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings" there can be review (whenever possible by the original panel) of the contested implementing measure. DSU art. 21.5. At the same
time, article 22 states that if a losing party fails to comply within a reasonable period of time, the winning party is entitled to invoke the process for seeking DSB
authorization for a suspension of concessions. Id. art. 22.2. Neither art. 21.5 nor
art. 22.2 make reference to each other. Consequently, the proper order or sequence that disputing parties should follow is unclear.
The resulting gap in the DSU led to a political dispute and negotiations during the BananasIII case, supra note 56. See infra Section 2.3.1 for a complete discussion of the Bananas III dispute including the political resolution (subject to later
reform during dispute settlement negotiations) of the sequencing dispute.
93 For example, DSU lacks rules of evidence. While the DSU does allow the
panels to request expert testimony, DSU art. 13.2, the DSU does not specify how
the panels should weigh the expert information they receive.
94 According to Article 19 of the DSU, when a panel or the Appellate Body
concludes that a measure is inconsistent with GATT/WTO obligations, "it shall
recommend" that the losing party "bring the measure into compliance with that
agreement." DSU art. 19.1. Article 19 does state that, in addition to its recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body "may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations." Id. Nevertheless, most
panel and Appellate Body reports do not suggest methods for compliance. There
have been such suggestions made, but only when the parties requested that the
Appellate Body take such a step.
95 Hormones/AB Rep, supra note 54.
96 Bananas III, supra note 56.
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Burton,97 Shrimp/Turtle,98 Film,99 Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC),100
Section 301,101 and Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs).102 Given

the busy caseload of the DSB, there will be disagreement about
whether these cases or perhaps others qualify as "impossible
cases." 10 3 However, there are strong reasons for nominating each
case. Each case created complications during the litigation itself, in
the following implementation period, or in both.104
What follows, therefore, is one interpretation of how to: 1) analyze the impossible cases of the DSU and 2) explain their consequences for the dispute settlement system and the WTO. The article will identify the characteristics or indicators of an impossible
case. Each case will then be analyzed for how it developed into a
case, how it was decided, and how it was or was not resolved. The
conclusion of the article will attempt to analyze how the WTO has,
to date, handled the legal failures that developed and what this
means for the DSU System.
2.2. Why Are These Cases "Impossible Cases"?
Isolating the factors that trigger a highly contentious case and
those that keep it from resolution is the best way to identify the
impossible cases. All of the major factors relate directly to what
97
Request for Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities,
United States - The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/2 (Oct.
3, 1996) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Panel Request] (summarizing the legal dispute
between the European Communities and the United States concerning Article 4 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes); see also Note by the Secretariat, United States - The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/6 (Apr. 24, 1998) [hereinafter Helms-Burton].
98 Shrimp/Furtle,supra note 83.
99 Panel Report, Japan -Measures Affecting Consumer PhotographicFilm and Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) (adopted Apr. 22, 1998) [hereinafter Film].

100 FSC, supra note 57.

101 Panel Report, United States -Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301].
102 Note by the Secretariat, European Communities- Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/24, WT/DS292/18,
WT/DS293/18 (Mar. 5, 2004) [hereinafter GMOs Panel].
103 William Davey characterizes most of the cases selected here as "controversial cases involving systemic issues or specific fact situations that were carried
over from the GAT-1 system." William J. Davey, The WATO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 18 (2005).
104 The recently decided GMOs case is illustrative of the sorts of considerations made in the resolution of such cases. See generally GMOs Panel, supra note
102.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss2/2

2007]

IMPOSSIBLE CASES IN THE WTO

sparks increased chances for non-compliance, produces stronger
disagreement over the legal norms, or creates greater stress on the
DSU procedures.
2.2.1. Increased Chancesfor Non-Compliance
Since 1995, the WTO DSU system has received over 340 complaints. 105 A significant percentage of these complaints ends by being settled- without recourse to the panel process. 10 6 The rest have
gone on to the panel and usually to the appellate stage. Almost all
of these cases have been resolved when the losing party complied
with the panel or Appellate Body recommendations. However,
there is a short but notable list of cases, 10 7 Hormones, Bananas III,
and FSC among them, which have turned into instances of sustained and/or complex non-implementation. Rather than comply
by removing its ban after the loss in the Hormones case, the European Communities (EC) unilaterally took action to instigate an investigation it believed would resolve the case. The EC was willing
to incur both long-term sanctions and additional litigation to reach
its preferred result. 108 In Bananas III, the parties resolved the case
105 Dispute Update, supra note 3, at iii. As noted earlier, the actual number of
disputes is 249. See supra note 26. In those cases, there have been fifty-one mutually agreed solutions and twenty-nine other settled or inactive disputes (situations
in which the contested measure was terminated or the panel request was withdrawn).
106 Id.

107 The United States had two other disputes, Anti-DumpingAct of 1916, supra
note 57, and U.S. - Byrd Amendment, supra note 57, in which the reasonable time
for compliance ran for substantial time periods. Both cases showed signs of also
producing "ordinary non-compliance." With regard to the Anti-Dumping Act of
1916 case, the Appellate Body ruled in May 2000 and the United States kept promising to repeal the Act. After years of such promises (from the July 2001 end of the
"reasonable period of time" until September 2003), the EC requested arbitration
about the suspension of sanctions. The EC received authorization in February
2004 but has not yet acted upon that authorization. The United States has now
repealed the legislation.
In the Byrd Amendment case, the Appellate Body ruled against the United
States in January 2003. The reasonable period of time was determined by arbitration and extended by negotiations with some of the complaining parties until December 27, 2004. Other complaining parties requested arbitration of the suspension of concessions and the arbitrator's decision was issued in August 2004. See
Dispute Update, supra note 3, at 197. The complaining parties have not yet suspended concessions. The United States, as of now, has shown no signs that it will
repeal the legislation.
108 See infra Section 2.3.2.3 (discussing EC implementation with regard to the
Hormones case).
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after the imposition of sanctions only after an EC attempt to stall
and delay (implementing a non-compliant solution). Even then,
the case was resolved and sanctions lifted only after a WTO political solution (a waiver). 09 The FSC case also involved a stall and
delay game -the U.S. implemented what it knew to be a flawed fix
to the violative statute and then fully litigated that case and faced
sanctions before adopting a fix that still had problems with it.110
Why did these cases not resolve-in accordance with the WTO's
preference for withdrawal or replacement of the offending measure- within a reasonable period of time?
Upon examining these cases (and the other impossible cases),
patterns emerge. There are repeat players and repeat problems.
When these are present, the losing party has, or claims to have,
greater difficulty in complying. Powerful states"' are the only
ones well positioned to resist the pressure to implement a DSB decision in favor of another Member State pushing hard for compliance. The only states to have resisted compliance in this scenario
have been the European Communities and the United States.
These states have resisted and sustained that resistance because
they value the benefits of avoidance and can afford the costs of
109 See infra Section 2.3.1.3 (discussing the implementation phase of the Ba-

nanas III case).
110 In the Hormones case, supra note 54, sanctions have been ongoing since
1999. In the Bananas III case, supra note 56, sanctions continued from 1999-2002.
In the FSC case, supra note 57, sanctions went only from March 2004 until October
2004. Dispute Update, supra note 3, at 165; Paul Meller, European Trade Chief Says
Sanctions on U.S. Will End, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 2004, at C2. The EC accepted the
United States legislation that repealed the FSC system (but still allowed United
States companies a transition period from 2005 until 2007). The EC, however,
sought a compliance review regarding whether the new United States legislation
with this transition period satisfies WTO obligations. Id.
The time frame of the request for suspension of concessions and the United
States' response does not begin to illustrate how long the United States actually
avoided compliance. The FSC legislation was found violative of the SCM Agreement in February 2000. The Appellate Body also found the United States' attempt
to amend the legislation to be violative in January 2002. The EC was authorized
to suspend concessions in May 2003 but postponed taking action until 2004.
There was also a second compliance review process (panel and appeal) over the
second attempt by the United States to comply. The last decision issued left the
United States with no real option other than abandoning the flawed portions of
the new statute. See infra Section 2.3.8 (discussing the second 21.5 review and how
the United States ultimately responded).
111 In Hormones and Bananas III, the resisting state was the European Communities. In FSC, the resisting state was the United States. These two states are
the richest and most powerful in the WTO. The two are also the heaviest users of
the DSU system. See Leitner & Lester, supra note 11, at 222.
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non-compliance.1 2 This does not mean that an impossible case
could not exist without one or more of the powerful states. Some
of the impossible cases," 3 Shrimp/Turtle and Bananas III, focused on
government practices that largely restricted market access for other
countries. But even in those two cases, one of the powerful states
was a party to the dispute. This factor, therefore, increases the
chance that a case involving other factors will develop into an impossible case.
Both of these large economies are also democracies with a great
amount of input from citizens and industry regarding which WTO
cases should be pursued and how they should be litigated and resolved." 4 The citizen/industry input to bring, and later to force a
case to sanctions is increased greatly when a high volume of trade
is impacted or market access is severely or completely cut offu 5 by
the government measure being challenged. Similarly, the resistance to resolving a case even when sanctions are imposed is increased when a major regulatory or policy shift 1 6 will be required

112 The United States and the EC have learned to plan around the time frames
of DSU operation and when any final action must be taken. When contemplating
resistance, a losing state knows that it will receive a reasonable period of time to
comply or to litigate over whether its fix equals compliance as well as some unspecified additional time before the winning party will force the issue of suspending concessions. Even when the winning party requests such authority from the
DSB, the resisting state can force an arbitration over the amount of concessions
that should be suspended which will also lengthen the time period before compliance is expected. Applying some or all of these delaying tactics allows the resisting state time to balance the costs of compliance. See Monika Biitler & Heinz
Hauser, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment From an Economic
Perspective, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 503, 506 (2000) ("Time is an important determinant of both parties' payoffs, because rents and costs accrue during the whole litigation process.").
113 Illustrations are Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 83, (which primarily involved
the loss of access to the United States market by South East Asian countries (Malaysia, Thailand, India)) and Bananas III (which involved the ACP countries and
Latin American countries that grew the bananas).
114 See Andrew Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S205 (2002) (analyzing the factors causing disputes at the WTO to move
from negotiation to the panel stage).
115 See infra Sections 2.3.1.3, 2.3.2.3 (discussing trade in volumes and loss of
market access in Bananas III and Hormones).
116 See infra Section 2.3.6 (discussing the major policy shift required for the
United States to comply in the FSC case); infra Section 2.3.1 (discussing the major
policy shift in Bananas III); infra Section 2.3.2 (discussing Hormones). In the Hormones case, it is clear that the EC is resisting and may continue to resist any policy
change that would open the market to hormone-fed beef. See Amelia Porges, Set-
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to comply. Given the DSU preference for withdrawal of the violative measure, the losing party faces problems when a complex fix
is required. Withdrawal of the measure, given public support,
may be regarded as impossible. As a result, the party may search
for a way to replace the measure or to "fix" the problem on its own
time schedule.11 7 The resisting state also heavily weighs such domestic political realities against the cost of DSU-authorized sanctions. In all of the cases that have sustained resistance in the WTO,
11
there have been politically empowered stakeholders s corporations, 119 citizenry, 120 or other countries1 21 - pushing to
bring 22 the case or resisting its resolution. As a result, the losing
party is unwilling to disoblige these stakeholders, or at least un123
willing to do so until it must.
tling WTO Disputes: What Do Litigation Models Tell Us?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 141, 176 (2003).
117 See infra Sections 2.3.2, 2.3.6.3 (giving illustrations regarding the Hormones
and FSC disputes).
118 See Porges, supra note 116, at 154-55 ("Stakeholder complaints may be of
any size, and many are surprisingly small. The only requirement is that they are
important enough to someone who is important enough.").
119 Politically empowered corporate stakeholders appear in more than half of
the impossible cases analyzed in this article -Bananas III, Hormones, Film, FSC, and
GMOs. In each instance, there was either strong corporate pressure on the complaining party to bring the case, strong pressure on the losing party to resist compliance, or both.
120 Throughout the Hormones case, the EC has contended that its citizens
would not allow it to comply. See infra Section 2.3.2 (offering a more complete
discussion). There has been similar discussion regarding citizen disapproval of
genetically modified foods in the GMOs case. See infra Section 2.3.8. There was a
similarly engaged and activist citizen response to the Shrimp/Turtle case. The
United States, however, was spared having to resist the Appellate Body recommendation because it was relatively easy to satisfy the objections raised by the
Appellate Body. See infra Section 2.3.5.
121 In the BananasIII case, the EC took the position that early resolution of the
case was going to be too difficult for the ACP countries that benefited from the EC
banana regime. See infra Section 2.3.1. Similarly, the United States took the lead
in pressing the case on behalf of the Latin American countries and in pursuing the
ultimate request for suspension of concessions because it was powerful enough
for its sanctions to have effects on the EC. By contrast, Ecuador, although also authorized to sanction the EC, never felt that it was in an economic position to pursue sanctions. See infra Section 2.3.1.3 (discussing the influence stakeholders have
to press trade ministries to bring WTO cases).
122 See Tarullo, supra note 63, at 488.
123 See Tarullo, supra note 63, at 488 (noting that it is in both the government's
and government officials' interest to be responsive). Tarullo states that "[t]his pattern is reinforced in the United States and, to varying degrees, in other countries
by the responsiveness of legislators to the concerns of specific constituents." Id.
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Among the repeat problems leading to delayed compliance is
the fact that the resisting state regards certain disputes as having
great symbolic 124 importance in the culture of the country. The
reason why the government has adopted the measure is of great
importance. In the case of the EC, such views about the "collective
preferences" of the public have been identified. 125 Several of these
preferences -multilateralism, food safety, precaution regarding
biotechnology- are directly implicated in several of the impossible
cases. 126 At least two of the U.S. collective preferences, based on
these cases, would appear to be national security and autonomy.
Yet another problem is that the losing state has been committed
to its position on the disputed issue for a long time. Most of the
impossible cases arrived in the DSU system with a weighted prior
history. 127 In each instance there was either prior GATT litigation
on the same or an analogous issue (Bananas 111,128 Shrimp/Turtle,
FSC129) or a long-standing disagreement between the contending

124 See Porges, supra note 116, at 154-155. Porges divided WTO cases into two
categories, stakeholder cases and policy cases. The policy cases are those which
have symbolic stakes.
125 According to the former EC Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy, the
name for such issues of symbolic importance is "collective preferences." Pascal
Lamy, European Commissioner for Trade, The Emergence of Collective Preferences in International Trade: Implications for Regulating Globalisation, Address
at the European Commission Conference: Collective Preferences and Global Govemance: What Future for the Multilateral Trading System? 1 (Sept. 15, 2004) available at http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_19992004/lamy/speeches
_articles/ spla242_en.htm.
126 According to Lamy, it is possible to be "definite about certain of Europe's
collective preferences: multilateralism, environmental protection, food safety, cultural diversity, public provision of education and healthcare, precautions in the
field of biotechnology, and welfare rights." Id. at 3. The Hormones and GMOs
cases involve food safety and biotechnology. The Section 301 case involves an attack on unilateralism- the converse of the valued multilateralism.
127 Prior history appears to play a large role in why certain cases were
brought to the WTO, how difficult they are to resolve once there, and how "impossible" it can be for the losing party to comply. See infra Sections 2.3.1 (Bananas
111),
2.3.2 (Hormones), 2.3.4 (Film), 2.3.5 (Shrimp/Turtle), 2.3.6 (FSC), and 2.3.7 (Section 301) (discussing the prior history of each case and how it influenced each one
at every stage).
128 See infra Section 2.3.1.2 (discussing the Bananas I and Bananas II cases filed
in the GATT dispute settlement system).
129 See infra Section 2.3.6.3 (discussing the DISC case and how its resolution
laid the framework for the FSC legislation and the ultimate EC attack on that legislation).
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states that led to a new agreement being negotiated during the
30
Uruguay Round (Hormones).1
A final factor leading to greatly increased chances for noncompliance is the strategic aspect of WTO dispute settlement. At
the very beginning of the operation of the DSU, there was pent-up
demand for dispute settlement. In the period right before and during the Uruguay Round negotiations, the GATT Contracting Par31
ties had seen a significantly higher failure rate in GATT disputes.
The United States had intensified its use of Section 301 (the statute
designed for attacking foreign trade barriers), 132 and pursued many
of the cases without going to GATT dispute settlement because it
argued that the GATT system itself was a failure. 133 The United
States became the country of "aggressive unilateralism." This in
turn led to support for the adoption of the DSU and, later still, to a
belief that the United States was still a problem when unilateralism
did not disappear with the adoption of the DSU. The HelmsBurton, Shrimp/Turtle and Section 301 cases were pursued to constrain the different types of unilateralism perceived in each. 34
2.2.2. Non-Consensus Regarding the Rules
Almost all of the impossible cases qualify as ones in which
there was little or no consensus on the state of the law. It stands to
reason that the parties to a dispute would disagree over the contours of the relevant legal obligations. In impossible cases, however, there is an additional complicating factor regarding the
meaning of the rules. In Hormones, the panel and Appellate Body
were required to interpret an agreement that was not only new, 135
but also contained a new type of obligation -positive obligations

130 See infra Section 2.3.2.3 (discussing the long-standing disagreement between the EC and the United States over the safety of meat products that came
from cattle fed with hormone-enriched feed).
131 See Taylor, supra note 34, at 226-27.
132 See infra section 2.3.7, 2.3.5 (discussing the Section 301 statute and how it
was used both before and after the adoption of the DSU).
133 See Taylor, supra note 34, at 222, 227-28.

134 See Tarullo, supra note 63, at 488 n.41 (explaining that the EC, rather than
the Member States, pushed the Helms-Burton and FSC cases to counter unilateralism in trade policy and a series of strong cases filed by the United States); see also
infra Sections 2.3.3, 2.3.5, and 2.3.7 (discussing the unilateralism in each case).
135 The United States' major objection to the EC ban on hormone-fed beef was
that it violated Articles 2 and 5 of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement. SPS
Agreement arts. 2 and 5.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss2/2

20071

IMPOSSIBLE CASES IN THE WTO

339

that hold communities to standards. 36 The GMOs case poses the
same problem in only a slightly different context.137 In Section 301,
the meaning of a new obligation in the DSU (the meaning of Article 23) itself and disputants' obligations under it was up for interpretation. The Helms-Burton dispute actually went unlitigated in
138
part because it was over a major uninterpreted GATT exception
139
that none of the potential parties were eager to see interpreted.
The FSC case involved not just the core issue of whether the U.S.
tax measure constituted an export subsidy, 140 but also whether the
political compromise from the prior GATT litigation over similar
legislation would be honored. 141 In Film the parties contended over
the meaning of an underutilized and controversial form of
GATT/WT jurisdiction-the non-violation nullification and impairment claim.142 In Shrimp/Turtle the disputing parties faced the
first major WTO case involving the linkage between trade and the

136 The major GATT obligations focus on trade liberalization and nondiscrimination. GATT art. XI (tariff bindings and the prohibition of quantitative
restrictions); GATT art. I, art. 3 (the Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligation and
the National Treatment obligation). By contrast the SPS obligations-to base
standards measures in the sanitary and phytosanitary field upon scientific evidence and to establish such standards though a risk assessment process-go beyond non-discrimination. See SPS Agreement arts. 2 and 5; Robert E. Hudec, Science and "Post-Discriminatory"IWTO Law, 26 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 185, 188
(2003) (describing SPS rules as "calling for an international tribunal to secondguess the rationality of a regulatory judgment at a national level"). The SPS rules
interpose an outside standard - scientific evidence - upon which to judge whether
standards measures are acceptable. See Jeffery Atik & David A. Wirth, Science and
International Trade- Third GenerationScholarship, 26 B. C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 171,
173 (2003) (noting that the Uruguay Round negotiators "seized on science to
clearly divide the legitimate from the protectionist. Measures protective of public
health, or worker safety, or the environment, are to be considered legitimate (and
insulated from a trade-based attack) if they have a scientific basis.").
137 One of the major issues in the GMOs dispute is whether a WTO Member
State can violate the SPS Agreement by not taking action to approve products
once it has set up an approvals process. See infra notes 160-61 (giving a complete
discussion of the EC ban on GM food products).
138 At stake was the National Security exception to GATr/WTO obligation.
GATT art. XXI.
139 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing why no WTO
Member State really wants the WTO to interpret the National Security exception).
140 SCM Agreement art. 3.1, Annex 1.
141 See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (discussing this issue in the
FSC dispute).
142 See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (offering a complete discussion of the Article XXIII:I(b) non-violation nullification and impairment theory
argued in the Film case).
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environment. 43 It was clear the case would raise major disagreements about the contours of the relevant GATT exception, Article
XX, because precursor GATT litigation had produced highly controversial (and ultimately unadopted) panel reports about how far
a country's regulatory power could extend in this area without violating the GATT.
Even after the completion of the DSU panel and appellate
phases in the Hormones, Bananas III, Shrimp/Turtle, and FSC cases,
the parties continued to disagree about what constituted compliance. In Bananas III, FSC, and Shrimp/Turtle, the losing party
passed legislation to implement the AB recommendations only to
face objections by the winning state over the nature of that compliance.l 44 In two of those cases, Bananas III and FSC, the disagreement by the winning party was found to be fully justified. 145 In
both cases the losing state had quickly implemented a new law or
regulation that was little more than a reworking of the original
46
measure. Making strategic use of the compliance process itself appearing to comply in order to "end" the dispute and thereby
147
avoid or delay retaliation -appears as a factor in these cases.
In the Hormones case the EC has also made strategic use of the
time following its WTO loss. Having endured five years of WTOauthorized sanctions while researching the scientific basis for its
ban, 48 the EC has tried something novel in DSU history. The EC
attempted to reopen the case to validate its chosen course of con143 See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text (discussing the background
of the Shrimp/Furtle case).
144 According to Article 21 of the DSU, a winning state is allowed to request
review by the original panel (if possible) of the new measure taken by the losing
party if there is "disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered
agreement of measures taken to comply." DSU art. 21.5.
145 In Bananas III the compliance review found that the second proposed EC
banana regime violated GATT obligations. See supra note 54 for a more thorough
discussion. In the FSC case the compliance arbitration determined that the replacement ETI legislation was also violative. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 51-57, 131-42 and accompanying text (giving examples).
147 Nevertheless in Bananas II and FSC, the winning state was still forced to
seek the suspension of concessions in order to force compliance of some type.
148 The major EC violation in the Hormones case was found to be its failure to
conduct a risk assessment on its ban. Hormones, supra note 54. After its loss in the
WTO the EC commissioned an independent scientific commission to carry out a
risk assessment. The EC argued to the DSB in November 2003 that the new risk
assessment showed that the hormones at issue were a risk to consumers. Dispute
Update, supra note 3 at 229.
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duct. 149 With its new measure allegedly justifying the ban already
in place the EC argued that the United States and Canada should
bring a case (an Article 21.5) to determine whether the "new" EC
ban is justified. Once both states resisted this approach the EC
filed a dispute against both countries arguing that their sanctions
were no longer justifiable. In taking this course of action the EC
150
put at issue the meaning of the DSU provisions on compliance.
2.2.3. Stresses on the DSU System
Most of the WTO's impossible cases have placed great, and
with some open-ended, stress on the DSU system. The stresses
have come from different aspects of the litigations. Several of these
5
cases, Hormones, Bananas III and Shrimp/Turtle created procedural' l
as well as substantive disputes. The contending parties ended up
fighting over important provisions in the DSU itself trying to obtain the best position possible in the ongoing dispute. Some of
these procedural disagreements, particularly over whether amicus
briefs should be allowed and the sequencing problem, 52 drew the
entire DSB into the disputes. Ultimately the mandated dispute settlement review for the DSU turned into what is now a process of
53
dispute settlement reform.
149 The EC position was that by conducting the new risk assessment it has
fulfilled its WTO obligations and deserves to have the long term sanctions removed. Dispute Update, supra note 3, at 229. The U.S. and Canada have expressed doubt about the risk assessment and whether it qualifies as compliance by
the EC. In December 2003 the EC requested that the United States and Canada
submit the compliance issue to multilateral decision as has been done in other
cases involving a compliance review (under Article 21.5). The United States and
Canada resisted the request and announced their willingness to hold bilateral discussions regarding the EC ban. Id.
150 There is no provision in the DSU which authorizes the reopening of a dispute, particularly after the losing party has failed to comply. The Article 21.5
compliance reviews are offered for situations where a country has attempted to
comply.
151With regard to procedural issues, in Bananas III the parties argued over
the sequencing issue, and over standing to pursue WTO disputes. See supra notes
49, 51-53 and accompanying text (giving a discussion of both procedural fights).
In theShrimp/Furtle dispute there was a highly contentious dispute over whether
the WTO/DSU system should accept amicus briefs. In the Hormones case the after-the-fact compliance attempts by the EC have put at issue what process should
be pursued regarding the reopening of a WTO dispute. See supra notes 73-81 and
accompanying text (discussing characteristics of overtaxing cases).
152 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (explaining that the "sequencing
problem" is a procedural problem).
153 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Doha Development Round Negotiations on
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The procedural fights in the DSB, however, at least grew out of
parties attempting to invoke their rights. Additional stresses have
been placed on the legitimacy of the DSU itself by states trying to
send political signals to others. Several of the cases, Helms-Burton,
Shrimp/Turtle and Section 301, were responses to the perceived aggressive unilateralism of the United States. 154 In others, states
made strategic decisions regarding at least the timing of the filing
of a case. Several of the impossible cases are widely regarded as
having either inspired the filing or timing of a subsequent case
against the other party (Bananas III-Section 301,155 Hormones/Bananas IlI-FSC,156 FSC-GMOs).157 In some instances an
Improvements and Clarifications of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding20012003: An Overview, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003 1-7 (Federico Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004) [hereinafter Doha Negotiations on
DSU] (describing that the 1994 mandated review was not completed prior to the
Doha Round). The Ministerial Declaration for the Doha Round also provided a
mandate for negotiations "on improvements and clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding." Doha Declaration, supra note 88, 30. The negotiations
on the DSU are so important to the proper functioning of the WTO that they are
on a separate track from the Doha Round negotiation mandates. Id. 47. Although the negotiations were to end in 2003, many of the proposals by Member
States were so broad in scope and potential effect that the negotiations continue as
of this date. See Doha Negotiations on DSU, supra.
154 In Helms-Burton, supra note 97, the United States was pursued for taking
unilateral actions against investment in Cuba that other countries viewed as acting outside the normal bounds of international law. In the Shrimp/Turtle case the
United States was regarded as attempting to unilaterally force its solution to the
problem of sea turtles killed in the harvesting of shrimp. For more discussion, see
supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text. In the Section 301 case, supra note 101,
the EC argued that the U.S. maintenance of its trade statute-which allowed the
USTR to make determinations of GATT inconsistency by other countries prior to
completion of DSU procedures -violated U.S. obligations under Article 23 of the
DSU. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (discussing DSU provisions
on compliance).
155 Following the Bananas III dispute the EC responded to the U.S. announcement that it would seek authorization to suspend concessions with the announcement that it would file the Section 301 case. After the sanctions were put
into place the EC brought the Section 301 case. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion.
156 Following the EC losses and problems with compliance in both Hormones
and BananasIII, the EC brought the FSC case against the U.S. See Alan Wm. Wolff,
Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 417, 418 (2001) (arguing
that the EC is believed to have brought the FSC case because it would cause, if the
United States lost, the same type of difficult compliance problems the EC had encountered with Hormones and Bananas III).
157 During the protracted compliance period it faced in the FSC case and in
response to the protracted EC resistance in Hormones, the United States decided to
even the score by filing the GMOs case.
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impossible case created the basis for a later trade disagreement
(Bananas III, Hormones and the U.S. adoption of carousel retalia159
tion)158 or another WTO case (Hormones- Continued Suspension,
BananasIII-Byrd Amendment), 160 (FSC-Boeing/Airbus).161
2.3. What Happened with the DSU's Impossible Cases?
The power and political fights have relocated into the DSU system the manner in which parties litigate their disputes before the
WTO panels and how they respond to panel and Appellate Body
decisions. Analyzing an impossible case, therefore, must be done
by examining the context of the dispute, the legal analysis of the
panel and Appellate Body reports, and the consequences that arose
from the dispute process. In this section of the article, the following questions will be answered (if appropriate) for each dispute:
Why did the parties pursue this dispute in the DSU system? What
158 Congress passed the Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106200, § 407, 114 Stat. 151, 193-94 in order to respond to the lack of EC progress in
complying with the Bananas III and Hormones decisions by the WTO. The legislation amended Section 306 of the Section 301 statute to allow for carousel retaliation in order to spread the consequences of the WTO-authorized sanctions over as
many EC countries as possible. The EC complained about the carousel retaliation
and filed a request for consultations regarding the legislation. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States-Section 306 of the Trade
Act of 1974 and Amendments Thereto, WT/DS200/1 (June 30, 2000). According to
the EC the carousel retaliation provision provided for:

[A] mandatory and unilateral revision of the list of products subject to
the suspension of GATT 1994 concessions or other Section 301(a) action
120 days after the application of the first suspension and then every 180
days thereafter, in order to affect imports from Members which have
been determined by the United States not to have implemented recommendations made pursuant to a WTO dispute settlement proceeding.
Id.
The EC also threatened to take action to seek sanctions prior to the completion
of the compliance review in the FSC dispute if the U.S. actually used carousel retaliation. Neither President Clinton nor President Bush used the authority. See
Daniel Wtiger, The Never Ending Story: The Implementation Phase in the Dispute Between the EC and the United States on Hormone-Treated Beef, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 777, 806-09 (2002) (describing the pressure on President Bush to implement
carousel retaliation).
159 See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
160 Appellate Body Report, United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003).
161 Request for Establishment of Panel by the United States, European Communities and Certain Member States- Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,
WT/DS316/6, (Apr. 11, 2006). See supra text accompanying notes 135 and 142 for
a discussion of the connection between the FSC and Boeing/Airbus disputes.
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did the adjudication determine regarding the contested government measure and the relevant GATT/WTO Agreement? Why did
the countries implement or fail to implement panel or Appellate
Body recommendations?
2.3.1. BananasIII
2.3.1.1. Background
The Bananas III dispute was the first case completed in the new
DSU system between the United States and the EC.162 By bringing
this dispute, the United States chose a case pushed heavily by interested United States parties against what had already been determined to be a clearly GATT-inconsistent trade regime. 163 The
EC, by contrast, believed it could justify its regime because the underlying goal was to assist developing countries through the EC's
long-term preference program. 6 4 Neither Member State was actually acting directly to protect domestic producers. Instead, each
acted, or so it contended, on behalf of other countries-the United
States on behalf of the banana producing countries in Latin America and the EC on behalf of the African, Caribbean and Pacific
("ACP") banana producing countries.
The WTO case was prompted by the EC adoption of a harmonized policy regarding banana imports in 1993.165 Prior to the
adoption of Regulation 404/93, each EC Member State had its own
policy regarding banana imports. 66 Germany for example, operated on an open market basis and applied no restrictions. From the
time Germany entered the EC, and the EC began adopting preference programs, Germany had insisted on its rights to treat bananas

162 The Hormones dispute was actually filed shortly before (Jan. 26, 1996) the
Bananas III case (Feb. 5, 1996) but was not resolved by the Appellate Body until
January 1998. The Bananas III AB report was circulated in September 1997.
16'. The Bananas III dispute was the follow up to two earlier cases (Bananas I &
II) that had found the EC regime to be GAIT-inconsistent. See F. Weiss, Manifestly
Illegal Import Restrictions and Non-Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings
in TRANSATLANTIc ECONOMIC DISPUTES 121, 128-130 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and
Mark A. Pollack eds., 2003) (discussing the claims and results in Bananas I, II and
III).
164 Id. at 126.
165 Council Regulation 404/93 on the Common Organization of the Market in
Bananas, 1993 O.J. (L 47) 1 (EC).
166 Weiss, supra note 163, at 123.
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on its own terms. 67 Germany even challenged the Banana Regulation as violative of EC rulemaking power but lost the case. 68 By
contrast, the other eleven EC Member States either applied a tariffonly regime, 169 a quota regime, or one with variations which applied both tariffs and quotas to limit market access for bananas. In
all of their various forms, these schemes limited the access of Central and South American bananas to the EC market in favor of protecting space for bananas produced in former EC colonies: the Af170
rican, Caribbean and Pacific states.
The EC had a long history of broad-based preference programs
for the ACP states that dated back to the earliest days of the European Community. 171 The major treaties between the EC and these
countries were the two Yaound6 Conventions of Association 172 and
the four Lom6 Conventions. 173 Since preference programs by definition allow one GATT/WTO Member State to give benefits to
some trading partners over others, they violate the core GATT rule
on non-discrimination: the most favored nation rule. The typical
response for a Member State wanting to ensure such programs is to
get a political waiver for the GATT violation. The Fourth Lomc
Convention contained not only preferences for ACP bananas but a
Banana Protocol' 74 that made it clear that ACP bananas would not
be put in a less favorable position. The EC was committed to its
167 Panel Report, European Communities -Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distributionof Bananas, 111.5, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) [hereinafter Bananas III Panel]; Protocol Concerning the Tariff Quota for Imports of Bananas,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 162.
168 Case 3/94, GATT-WTO-Framework Agreement on Bananas, 1995 E.C.R. I4577 (describing Germany's challenge of the Banana Regulation as violative of EC
rulemaking power but ultimately losing the case).
169 Weiss, supra note 163, at 123.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 122-23.
172 Convention of Association Between the European Economic Community
and Associated African States, with Related Agreements, July 20, 1963, 2 I.L.M.
971 (1963).
173 African Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic Community
(ACP-EEC): Final Act, Minutes and Fourth ACP -EEC Convention of Lom6, Dec.
15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990) [hereinafter Lom6 IV]; ACP -EEC: Third Convention
of Lom6, Dec. 8, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 571 (1985); ACP-EEC: Second Convention of
Lom6, Oct. 31, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 327 (1980); ACP-EEC: Lom6 Convention, Feb. 28,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 595 (1995).
174 "[N]o ACP State shall be placed, as regards access to its traditional markets and its advantages on those markets, in a less favourable situation than in the
past or at present." Lom6 IV, supra note 173, Protocol 5 art. 1.
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preferences to the ACP countries as part of its development program' 75 for these countries, even if the preferences did offer less
help than was intended. 176 In addition, the ACP banana preference
was considered crucial to the economy of the countries that benefited from the import regime. 177
The EC plan was to use Regulation 404/93 as part of its single
market project to harmonize the different Member State policies. 178
What the EC actually produced to satisfy these goals was an import regime notable for its complexity and lack of transparency.
Regulation 404/93 allocated quotas and different tariff rates for
bananas coming into the EC to three categories of countries: ACP
countries, non-traditional ACP countries, and third (or non-ACP)
countries. The ACP countries were clearly treated better than the
other countries. In order to import bananas into the EC, an importer also had to qualify under an import operator category. In
other words, the EC imposed a complicated import licensing system that allocated licenses according to the activity function of the
importer.179 The overall operation of the import regime, therefore,
benefited not only the ACP countries, but also importers who had
traditionally served the EC market to the detriment of non-ACP
countries and other importers seeking access. The EC was aware at
the time it passed the banana import regime that there were GATT
inconsistencies that would require a waiver of the rules by political
action of the GATT General Council. 180
The Latin American countries that suffered most of the discrimination quickly began taking whatever steps they could to

175 Weiss, supra note 163, at 126; see also Douglas Ierly, Defining the Factors that
Influence Developing Country Compliance with and Participationin the WVTO Dispute
Settlement System: Another Look at the Dispute Over Bananas, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 615, 629 (2002) (describing the EU's justification of its involvement in the banana trade on the grounds of development aid).
176 See Martin Wolf, Going Bananas: Far From Helping Poor Producers, the EU
Banana Regime is Discriminatoryand Makes No Economic Sense, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24,
1999, at 18 (arguing that the ACP countries were actually not filling their share of
the quotas designed to benefit them).
177 Bananas III Panel, supra note 167,
6.3 (stating that for the ACP countries,
the banana exports to the EC were crucial and a "very high proportion of their total banana exports.").
178 Weiss, supra note 163, at 124.
179 See Raj Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 839, 852, 863-64
(2000) (discussing the EC's establishment of three banana import categories and
allocation of import licenses).
180 Weiss, supra note 163, at 124-25.
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dismantle the EC banana regime. Their actions created the two
GATT decisions on the banana import regime (Bananas I and Bananas I). In 1993, five Latin American countries filed the first
GATT case against the import regimes of several EC Member
States. 181 The Bananas I panel found that the quota schemes of
France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the UK violated GATT Articles I
(Most Favored Nation rule) and XI (Prohibition on Quantitative
Restrictions). 182 The EC and the ACP countries blocked the adoption of the report. Right before the adoption of Regulation 404/93,
the Latin American countries brought another GATT case challenging the new measure.1 83 That GATT panel (Bananas I) found that
404/93 violated Articles I, II, and III of the GATT.84 The EC, however, also blocked adoption of that decision. Although it was unwilling to accept any GATT decision about the banana regime, the
EC did respond by applying for a GATT waiver for the Fourth
Lom6 Convention 185 and negotiating a Framework Agreement on
Banana Imports 1 86 with four of the five Latin American complainants in Bananas II. The Framework Agreement set out a deal that
exchanged increased market access for a standstill on further legal
maneuvers within the dispute settlement system. The Latin
American countries agreed to stop pushing for the adoption of the
Bananas II report and not bring any additional dispute settlement
proceedings on the import regime until the end of 2002, in exchange for an increase in their share of the quotas and a decrease in
187
the tariffs charged.
The United States became involved in the case when Chiquita
Brands filed a Section 301 petition with the United States Trade
Representative ("USTR") challenging the banana regime and the

181 The countries that brought the BananasI case were: Colombia, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Report of the Panel, EEC -Member States'
Import Regime for Bananas, 1, DS32/R (June 3, 1993).
364, 374-75.
182 Id.
183 Report of the Panel, EEC -Import Regime for Bananas, DS38/R (Feb. 11,
1994).
170, 230.
184 Id.
185 The Fourth ACP- EEC Convention of Lomi-GATT Waiver, L/7604 (Dec. 19,
1994); see also Weiss, supra note 163, at 129 ("The contracting parties of the Lom6
Convention... applied for a waiver for the fourth ACP-EED Convention of Lom
with the aim 'to improve legal certainty for the trade of ACP countries.'").
186 Framework Agreement on Banana Imports, Mar. 29, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1
(1995).
187 Id.
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Framework Agreement as GATT-violative. 188 Chiquita had largescale investments in the Latin American countries disadvantaged
under the import regime. 189 Chiquita was also a wealthy firm with
high-level political connections and was, at the time, one of the
largest contributors to both U.S. political parties. 190 To many, the
vigorous pursuit of the dispute by the USTR proved the United
States worked on behalf of private parties rather than for overall
government interests. 191 However, the United States had already
committed itself to bringing cases in the new system and, in the
early days, had taken an active role in it.192 The USTR therefore initiated the Section 301 investigation and in 1995 made a preliminary
determination that the banana import regime adversely affected
U.S. interests. When negotiations failed, the United States terminated the Section 301 case and filed along with Ecuador, Guate193
mala, Honduras, and Mexico the WTO dispute against the EC.
The plaintiffs launched a broad scale attack on the banana import regime, alleging violations of Articles I, II, III, X, XI, and XIII
of the GATT, the Import Licensing Agreement, the Agreement on
Agriculture, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS).9 4 Consultations were unsuccessful and led the complainants to request a panel in April 1996. The primary defense of the
EC was that the banana regime was part of the Lom6 Convention
and, as such, covered by the GATT waiver. 195 In May 1997, the
188 See Disclosure to Investors in Systemwide and Consolidated Bank Debt
Obligations of the Farm Credit System, 59 Fed. Reg. 5341 (proposed Feb. 4, 1994)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 630) (responding to the Section 301 petition); see also
GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO
LITIGATION 23-24 (2003) (discussing U.S. support for Chiquita Brands' opposition
to the EC banana licensing regime); Bhala, supra note 179, at 863 (explaining how
the EC allocates import licenses).
189 According to the panel, Chiquita and Dole Foods had played a major role
in developing the EC banana market. The EC measures "had the effect of constraining U.S. companies' import, delivery, and distribution flexibility and required them to expand substantial capital just to try to restore their former business." BananasIII Panel, supra note 167, 4.23.
190 SHAFFER, supra note 188, at 23-24.
191 Id. at 23.
192 Id. at 68.
193 Request for Consultations by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and
the United States, European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/D527/18 (Aug. 31, 1998).
194

Id.

Bananas III Panel, supra note 167,
77 7.196-.204 (regarding Article I).
195
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panel found that the regime violated the GATT (Articles I, III, X,
and XIII), the Import Licensing Agreement, and the GATS (Articles
II and XVII).196 The panel did agree with the EC to one limited extent: it found that the Lom6 Convention waiver covered the regime's violations of the Most Favored Nation rule (Article 1)197 but
not its violations of Article XIII (providing for allocation of quotas) .198

2.3.1.2 The Bananas III Dispute
The Bananas III dispute seems to be more important for the
events that took place after the AB issued its report rather than for
the issues decided in the case. 199 This is because the decision of the
Appellate Body did not really resolve the case. The parties to the
dispute remained at loggerheads over the issue of what constituted
compliance. In later impossible cases there was a similar trend of
the parties having extended disputes over not only what constitutes proper procedure during the compliance phase (i.e., what
steps is a WTO Member State allowed to take when it designs its
compliance with a DSU loss?) but also over whether actual compliance had occurred.
In its appeal, the EC argued that the United States lacked
standing to pursue the dispute and attempted to defend certain aspects of the banana import regime. However, with regard to both
areas of EC effort, the Bananas III AB panel largely upheld the
panel decisions. On the standing issue, the AB report agreed that
there is no requirement in the text of the DSU that a WTO Member
State have a "legal interest" in a dispute in order to bring a
claim. 200 In fact, according to the AB report, Member States have

196 Id.
197
198

Id.
Id.

9.1.
7.196-.204.
7.95-.109.

199 See Mauricio Salas & John H. Jackson, ProceduralOverview of the WTO EC Banana Dispute, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 145, 165 (2000) ("Bananas III is considered a
landmark case in WTO jurisprudence .... mostly because of the precedents being
set in the procedural case-law of the WTO."); see also John H. Jackson & Patricio
Grane, The Saga Continues: An Update on the Banana Dispute and Its Procedural Offspring, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 581 (2001) (providing an overview of the ongoing controversy).
200 Appellate Body Report, European Communities -Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R 132 (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter
Bananas III AB Report]. The AB report also noted that there was no need for a "legal interest" to be implied in the DSU or any other WTO Agreement. Id.
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"broad discretion" in deciding whether to bring a claim. 20 1 The
United States was found to be justified in bringing the claims in
Bananas III because it was a producer of bananas with potential export interests and its own internal market could be affected by the
20 2
EC regime.
The AB report also upheld all of the major GATT violation decisions reached by the panel. 203 In particular, the AB report supported the finding that the way the banana import regime allocated quotas did not satisfy the GATT rule 20 4 and that, as a result,
the Latin American countries had lost large market shares. Unfortunately for the EC, the AB report rejected the panel's broad reading of the EC's biggest defense to its Article I and Article XIII violaThe AB report found the Lom6
tions-the Lom6 Waiver.
Convention Waiver to be limited solely to the Most Favored Nation (Article I) violation and not to cover the violation regarding
the allocation of quotas (Article XIII). The AB report stated that
given the exceptional nature of waivers, the strict discipline on
them and the restrictions put on the Lom6 Waiver itself, a narrow
reading of the Lom6 Waiver with regard to Article X111 20 5 was required.
In the other major set of holdings in the dispute, the AB report
upheld the panel's reading of the relationship between the GATT
and GATS-that a government trade measure could be subject to
both sets of rules and that the rules could overlap in their application.206 The AB report also provided the first interpretation of the
basic non-discrimination provisions in the GATS Agreement finding that the rules applied to de facto as well as de jure discrimina7
tion.20
The end result of the litigation was a complete rejection of the
banana import regime. That overall legal result had not really been
in doubt since the Bananas II dispute. What mattered was whether
the more adjudicative WTO dispute settlement system would facilitate compliance by the losing state. The recommendations in

201
202
203
204
205
206
207

Id. 7 135.
Id. 136.
Id. 255.
Id. 163.
Id. IT 184-88.
Id. 77 220-22.
Id. 77 232-34.
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the AB report, however, did not make it clear how compliance
208
should take place.
The United States received an offer for compensation to end the
dispute, but rejected it.209 The EC response was to offer to modify
the banana regime. 210 After an arbitration over what would constitute a reasonable period of time to comply, the EC received a deadline of January 1, 1999.211
2.3.1.3 Implementation and Surveillance Phase
The EC proposed a revision to the banana import regime,
which it proclaimed to be WTO-compatible. The revised scheme
left in place a two-track scheme for allocating banana quotas-one
for Latin American countries and another for ACP countries although it did eliminate the discriminatory import licensing system.212 Over U.S. objections that the new regime did not comply,
the EC Council approved the new scheme in October 1998.213 The
United States and Ecuador took the lead in responding to the new
legislation. The U.S. response was to announce, under its Section
301, a preliminary list of the EU products that would be subject to
suspension of concessions if the EC failed to adopt a consistent regime by January 1999.214 The United States later sought a DSB authorization for these sanctions under Article 22.2, which allows a

208

Id.

257. The entire recommendation of the AB report reads as follows:

The Appellate Body recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request the European Communities to bring measures found in this Report
and in the Panel Reports, as modified by this Report, to be inconsistent
with the GATT 1994 and the GATS into conformity with the obligations
of the European Communities under those agreements.
Id. See also Bhala, supra note 179, at 958-59 (noting that a compliance deficit was
created because recommendations in the AB report were not clear).
209 Weiss, supra note 163, at 130.
210 Id.
211 Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, European Communities- Regime for
the Importation,Sale and Distributionof Bananas, 20, WT/DS27/15 (Jan. 7, 1998).
212 See Bhala, supranote 179, at 953 (discussing the EC's two-tiered scheme for
allocating banana quotas).
213 Commission Regulation 2362/98, 1998 O.J. (L293/32) (Oct. 31, 1998).
214 Implementation of WTO Recommendations Concerning the European
Communities' Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 63
Fed. Reg. 63,099 (Nov. 10, 1998); see Salas & Jackson, supra note 199, at 155 (discussing EC reactions to the proposed U.S. actions under Section 301).
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request for authorization twenty days after the passing of the date
215
of implementation.
The EC argued that the United States was not entitled pursue
Article 22 until after an Article 21.5 (compliance) panel had reviewed the new measure for compliance. The EC had already requested such a panel. 216 Ecuador requested the reestablishment of
the original panel to resolve the conflict over compliance. 217 The
extended disagreement over the proper procedure to be followed
was the first skirmish in the fight over "sequencing" 218 - the issue
of the proper timing of actions taken regarding implementation
(whether or not a new measure is compliant with DSB recommendations) and requests for sanctions because of non-compliance.
The DSU provisions relating to compliance review (Article 21.5)
and the request for a DSB authorization to suspend concessions
against a non-complying Member State (art. 22) do not refer to
each other. Consequently, there is a gap in the procedural rules on
the sequencing point. The United States and the EC each firmly insisted that the right to proceed could only be on its understanding
of sequencing.
The EC was so troubled by what it saw as a U.S. unilateral
threat of sanctions that at first it refused to participate in an Article
21.5 proceeding unless the United States suspended its threat of retaliation. The EC also filed a DSU case against the United States on
the WTO consistency of Section 301 (which later developed into the
Section 301 dispute). 219 Ultimately, the EC agreed to an Article 21.5
proceeding, but one that would presume conformity of its new regime with WTO rules unless the other party followed the proper
215 Recourse by the United States to Article 22.2 of the DSU, European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/43
(Jan. 14, 1999); see also Salas & Jackson, supra note 199, at 157-58 (describing the
U.S. communication to the DSB and following events).
216 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities,
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/40 (Dec. 15, 1998).
217 Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU, European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distributionof Bananas, WT/DS27/41 (Dec. 18, 1998).
218 See generally Salas & Jackson, supra note 199, at 153-60 (explaining the interaction between Articles 21.5 and 22 of the DSU).
219 Request for Consultations by the European Community, United States Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/1 (Nov. 30, 1998). See Weiss,
supra note 163, at 132-33 (recalling the fight between countries over the "proper
procedure to be followed to challenge the implementation of an adopted panel
and Appellate Body report").
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DSU procedure. Ecuador countered with an application for an Article 21.5 panel to review the conformity of the revised regulation.
The DSB granted both requests and sent them to the original
panel. 220 The panel was asked to review the issue of sequencing.
During this same time, the United States was pushing its retaliation claim forward with the DSB. The political fight over what
constituted the proper procedure ultimately led to the brokering of
a compromise by the Director General. The DSB would suspend
consideration of the U.S. retaliation request in exchange for EC
agreement to arbitrate over what would constitute an appropriate
level of retaliation. 221
When that arbitration moved too slowly for the United States,
it again threatened retaliation. Ultimately, a panel issued a report
on the Art. 21.5 requests of both the EC and Ecuador and the authorization arbitration request of the United States.222 The 21.5 report found the EC revised scheme to be GATT-violative. The
panel also responded to Ecuador's request for specific suggestions
on EC implementation by suggesting a tariff-only system and/or
action to obtain a WTO waiver for the EC regime. 223 The 21.5 panel
declined to consider the issue of proper sequencing and declared
that the issue belonged to the WTO itself in the context of the ongoing review of the DSU. 224 The panel did arrive at a figure for the
225
U.S. request for retaliation: $191.4 million per year.
What happened to the United States and Ecuador following
this 21.5 process illustrates the great advantage powerful countries
have during the implementation phase of a DSU case. When the
EC failed in its second attempt to produce revised legislation in a
timely fashion, the United States implemented its sanctions authorization in April 1999. Ecuador also sought and received authorization to suspend concessions in the area of services and
trade-related intellectual property rights rather than on trade in

220 See Salas & Jackson, supra note 199, at 160 (discussing the Bananas III
panel's final determinations as to the Article 21.5 request filed by Ecuador).
221 Id. at 160-61.
222 Panel Report, European Communities -Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas,WT/DS27/RW/ECU (Apr. 12, 1999).
223 Id.
224 Id. See Weiss, supra note 163, at 133 ("[T]he panel declined to make such a
finding as requested by the EC.").
22 Id. See IWTO Banana Arbitrators Find for US on Procedure, Substance, INSIDE

US TRADE, Apr. 9, 1999.
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goods 226 because seeking retaliation through trade in goods would
only hurt it.227 Although granted the authorization by the DSB for
this cross-retaliation, Ecuador never employed it. By contrast, the
United States continued to use its sanctions while seeking a negotiated settlement to the dispute. The United States and EC parties
reached an understanding228 in 2001 that required in exchange for a
U.S. suspension of retaliation an EC adoption of a new banana
regulation by the end of 2001.229 Ecuador was left out of the settlement negotiations and objected to the other two Member States
attempting to end the dispute without its input. In response to
these concerns, the EC later resolved its dispute with Ecuador as
well. 230
The new regime was designed as a tariff-only system that
would go into place by January 1, 2006. Until then, the EU would
continue to apply a tariff/quota system, but one based on the actual market shares (given the historical preferences) between the
years of 1994 and 1996, the beginning point of the dispute. 231 The
solution still involved GATT inconsistencies. Consequently, the
EC sought and was granted two waivers ("the Doha Waiver") by
the WTO membership during the Ministerial Conference in November 2001 that would allow the programs to be set up under the
Understandings with Ecuador and the United States.
The negotiated settlement and WTO waiver have not fully resolved the underlying problems faced by Latin American coun226 Recourse of Ecuador to Article 22.2 of the DSU, European Communities Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/52 (Nov. 9,
1999). See also, Salas & Jackson, supra note 199, at 161-62 (providing an explanation of the request Ecuador made to the DSB).
227 See Salas & Jackson, supra note 199, at 156-57 (noting Ecuador's request for
an Article 21.5 panel); Jackson & Grane, supra note 199, at 587 (discussing Ecuador's recourse to Article 22.2 and 22.7).
228 US-EU Banana Agreement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 13, 2001, at 20. See Jackson & Grane, supra note 199, at 588-89 (discussing the agreement by which Ecuador was still bound); see also Press Release, The U.S.-EU Banana Agreement, Frequently Asked Questions, Apr. 11, 2001, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2001/ April/TheJUS-EUBananaAgreement
.html.
229 Jackson & Grane, supra note 199, at 591.
230 The Understandings were both submitted by the EC to the DSB as a mutually agreed solution to the dispute. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution,
European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/58 (July 2, 2001).
231 Ministerial Conference Decision, European Communities-The ACP-EC
PartnershipAgreement, WT/L/436 (Dec. 7, 2001).
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tries. As part of the final shift to a tariff-only system, the Doha
Waiver agreement required that the EC agree to arbitrations on
whether the EC's final solution to tariff levels for banana imports
232 It is
maintained market access for Latin American countries.
now clear that the disputants still disagree over the concept of
market access. The EC proposed two tariff levels (of 230 euros per
ton and 187 euros per ton) that were challenged by the Latin
American countries and rejected by WTO arbitrators as noncompliant with the terms of the Doha Waiver. 233 Nicaragua, Pa234
nama, and Honduras have now filed a request for consultations
on the EC Council Regulation that was adopted following the earlier arbitrations. 235 The Latin American countries contend that the
latest tariff level in the Regulation (176 euros per ton) and the duty
free quota for ACP bananas are too high (and inconsistent with the
Doha Waiver 236) to allow them the market access. The official EC
position is that the latest proposal satisfies its obligation to arbitrate under the Doha Waiver and the tariff will allow full market
access for the Latin American countries. 237 The dispute, which was
filed as an Article 21.5 compliance matter, will go before a panel
unless the parties renegotiate.

232 Request for Consultations by Nicaragua, European Communities -Banana
Import
Regime
and
ACP-EC
Partnership Agreement,
WT/DS27/64,
WT/L/607/Add.18 (Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Consultation]. See also Request for Consultations by Ecuador, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distributionof Bananas, WT/DS27/65 Rev. 1 (Nov. 26, 2006).
233 Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities - The ACP-EC Partnership
Agreement-Recourse to Arbitration Pursuant to the Decision of 14 November 2001,
WT/L/616 (Aug. 1, 2005).
234 2005 Consultation, supra note 232.
235 Council of the European Union, Council Regulation on the Tariff Rates for
Bananas, 14441/05, AGRI 297, WTO 199, ACP 148, AMLAT 93, OC 832 (Nov. 25,
2005).
236 2005 Consultation, supra note 232.
237 Press Release, Council of the European Union, European Union Adopts
New 'Tariff-Only' Import Regime for Bananas from 1 January 2006, (Nov. 29,
2005), available at http://europea.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
IP/05/1493&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. The EU
countries were in sharp disagreement about the tariff level to set for the new import regime. Seven countries, led by Germany, argued that the tariff was set too
high. See Bananas: EU imposes, WTO to rule, LATIN AMERICAN CARIBBEAN &
CENTRAL AMERICA REPORT, Dec. 2005, at 7.
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2.3.2. Hormones
2.3.2.1. Background
Underlying the Hormones dispute (WT/DS26) between the
United States (and Canada) and the EC is a difference over how
states determine allowable health risks. The dispute, which was
filed as an Article 21.5 compliance matter and is now before a
panel, highlights how differently each state handles the role of
politics in determining the issue. Both the United States and Canada allow the use of growth hormones in cattle production. There
is support for their choice in using hormones in the international
standards on hormone use. 238 Both governments base their regulatory policy on such scientific evidence. 239 Over time, the EC came
to disallow the use of any type of hormone for almost all purposes.
In order to make its policy effective, the EC banned all use of the
hormones for domestic and imported beef. Although the EC
measure was non-discriminatory, the difference in regulatory
standards between the countries greatly impacted North American
producers. Almost all beef exports from the United States and
Canada were shut out of the EC market. 240 In the ensuing dispute
one party tried to satisfy the demands of U.S. and Canadian beef
producers 24 1 while the other sought to satisfy consumers and consumer groups. At the same time, both sides sought to be responsive to the views of the other.
The EC adopted its strict policy on hormone use against a background of consumer outrage over health scares that produced

Concerning Meat and Meat
238 Panel Report, European Communities -Measures
Products (Hormones), 11.17-11.25, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter
Panel Report]; David A. Wirth, International Decisions: European CommunitiesMeasures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 755 (1998).
239 See Dale E. McNiel, The First Case Under the AWTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement: The European Union's Hormone Ban, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 89, 99-100
(1998) (reviewing the U.S. study of hormones use).
240 See P.C. Mavroidis, The Trade Disputes Concerning Health Policy Between the
EC and the US, in TRANSATLANTIc EcoNoMic DIsPurEs 233, 235-37 (Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2003) (explaining the Hormones dispute).
241 See Terence P. Stewart et al., Trade and Cattle: How the System is Failing an
Industry in Crisis, 9 MINN. J.GLOBAL TRADE 449, 500-02 (2000) (noting the efforts of
the cattle industry to use the WTO system to open up closed markets in the Hormones case, which have not been successful because the EC response to losing the
case was to refrain from ever lifting the ban).
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pressure for some action beginning in the 1970s.242 The first hormone ban went into effect in 1981 immediately following consumer outcry over a health scare.243 Under the terms of that ban,
some hormones were permitted -those needed for therapeutic and
zootechnical purposes and those used for growth promotion. The
EC states were thus allowed growth hormones if they were acceptable under their regulatory schemes. 244 The EC Council was also
charged with determining whether any hormones should be allowed. The Council authorized an EC Commission report on hormone effects and scientific development in order to fulfill its mandate. The report ultimately produced by the commission did not
support a complete ban, leading the Commission to propose a ban
on artificial hormones. 245 There was immediate 246 political opposition to this result from the EC Economic and Social Committee, the
EC Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament. In response to this push for a stricter policy, the Commission cancelled
further meetings of the scientific group that examined Commission
reports. 247 The report ultimately produced did not support a complete ban in 1985 on all hormones used for growth purposes and
authorized controlled use of hormones for therapeutic purposes
only. 2 48 Throughout this period not all EC Member States supported the restrictive position ultimately adopted by the EC Council. 24 9 That ban was readopted in 1988250 and renewed in 1996.251
The adoption of the complete ban was widely perceived as the EC
242 See Donna Roberts, Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of the W/TO Agreement on Sanitary and PhytosanitaryTrade Regulations, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 377, 386-87
(1998) (reviewing the background of the hormones dispute).
243 Council Directive 81/602/EEC, 1981 O.J. (L 222) 32 (EC). See McNiel, supra note 239, at 100-06 (detailing a review of the beginnings of the hormone concerns in the EC and the scientific and legislative steps taken in response); Roberts,
supra note 242, at 386.
244 Panel Report, supra note 238,
4.3.
245 Christian Joerges, Law, Science and the Management of Risks to Health at the
National, European and InternationalLevel - Stories on Baby Dummies, Mad Cows and
Hormones in Beef, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 10-11 (2001).
246 Panel Report, supra note 238,
28-29.
247 Joerges, supra note 245, at 10.
248 Panel Report, supra note 238,
4.30.
249 See Jerges, supra note 245, at 6, 9 (noting that the U.K. and other states argued against the 1981 ban and the later 1985 ban).
250 Council Directive 88/146/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 070) 16, 18 (EC); see Roberts,
supra note 242, at 385-87 (discussing the EC litigation over the earlier ban).
251 Council Directive 96/22/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 125) 3 (EC).
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responding to consumer preferences regarding hormones 2 2 and
the belief that the public did not trust the government or "science"
to decide the issue.
In its first response to the EC's regulatory policy in this area,
the United States tried to obtain assistance from the GATT. GATT
rules in the 1980s required consensus by all parties for actions to be
taken regarding disputes. In 1987, the United States sought the establishment of a technical experts group under the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT Agreement), 253 arguing that the EC
Directive was not supported by any scientific evidence. 2 4 The EC
rejected the request for such a group on the basis that the TBT
Agreement did not cover a production and process method. 255 The
dispute on the TBT issue did not progress. Shortly after this period, the ongoing negotiations under the Uruguay Round reached
consensus on the major outline of a Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement (SPS Agreement) to deal expressly with the issue of
government standards measures aimed at protecting human, animal, and plant life and safety. 256 The negotiators agreed in principle on two major issues: that government SPS measures should be
consistent, as far as possible, with internationally established standards and that SPS measures should be based on scientific evidence. 257 The hormones dispute was widely regarded by negotiators as the type of issue that would be subject to the new
agreement's approach of requiring states to use scientific determi58
nations to justify health measures. 2
Attempting to obtain some favorable EC response to its concerns sooner than was possible through a new set of rules, the
United States threatened unilateral sanctions of 100% tariff in-

252 See Joerges, supra note 245, at 10 (expressing that the EC has always
pointed to surveys which reveal that consumers do not want to buy hormone-fed
beef or beef products).
253 Petersmann, supra note 90, at 237-38.
254 Panel Report, supra note 238,
4.34 (emphasizing the U.S. argument for
the establishment of the technical experts group under Article 14.5 of the TBT
Agreement).
255 Id. The EC instead argued for the establishment of a panel to review obligations under Article 14.25 of the Agreement.

256

See JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF

THE URUGUAY ROUND 202 (2d ed. 1999) (pointing out that the negotiations were
reaching a consensus between the years 1988 and 1990).
257

Id.

258

Atik & Wirth, supra note 136, at 173; McNiel, supra note 239, at 90-91.
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creases on eight EC agricultural products that would shut them out
of the U.S. market. 259 The EC actually delayed its implementation
of the 1988 ban for one year in response to the threat of retaliation.
The sanctions went into place, however, when the EC made its
hormone ban effective in 1989.260 The EC requested a GATT panel
on the issue of whether the United States was entitled to use such
unilateral sanctions. The United States responded by blocking the
creation of a panel. The United States retaliation continued until
261
1996 when the Hormones panel was established.
2.3.2.2. The Hormones Dispute
The Hormones case was the first dispute the United States filed
against the EC. In this case and its companion, Bananas 111,262 the
United States chose to bring two longstanding and contentious
disputes 263 to the new DSU system. The United States (and Canada 264) argued that by banning meat and meat products produced
by growth hormones, the EC violated Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the
new SPS Agreement.
The SPS Agreement sets out the major obligations of Member
States in the adoption or maintenance of sanitary and phytosanitary measures. A Member State must ensure that any SPS measure
is only adopted when necessary to protect human, animal, or plant
life, or health, and that it is based on scientific principles. 265 A
Member State must base its SPS measure on international standards and guidelines, except where the country intends to provide
a higher level of protection. 266 If a Member State does choose to

Petersmann, supra note 90, at 238.
Id. The United States and EC negotiated a joint Task Force Agreement to
allow the importation of products that could be certified as hormone-free. Panel
Report, supra note 238, 4.36. This step did lead to the United States limiting its
retaliation list.
261 Petersmann, supra note 90, at 238.
262 Request for Consultations by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and
the United States, European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/1 (Feb. 12, 1996).
263 See Shaffer, supra note 188, at 68.
264 Request for Consultations by Canada, European Communities -Measures
Affecting Livestock and Meat (Hormones), WT/DS48/1 (July 8, 1996). The results of
the U.S. and Canadian panels in the dispute reached the same results. The appeal
combined the disputes.
265 SPS Agreement arts. 2.1, 2.2.
266 Id. arts. 3.1, 3.3.
259

260

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 28:2

provide that higher level of protection it must base its SPS measure
on "an assessment, appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks"
267
to human, animal, or plant life or health.
The U.S. and Canadian complaints were that the EC ban was
not based on scientific evidence, did not satisfy international standards, and was not based on a risk assessment. Consequently, the
dispute centered on how the EC came to adopt and maintain its
hormone ban. A DSU panel was established in 1996 and reported
in 1997 that the ban was inconsistent with Articles 3 and 5 of the
268
SPS Agreement.
All parties appealed portions of the panel report. 269 The Appellate Body Report was widely anticipated for how its review of the
panel determinations would decide the issue of the ban's inconsistency with the SPS Agreement. All of the disputants knew that the
AB Report would provide the first definitive interpretation of the
new agreement. In addition, there was great interest in whether
the Appellate Body would reemphasize its textual approach to the
interpretation of GATT/WTO obligations, an approach it had
demonstrated in its first decision. 270 Issued in January 1998, the AB
Report concurred with the panel determination that the ban violated the SPS Agreement. At the same time, however, the Appel-

Id. art. 5.1.
Panel Report, European Communities -Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Hormones
Panel Report]. The Panel found that the EC ban violated Articles 3.1 and 3.3 as
well as Articles 5.1 and 5.5. Id.
269 Hormones AB Report, supra note 54. The EC argued that the panel erred
with regard to: (1) the correct burden of proof, (2) the appropriate standards of
review, (3) its interpretation of the Precautionary Principle (Article 5.7), (4) its
failure to provide an objective assessment of the facts, (Article 11), (5) its temporal
application of the SPS Agreement, and (6) its findings of violations of Articles 3.1,
3.3, 5.1, and 5.5. Hormones AB Report, supra note 54,
9-36. The United States
appealed the panel's finding of an EC violation of Article 3.1, arguing that it did
not need to resolve that issue. Id. 46. Canada appealed to preserve its arguments about a violation of Article 5.6 if the Appellate Body decided to modify or
reverse the panel findings on Articles 3.1, 5.1 and 5.5. Id. 77.
270 See Appellate Body Report, United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). It is widely agreed that the
Appellate Body has adopted a textualist approach to the GATT/WTO agreements. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate Body, 38
TEX. INT'L L.J. 469, 480 (2003) ("[T]he Appellate Body has certainly attached the
greatest weight to the first [criteria for interpretation under the Vienna Convention] -'the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty.'").
267
268
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late Body rejected most of the panel's legal findings that supported
271
its determination.
The major failing of the EC ban, 272 according to the AB, was
that it was not "based on" a risk assessment and thus in violation
of Article 5.1. In reaching that conclusion, the Appellate Body decided the proper legal interpretation of the Article 5.1 obligation,
and then examined whether the panel was correct that the EC
measure failed to meet it. The Appellate Body began its analysis
with a close reading of the words of Article 5.1.273 It moved from
an interpretation of what constitutes a "risk assessment"274 to
whether the EC measure was "based on" that risk assessment. 275 In
its approach to these two preliminary points, the AB panel illustrated the proper approach for analyzing WTO obligations. The
AB Report did endorse the panel's view that the obligation at issue - the requirement to conduct risk assessments - had to be examined in relationship to other SPS obligations. Article 5.1 was
found to be a specific application of the Article 2 responsibility of a
government to base its SPS measures on scientific principles. 276
Given that relationship, the elements that define the basic obligation in Article 2.2 did "impart meaning" to Article 5.1.277 The Appellate Body, however, rejected the panel's attempt to make sense
of the concept of "risk assessment" by contrasting it with the concept of "risk management" because the latter phrase appears nowhere in the text of the SPS Agreement. 278 Proper interpretation of
an agreement's obligation, according to the AB Report, requires interpreting the words actually used "and not words which the in271 The Appellate Body disagreed with the panel's interpretation of Article 3
and Article 5.1, and it rejected the panel's findings of a violation of Article 5.5.
272 The Appellate Body Report did find that the ban also violated Article 3.3
because of its violation of Article 5.1 (the failure to base the SPS measure on a risk
assessment). Hormones AB Report, supra note 54, 209.
273 Article 5.1 provides:

Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures are
based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to
human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment
techniques developed by the relevant international organizations.
SPS Agreement art. 5.1 (emphasis added).
274 Hormones AB Report, supra note 54,
180-87.
275 Id.
188-94.
276 Id.
180.
277

Id.

278

Id.

181.
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terpreter may feel should have been used." 279 For the same reason,
the Appellate Body also rejected the panel's effort to explain how a
"risk assessment" should be conducted-by following a two-step
process of identifying the adverse health effects and then evaluat280
ing the potential or probability of such effects.
According to the AB report, in order to follow the proper
methodology when adopting an SPS measure, states need to develop a concept of the proper magnitude of risk and focus on "scientifically identified risks." 281 The SPS Agreement explains how to
assess risks in Article 5.2.282 The factors listed there include some
assessment methods that are not laboratory-based, and it is not a
"closed list" of factors. 283 Governments are thereby free to consider
"the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real
world where people live and work and die" when adopting SPS
284
measures.
The same textual approach was used by the AB Report when it
interpreted the Article 5.1 requirement that an SPS measure be
"based on" a risk assessment. The Appellate Body rejected the
panel's attempt to add additional requirements-a "minimum procedural requirement" and a "substantive requirement" (that the
scientific conclusions implicit in the measure correspond to those
reached by the risk assessment) 285 - that a state must follow in order for its measure to be based on a risk assessment. Instead, the
Appellate Body stressed that, when read contextually with Article
2.2, Article 5.1 requires that the risk assessment sufficiently warrant or reasonably support the SPS measure.286 The substantive requirement of Article 5.1, and the test to be applied to all future
measures, is that there be a "rational relationship between the
287
[SPS] measure and the risk assessment."
Focusing closely on the text of the SPS Agreement allowed the
Appellate Body to emphasize the wide latitude a government actually possesses in designing the SPS measure it believes necessary

282

Id.
Id. T 183.
Id. T 185-86.
Id. 187.

283

Id.

284

Id.

285

Id.

286

Id.

287

Id.

279
280
281

188-89.

193.
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to meet its goals. 288 When designing a risk assessment, govern289
ments can look at qualitative as well as quantitative factors,
adopt risk assessments developed by other Member States or international organizations, 290 and adopt the minority view on a scientific issue. 291 Consequently, when a DSU panel searches for the
rational relationship between an SPS measure and its risk assessment, the panel must do a case-by-case analysis taking into account
292
all considerations that bear on potential adverse health effects.
The one area in which the Appellate Body concurred with the
panel report was on the key fact issue-whether the EC had per293
formed a risk assessment on the effects of growth hormones.
The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the studies and
evidence submitted by the EC showed the existence of the general
risk of cancer but not the particular risks at stake in the hormone
dispute-the carcinogenic or genotoxic potential of the hormone
294
residues found in the cattle produced with growth hormones.
The final recommendation of the Appellate Body Report was
standard for such reports- that the EC bring its SPS measures into
compliance with its SPS obligations. 295 The recommendation did
not provide guidance on how the EC should comply. Since the basis for the adoption and maintenance of the ban was flawed - it
was not based on a risk assessment -it is arguable that compliance
required removal of the ban. Simple removal of the ban, however,
was never contemplated by the EC.
2.3.2.3. Implementation and Surveillance Phase
Eight years after the adoption of the AB Report, EC compliance
remains unresolved. No other WTO dispute has continued over
such a long period. Immediately after the Appellate Body issued
its report, the EC announced its intention to comply. The EC,
however, failed to reach consensus with the United States and Canada on the time frame for implementation. 296 Consequently, the
288

Id.

194.

289

Id.

187.

290

Id.

190.

291

194.

293

Id.
Id.
Id.

294

Id.

200.

295 Id.

255.

292

296

195-209.

Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Pro-
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three parties ended up before an arbitrator on the issue of a "reasonable period" of time for EC compliance. 297 The Article 21.3 arbitration revealed the crucial divide between the disputing parties
over what would constitute compliance with the Appellate Body
recommendations. The EC argued that thirty-nine months was a
"reasonable period" of time,298 contending that it would need two
years to perform a risk assessment and another fifteen months to
take any necessary legislative action in response to such an assessment. 299 In support of this compliance plan, the EC contended
that the DSU does not specify what implementation means and
that each Member State has options concerning "the precise means
30 0
of implementation."
The United States countered with the argument that the conducting of any risk assessment was irrelevant to implementation
and could not be used to delay the reasonable period of time
needed to comply.3 1 Canada concurred that withdrawal of the
ban was the only way the EC measure could be brought into compliance. 302 Canada also argued that countenancing any argument
for a risk assessment would only "reward" the EC by allowing it to
claim the benefits of the precautionary principle (the SPS Agreement provision that allows for provisionary measures even with3
out a risk assessment). 03
The arbitrator concluded that the "reasonable period" of time
should be the shortest time possible within the legal system to im-

cedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, EC - Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones); T 1, 2, WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13 (May 29, 1998)
[hereinafter Hormones 21.3].
297

DSU art. 21.3.

Hormones 21.3, supra note 296, 5.
Id. As part of its argument, the EC outlined its plan to conduct hormonespecific and residue-specific assessments of all the hormones that had been
banned. It also stated that it would abolish, amend, or maintain the ban based on
the assessment. Id. 6.
298
299

300
301

Id.
Id.

8.
17.

Id.
The SPS Agreement has a version of the precautionary principle in Article
5.7. Under its terms a Member State can put into effect a measure even when
there is insufficient scientific evidence. Article 5.7 is designed to allow provisional
measures for governments needing to protect the public. Since the government
receives leeway to proceed without a risk assessment, however, it is under an obligation to further study the issue. SPS Agreement art. 5.7.
302
303
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plement the DSB recommendations. 3°4 The arbitrator could not
reconcile the concept of prompt compliance with the EC request
for time "to conduct studies or to consult experts to demonstrate
305
the consistency of a measure already judged to be inconsistent."
The arbitrator also noted that the EC had been facing SPS obligations since 1995 but had not managed to produce studies that
would allow it to meet its obligations. 3 6 The report concluded that
the EC was entitled to a 15 month period, long enough to withdraw the measure under EC legislative rules. 30 7 The decision thus
undercut the EC position that it was completely free to devise its
own method of compliance. The EC response was to ignore the
basis for the arbitrator's determination in its subsequent actions.
After this point, virtually every part of the Hormones controversy became marked by disagreements between the parties over
how to proceed. 3 8 The EC followed through on its announced
plans to begin a risk assessment. 309 In its last status report 310 on implementation in May 1999, the EC announced to the DSB that the
available scientific evidence did not leave it in a position to lift its
ban.311 The United States and Canadian response was to seek authorization for the suspension of concessions under Article 22 of
312
the DSU.
This action precipitated a procedural controversy that remains
unresolved today. The EC argued that a WTO Member State is not
entitled to proceed under Article 22 unless it has followed compliance procedure under Article 21.5. The United States and Canada
disagreed on the "sequencing" of steps that parties are required to

Hormones 21.3, supra note 296, 26.
Id. 39.
306 Id. 40.
307 Id. 47.
308 See generally Wager, supra note 158, at 795-814 (discussing the disagreements and subsequent developments).
309 Id. at 797.
310 Under the DSU, Member States are required to report on the actions they
have taken towards compliance. The issue of compliance is overseen by the DSB
and is put on its agenda six months after the date of the reasonable time period
has been established. The DSB is supposed to keep the issue on the agenda until
"the issue is resolved." DSU art. 21.6.
311 Status Report by the European Communities, European Communities Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/17/Add. 4,
WT/DS48/15/Add. 4 (May 11, 1999).
312 DSU art. 22.2.
304
305
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take under Articles 21.5 and 22.313 Since the EC had taken no action, the two countries felt free to seek the suspension of concessions. The parties also ended up before another arbitrator over the
issue of the proper amount of concessions.314 The resulting decision led to a DSB authorization of sanctions of $116.8 million per
315
year for the United States and $11.3 for Canada.
As sanctions continued, the EC took steps towards their own
conception of compliance. The EC completed its first risk assessment studies (1999-2000)316 and subsequently passed revised legislation banning growth hormones (banning one completely and five
others provisionally) based on those studies (2003).317 During this
time frame, EC and United States officials also tried to negotiate a
political settlement to the case -compensation for the United States
and Canada and a continuation for the suspension of concessions
EC ban -but no agreement was ever reached. 318 Trying to spur the
EC into taking action it would find satisfactory, the United States
in 2000 adopted "carousel retaliation." 319 This is the practice of rotating the products that would be subject to the WTO-authorized
tariff increase in order to increase pressure from all of the affected
EC industries on their government to withdraw the ban. The
United States justified its adoption of the carousel legislation on

313 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the sequencing controversy). Parties to other WTO disputes reaching the stage of sustained noncompliance have negotiated over the issue of sequencing in each case.
314 Any suspension of concessions granted by the DSB is supposed to be
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment of the benefits suffered by
the prevailing party. DSU art. 22.4. If the disputants cannot agree upon the appropriate level of concessions, the matter is sent to arbitration. Id. art. 22.6-.7.
315 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities -Measures
Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 83 WT/DS26/ARB July 12, 1999); see also
Wtiger,supra note 158, at 795-97 (discussing the issues raised during that arbitration).

316

Wuger, supra note 158, at 798-800.

Council Directive 2003/74, 2003 O.J. (L 262) 17-18 (EC); Communication
from the European Communities, European Communities -Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/22, WT/DS48/20, Oct. 28, 2003
[hereinafter EC Communication] (attaching the EC's new Directive 2003/74/EC
to the DSB, and stating that "with the publication and entry into force of this Directive, the EC considers that it has now fully implemented the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB in the aforementioned dispute.").
318 Wtiger, supra note 158, at 812-14.
319 Trade and Development Act of 2000, § 407 Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat.
317
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367

the EC non-compliance in Hormones and Bananas 111.320 When faced
with threats from the EC to go to sanctions in the FSC dispute,
however, the Clinton administration chose not to implement car321
ousel retaliation.
In October 2003, the EC announced its new legislation to the
DSB and claimed that its new scientific evidence 322 justified its ban.
The EC also took the position that by enacting Directive
2003/74/EC it had fully implemented the DSB recommendations
thus requiring the United States and Canada to terminate sanctions.323 Both the United States and Canada argued that it was not
clear that the EC measure was consistent and refused the EC request to initiate a compliance proceeding under Article 21.5 to resolve this dispute. 324 Negotiations continued over this impasse until November 2004 when the EC requested consultations with the
United States and Canada 325 on the legality of the continued suspension of concessions. When consultations failed, the EC requested the establishment of a panel in January 2005.326 The panel
heard arguments in the case in September 2005.
2.3.2.4. Continued Suspension of Obligations in EC-Hormones
Dispute
The EC claims in the new dispute are that by 1) leaving in place
the suspension of concessions from the Hormones dispute; and 2)
both making unilateral determinations that the new EC ban is in
violation of the SPS Agreement and failing to seek recourse under

Wtiger, supranote 158, at 806.
Id. at 806-07. The United States and EC did end up having the DSU consultations over carousel retaliation but the dispute was never pursued further. Id.
at 810.
322 EC Communication, supra note 317, Annex I.
323 Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 7 November 2003,
28, WT/DSB/M/157 (Dec. 18, 2003).
324 Id.
29-31.
325 Acceptance by the United States of the Request to Join Consultations,
United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute,
WT/DS320/5 (Dec. 14, 2004); Acceptance by Canada of the Request to Join Consultations, Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligationsin the EC-Hormones Dispute,
WT/DS321/5 (Dec. 14, 2004).
326 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities,
United States -Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute,
WT/DS320/7 Gan. 14, 2005).
320
321
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Article 21.5327-the compliance procedure-the United States and
Canada have violated Articles 21.5, 22.8 and 23.1 and 23.2(a) of the
DSU as well as Articles I and II of the GATT.328 The GATT claims
relate directly to the imposition by United States and Canada of the
sanctions against the EC following the Hormones dispute. Consequently, those claims will not be accepted by a panel as violations
unless the EC can establish that the actions of both countries violate the DSU provisions. The following section sets forth and analyzes the positions the parties have taken in the dispute which was
heard by a panel that was scheduled to issue its report in October
2006.329

The parties fail to agree about the very nature of the Continued
Suspension dispute. The EC argues that the case is about the proper
procedural obligations of Members who continue to maintain the
suspension of concessions after proper notification by the losing
party of its adoption of implementing measures. 330 The EC also
claims the case is not about EC compliance in the Hormones dispute. 331 By contrast, the United States argues that the dispute raises
the "simple question of whether the EC has established that it has
come into compliance" in the Hormones dispute. 332 The total variance in these positions reflects the unusual posture of the dispute.
The dispute is the first WTO case to center on the obligations of
disputing parties on an issue that the DSU does not directly address- what happens after the suspension of concessions has been
333
authorized.
327 Id.; see also First Written Submission by the European Communities, United
States- Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute,
4,
WT/DS320 (July 11, 2005) [hereinafter EC Submission].
328Id. 8.
329 The United States and the EC have made their written submissions available on the USTR and Europa websites. The Chairman of the panel has for the
second time announced that due to the complexity of the scientific issues involved
(and in scheduling a second open hearing with the Parties and experts), it would
not complete its work within the normal six month time frame. Communication
from the Chairman of the Panel, United States -Continued Suspension of Obligations
in the EC-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/10 (Jan.29, 2007).
330 EC Submission, supranote 327,
7, 25.
331 EC Submission, supranote 327, TT 7, 25.
332 First Written Submission of the United States, United States- Continued
Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute,
7, WT/DS320 (Aug. 8
2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_- Agreements/Monitoring
_Enforcement/Dispute-Settlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset
uploadjfile331_7903.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Submission].
333 The Section 301 dispute did focus on whether the U.S. statute Section 301
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The WTO-authorized sanctions in Hormones have gone on for
almost eight years, far longer than any retaliation. The Uruguay
Round negotiators did not seem to provide for sanctions to continue over a sustained period. According to the DSU, the suspension of concessions is meant to be "temporary" and continue only
until the measure that was found to be inconsistent has been removed. 334 Obviously the drafters believed the use of sanctions
would force the resisting party to comply. In addition, the DSU
lacks any procedure for determining whether implementation has
taken place after the use of DSB-authorized sanctions. The assumption was probably that the disputing parties would negotiate
a solution to a dispute after sanctions were authorized and employed. In the other disputes which have seen the sustained use of
sanctions, the parties either negotiated a settlement to end sanctions (Bananas III) or withdrew the sanctions after the losing state
took action to remove the offending measure, even while invoking
an Article 21.5 proceeding on whether the new measure was fully
compliant (FSC). The textual gaps in Article 22, therefore, do leave
the parties free to argue about what each party is required to do
should a dispute reach this point.
The United States and Canada have continued sanctions because neither country believes that the EC has complied with the
DSB recommendation that the EC bring its measure into compliance. 335 From the beginning, the United States and Canada have
contended that the EC must remove the ban to be in compliance.
The EC position is that it has removed the old ban and put a new
measure (Directive 2003/74) in place based on its new risk assessments. 336 The EC contends that since it has removed the old ban
and put in place a properly supported ban, it is in compliance with
the DSB recommendations and that it is the continued sanctions
that violate the DSU. 337 Thus, as it argued in November 2003 and
was in compliance with DSU Article 23. See infra Section 2.3.7.2. In that case,
however, the focus was on the U.S. statute and whether by maintaining it the
United States violated its DSU Article 23 obligations. The Continued Suspension
dispute goes right to the core of what steps disputing Member States are obligated
to take during the post-suspension phase of a dispute.
334 DSU art. 22.8.
335 See Tobias Buck, US 'Will Not Lift' Sanctions on EU in Beef Spat, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 2003, at 8 (discussing the continuation of the sanctions).
336 EC Submission, supra note 327,
3.
337 Id. T 17, 95-99 (discussing factual aspects in 7 17 and legal arguments in
95-99).
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maintains in the Continued Suspension dispute, the EC has complied
with its WTO obligations by removing the old ban and enacting
338
the new measure.
The inability of the parties to agree on the central issues of the
dispute also appears in how they argue to the panel. The EC focuses its submission on U.S. violations that indicate unilateralism
on the part of the United States in continuing the suspension of
concessions. According to the EC, the United States has violated
the DSU provision prohibiting unilateralism, Article 23, 33 9 by continuing to suspend concessions. The particular violation claimed is
of Article 23.2(a) which states that a Member shall not make a determination that a violation has occurred without recourse to dispute settlement under the DSU procedures. 340 The EC contends
that by continuing sanctions authorized for the old measure and
ignoring the EC claims of implementation, the United States is
making a determination without recourse to the multilateral system- to the Article 21.5 review which it would properly test the issue of compliance.34The EC argues that it is entitled to a presumption of good faith regarding its claim that Directive 2003/74/EC is
in compliance with obligations (from the Hormones case) and that
the United States is not allowed to make a unilateral determination

338

Id.

7.

Article 23 was added to the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures
when the new DSU was adopted. The EC had pushed from the beginning of the
dispute settlement negotiations for the adoption of Article 23, entitled, "Strengthening the Multilateral System." The measure was aimed at the United States and
its use of Section 301. The EC had argued that the reform of the dispute settlement system required a ban on unilateral action of the type the United States had
engaged in under Section 301. CROOME, supra note 256, at 126-27. During the final phase of negotiations on the DSU the negotiators adopted the negative consensus rule, and, as a counterpart to that, Article 23. Id. at 281-83.
34 Specifically,
339

In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred,
that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of
any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except
through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and
procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate
Body Report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under
this Understanding ....
DSU art. 23(2).
341 EC Submission, supra note 327,
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to the contrary. 342 Since according to this argument the EC has
complied, the United States is required to discontinue the suspension of concessions under Article 22.8, 343 (which sets out the course
of action for the removal of sanctions). In the alternative, the EC
argues that if the panel finds no violations of Articles 23, 22.8, or
21.5 based on the EC presumed compliance, the panel should find
that the EC has actually fully complied by adopting Directive
2003/74/EC.344 Since the United States continues to suspend con34
cessions despite the EC's actions, it is in violation of Article 22.8. 5
The United States, by contrast, argues that the EC arguments
lack textual support in Article 22.346 According to the United
States, it is the EC's actions that constitute a unilateral determination-namely, that the EC is in compliance. The United States argues that by simply making a claim that it has complied, the losing
party to a WTO dispute cannot dictate the issue of whether DSBauthorized sanctions can continue. 34 7 According to the United
States, the DSB plays a monitoring role at this point in WTO disputes and Article 22 is concerned with the multilateral review of
compliance. 348 Article 22.8 by its terms contemplates the lifting of
sanctions when 1) the offending measure is removed; 2) the losing
Member State "provides a solution" to the nullification or impairment caused by the measure; or 3) the disputing parties reach a
349
mutually satisfactory solution.
The United States also contends that the EC actions do not establish any of the grounds for discontinuing sanctions. Moreover,

342
343

Id. 7 72, 80-98.
Id. 98. Article 22.8 provides:

The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary
and shall only be applied until such time as the measures found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the Member
that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to
the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached.
DSU art. 22(8).
344 EC Submission, supra note 327, 77 135-46.
345 Id.
346
347

147.

U.S. Submission, supra note 332, 7 109.
Id.

348 Id.
349 DSU art. 22(8); U.S. Submission, supra note 332,
104 (stating that these
are the three grounds for removing a suspension of concessions and that the EC
has to establish one of them in order to prevail in its Article 22.8 claim.).
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accepting the EC position that it can determine compliance would
undercut the stable operation of the DSU itself. If this argument
were accepted, it would allow a Member State to avoid the consequences of a WTO breach. 350 Most importantly, the EC bears the
burden of proof under Article 22.8. 351 The EC must establish to the
satisfaction of the DSB that it has removed the measure or provided a solution. Since it has not done so, according to the United
States, it has not made out a prima facie violation of Article 22.8.352
The United States then examines, and seeks to disprove, the
claims the EC has made about Directive 2003/74-that the new
ban on one hormone (estradiol 17p) and the provisional ban on the
five other hormones -complies with the SPS Agreement obligations. The EC claims that the provisional ban is justified under the
SPS Agreement, Article 5.7 version of the precautionary principle,
and that the final ban is justified by its risk assessment. 35 3 The
United States' submission subjects each relevant SPS Agreement
provision - Articles 5.7 and 5.1 - to a textual analysis in order to
prove that the EC's actions here cannot meet their requirements.
With regard to the provisional ban, the EC cannot establish the Article 5.7 requirements that 1) it be imposed where scientific evidence is insufficient or 2) it is based on the "available pertinent information." 354 The United States points to the long study of
hormones (over twenty-five years) and risk assessments, including
those done recently, which establish that there is sufficient scientific information. 35 5 The United States also argues that the many
studies which do exist reveal that the residues from meat products
do not pose a risk to consumers, thus undercutting the EC claim
that its provisional ban is based on the "available pertinent information." 356 According to the United States, the final ban on estradiol 17P in Directive 2003/74 also fails to satisfy EC SPS Agreement obligations for the same reason as the original EC ban-that
350 U.S. Submission, supra note 332, T 112.
351 Id.
113.
352 Id. $$ 114-15.
353 Id.

121.

354 Id.

123.

355 Id.

124-27. The United States cites another Appellate Body Report on
Varietals, which indicated that insufficient information meant that there was not
even enough evidence to do a risk assessment under Article 5.1. The United
States argues that there is enough evidence to do such a risk assessment on these
five hormones.
356 Id.

131.
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373

is not based on a proper risk assessment. 3 7 The United States contends that Directive 2003/74 rests on opinions and studies that do
not demonstrate the specific risks posed to humans from hormone
residues. 358 Consequently, the opinions and studies do not rea3 9
sonably support the ban as required by Article 5.1. 5
With regard to its second alleged violation, the refusal to pursue the procedure under Article 21.5 to resolve the issue of EC
compliance, 360 the United States argues that the DSU specifies several pathways parties can follow in post-suspension situations.3 61
The policy arguments that the EC offers for why the United States
was obligated to bring an Article 21.5 case would result in the DSU
being "rewritten in the manner desired by the EC."362 The United
States points out that since the WTO dispute reform negotiators
have failed to reach a consensus on a post-suspension process, the
panel should resist prescribing a solution. 363 The EC pursuit of the
Continued Suspension dispute as a new case also illustrates that Ar364
ticle 21.5 does not provide the only way to proceed.
The final defense of the United States is against the EC claims
that it had made a unilateral determination of inconsistency of the
new measure in violation of Article 23 of the DSU. 365 The United
States argues that it has made no "determinations" about the EC
Directive (and whether it complies with the EC's obligations);
rather, it has simply made statements about its evaluation of the
366
EC Directive.
2.3.3. Helms-Burton
The Helms-Burton case 367 differs from all of the other impossible

360

Id. 135.
Id. 1 139, 141-60.
Id. 167.
Id. 168.

361

Id.

357
358
359

Id. 168.
Id. 198.
364 Id.
199-200.
365 Id.
170-80.
366 Id.
184.
367 See Helms-Burton Panel Request, supra note 97 (summarizing the legal
dispute between the European Communities and the United States concerning
Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes).
362
363
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cases in one major respect. The dispute between the EC and the
United States was submitted to the DSU system but a panel, although appointed, 368 never reviewed the case. The United States
took the position that the WTO has no jurisdiction over the dispute.369 The United States refused to participate officially and
never submitted any documents regarding the dispute to the DSB.
The United States took this stance even though it was a supporter
of the DSU and at that time was the most active litigant under its
new procedures. 370 Consequently, the Helms-Burton case has a
background and post-WTO aftermath 371 but no actual input from
the dispute settlement system itself.
Why was the United States so determined to avoid the WTO as
a forum for defending the Helms-Burton statute? In all likelihood,
if the United States had accepted WTO jurisdiction, it would have
had to develop a position on the meaning of its best defense: that
the U.S. measure372 was justified under Article XXI of the GATT
because it served U.S. national security interests.
2.3.3.1. Background
The triggering event for the U.S. adoption of the Helms-Burton
statute was the downing by the Cuban military of two small planes
368 See Helms-Burton Panel Request, supra note 97, at 3 (stating that under the
terms of Article 7 of the DSU, if no agreement is reached between the parties after
twenty days of establishment of a panel, the Director General appoints a panel);
see also United States - The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/3
(Feb. 20, 1997).
369 The United States made statements on this issue only before the DSB and
to newspapers. See David E. Sanger, U.S. Won't Offer Trade Testimony on Cuba Embargo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at Al (providing a statement from Stuart Eizenstat, United States Under-Secretary of Commerce).
370 See John H. Jackson & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Helms-Burton, the U.S., and
the WTO, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Mar. 1997, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insight7.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2007) (expressing
concerns that the United States would change the DSU system by boycotting the
case).
371 See generally Stefaan Smis & Kim Van Der Borght, The EU-U.S. Compromise
on the Helms-Burton and D'Amato Acts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 227 (1999) (providing
background material relating to the Helms-Burton case and post-WTO aftermath).
372 Article XXI is entitled "Security Exceptions" and provides several bases
for a state to invoke a defense for action it considers necessary for the protection
of essential security interests. The most relevant provision is XXI(b)(iii), which
reads: "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of
its essential security interests... (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations...." GATT art. XXI(b)(iii).
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flying over Cuba in February 1996. 373 The legislation had already
passed both houses of Congress in the fall of 1995 but had been
stalled by the Clinton administration. 374 U.S. Congressional desire
to take action against Cuba, beyond the traditional embargo, had
been building since the early 1990s. The trade embargo against
Cuba, put in place as a response to Castro's decision to expropriate
all foreign property in 1959, began in 1962.37 5 Increased congressional dissatisfaction towards Cuba and the desire to take additional steps against the regime in the 1990s was in response to Castro's efforts to replace lost Soviet aid with appeals to other
376
countries to seek out investment in Cuba.
The downing of the aircraft simply provided the political force
for Senator Jesse Helms and Congressman Dan Burton to push for
Presidential acceptance of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (LIBERTAD),377 which has most often been referred to as the Helms-Burton Act. 378 Even before President Clinton signed the legislation (in February 1996), there was an outcry
from the EC and other major U.S. trading partners, notably Canada
and Mexico, against the law. 379 In March 1996 the EC summarized
373 The United States argued that the planes were in international air space
while Cuba contended otherwise. The four men killed were Cuban-Americans
working with the anti-Castro group Brothers to the Rescue. See Jerry Gray, President Agrees to Tough New Set of Curbs on Cuba, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 29, 1996, at Al (describing the event).

374

Id.

Proclamation No. 3447: Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, 27 Fed. Reg.
1085 (Feb. 6, 1962); Cuban Import Regulations, Miscellaneous Amendments, 27
Fed. Reg. 2765 (Mar. 24, 1962); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 420 (1996)
(discussing the format of the embargo when issued).
376 The first statute passed during this period was the Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992, which attempted to stifle such investment by prohibiting foreign affiliates
of U.S. companies' licenses if they engaged in transactions with Cuba. 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6001-6010 (2004). The law also authorized the President to prohibit economic
and military aid, military sales or debt relief to any country providing assistance
to Cuba. Id. § 6005. See H. Paemen, Avoidance and Settlement of 'High Policy Disputes': Lessons from the Dispute over 'The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act,'
in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES 361-64 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Mark
A. Pollack eds., 2003) (describing the growth of congressional dissatisfaction with
Cuba).
377 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021- 6091 (2004) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].
378 There were other factors at play as well: 1) a politically powerful group of
citizens (the Cuban-American community) pushing for action and 2) long- term
U.S. outrage over an unrepentant communist state located so closely to the United
States.
379 Paeman, supra note 376, at 363.
375
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the objections of all of these countries in the formal protest, stating
that the Act would revive long-standing disagreements over "the
unilateral and extraterritorial aspects of various statutes imple380
menting U.S. policy vis-A-vis Cuba."
The Helms-Burton Act has four major sections-the overall
purpose was to dissuade other countries from investing in Cuba
and to undercut the Castro regime. 381 Title I codified and strengthened the long-standing embargo against Cuba. 382 Title II laid out
the forms of assistance the United States was prepared to give to
Cuba if it had a democratically elected government. 383 Title III
provided a private right of action for U.S. citizens (both those who
were citizens before the 1959 expropriations and those who subsequently became U.S. citizens) to pursue actions in federal court
against companies that trafficked in property that had been expropriated without compensation. 384 Title IV of the Act required the
U.S. State Department to deny U.S. visas to officials of companies
(and their families) that trafficked in expropriated property.385
Not content simply to protest what was widely perceived as a
unilateral attempt to force all countries to participate in the embargo against Cuba,386 most major U.S. trading partners ultimately
passed blocking legislation against the Helms-Burton Act.387 The

380 Dmarches by the European Union: Delegation of the European Commission, Mar. 5, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 398-99.
381 See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, pt. 1, at 35 (1995) ("The purpose of this new civil
remedy is, in part, to discourage persons and companies from engaging in commercial transactions involving confiscated property, and in so doing to deny the
Cuban regime the capital generated by such ventures and deter the exploitation of
property confiscated from U.S. nationals").
382 Helms-Burton Act, supra note 377, § 102.
383 Id. §§ 202- 04, 207.
384 Id. § 302.
385 Id. § 401.
386 See Lowenfeld, supra note 375, at 429-30 (explaining how the provisions of
the Helms-Burton Act operate as a secondary boycott).
387 See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA), R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1985),
amended by 1996 S.C., ch. 28 (Can.), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 111 (1997); Mexico: Act to
Protect Trade and Investment from Foreign Norms That Contravene International
Law, Oct. 23, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 133 (1997); Council Regulation 2271/96, Protecting
Against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by
a Third Country, 1996 O.J. (L309) 1, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 125 (EC) (blocking the
Helms-Burton statute).
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EC also asked for WTO consultations 388 on the Act in May 1996
while it was preparing its blocking legislation.
The EC request for WTO consultations noted that the Cuban
Democracy Act and the Liberated Act contained provisions which
had the intent and effect of restraining the liberty of the EC "to export to Cuba or to trade in Cuban origin goods" and that it contained "measures which may lead to the refusal of visas and the
exclusion of non-US nationals from US territory in a way which
may contravene US commitments under GATS."389 In its request
for the establishment of a panel, the EC claimed that the U.S.
measures violated Articles V (Freedom of Transit), XI (Prohibition
on Quantitative Restrictions) and XIII of the GATT and Articles II,
III, VI, XI, XVI and XVII of GATS and its Annexes on the Movement of Natural Persons (paragraphs 3, 4).390
While the United States never filed any documents with regard
to the dispute, it did present views on the dispute during two
meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). In the October
1996 meeting, the United States argued that the Helms-Burton Act
had only two new features (the private rights of action and the exclusion provisions) and that most of the EC complaint concerned
pre-existing U.S. trade measures. 391 According to the United States
this proved that the dispute was "not fundamentally a trade matter" and that the legislation was enacted in pursuit of "essential US
security interests." 392 The final U.S. contention was that the WTO
had been established to manage trade relations and not "diplomatic or security relations that might have incidental trade or investment effects." 393 By the November 1996 DSB meeting, the
United States formalized its final position on the dispute-that the

388 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/1 (May 13, 1996) (circulating the request for the establishment of a panel to Members of the WTO).
389

Id.

Helms-Burton Panel Request, supra note 97.
See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William
Rappard on 16 October 1996, WT/DSB/M/24 (Nov. 26, 1996) (describing the discussion about The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act that was passed
in the United States and the European Communities, and their member states' request for the establishment of a panel).
392 Id.
390
391

393

Id.
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WTO lacked competence and that any recourse to a panel would
394
pose risks for the WTO's new dispute settlement system.
The Helms-Burton dispute was the thirty-eighth dispute submitted to the DSU system. During the consultations period on the
case in the fall of 1996, the DSU had been in operation for not quite
two years and had produced only five panel reports and two Appellate Body reports. The new WTO and DSU were still regarded
as experiments that needed support from the Member State governments. Consequently, neither side was eager to use the WTO as
the only forum for resolving the dispute. The EC took some efforts
to respond to the crisis by negotiating a "Common Position on
Cuba," a document it closely negotiated with the United States 395
In response, President Clinton continued to waive the Title III provisions on private rights of action. 396
When the DSB did appoint a panel under DSU rules in February 1997, the United States announced that it would not take part
in the proceedings. 397 The United States claimed that the WTO
lacked competence and that if it invoked the national security exception, there would be no proceedings in the case. 398 The EC resisted this interpretation of WTO competence and countered with
the argument that a panel would have to decide the issue of com399
petence.

394 See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William
Rappard on 20 November 1996, WT/DSB/M/26 (Jan. 15, 1997) (summarizing the
continuing discussion regarding The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act passed in the United States and the European Communities and their member
states' request for the establishment of a panel).
395 See Paemen, supra note 376, at 365 ("In an effort to de-politicize the conflict, the EU, in December 1996, adopted a 'common position' towards Cuba.")
(citing Common Position of 2 December 1996 defined by the Council on the basis
of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on Cuba, O.J. 1996 (L332)).
396 See Paemen, supra note 376, at 365 ("The 'common position' was quoted by
President Clinton as the basis for announcing in January 1997 that he was suspending the right to bring suits under Title III for another six months.").
397 See Sanger, supra note 369 ("Just hours after the World Trade Organization
appointed a panel of judges to hear a European challenge to Washington's embargo of Cuba, the United States said today that it would refuse to take part in the
legal proceedings.").
398 Id.
399 Sanger quoted Prof. Jackson's disagreement with the U.S. position ("I
think the U.S. is way off base"), and noted that within the Clinton administration
some officials argued that the position could later be used against U.S. interests.
Id.
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President Clinton, who had initially opposed the HelmsBurton Act, continued to push for a diplomatic settlement with the
EC. Ultimately, this negotiation process resolved the dispute. In
April 1998, the two governments concluded a Memorandum of
Understanding 40 0 dealing with the Helms-Burton and the
Iran/Libya Sanctions Act. The deal struck involved the "new"
portions of Helms-Burton. The President would continue to suspend Title III and try to obtain authority from Congress to waive
Title IV (on exclusions) in exchange for the EC suspension of the
WTO panel. 401 The suspension of the WTO panel continued until
the lapse of the panel's authority under DSU rules in April 1998.402
In May of that year, the United States and EC signed another
agreement that removed the threat of any WTO action. The "Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for the Strengthening of
Investment Protection" was adopted to provide a common
U.S./EC position on how to deter future expropriations and protect investors. 403 The EC announced that it would not take action
on the Helms-Burton Act "as long as the waiver of Title III HelmsBurton remain[ed] in effect" and waiver authority was granted for
Title IV.404 The official United States response was that it had always believed that the dispute was "a matter that should be handled through diplomatic channels rather than the W.T.O." 405

400 European Union-UnitedStates: Memorandum of UnderstandingConcerning the
U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, Apr. 11, 1977, 36
I.L.M 529, 529-30 (1997).
401 Id.
402 See Note by the Secretariat, United States - The Cuban Liberty and Democratic
SolidarityAct, Lapse of the Authorityfor Establishment of the Panel, WT/DS38/6 (Apr.
24, 1998) (describing the lapse of the panel).
403 See
Guide
to
the
EU-US
Summit
(May
18,
1998),
http://www.eurunion.org/partner/summit/9805sum.htm (follow "Understanding on Conflicting Requirements and Disciplines on Investment in Expropriated
Properties" link) [hereinafter Guide] ("The EU and the U.S. agree to step up their
efforts to develop agreed disciplines and principles for the strengthening of investment protection" and recognize "that the standard of protection governing
expropriation and nationalisation embodied in international law and envisioned
in the MAI should be respected by all States.").
404 The EU made a "Unilateral Statement" during the EU-US Summit that
contains its pledges regarding the Helms-Burton Act. Id. (follow "EU Unilateral
Paper" link).
405 David E. Sanger, Europeans Drop Lawsuit Contesting Cuba Trade Act, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1998, at A8 (quoting Stuart Eizenstat, the Under Secretary of State
for economic and business affairs and chief negotiator for the United States regarding the EU's challenge to the Helms-Burton Act).
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2.3.3.2. The Basis of a WATO Case
Since the Helms-Burton case was avoided, it is only possible to
speculate about how it would have been litigated or decided. The
U.S. position was that the WTO lacked competence. If the United
States stuck by that position, it would have refused to participate
in any panel proceedings. It is difficult to know what course the
DSB would have taken. Given how the Appellate Body has interpreted the other GATT exceptions, notably Article XX, it is fair to
conclude that any invocation of Article XXI would have started
with a panel examining the text and the context and purpose of Article XXI.406 Nothing in the terms of Article XXI provides a jurisdictional defense. In addition, Article XXI places limiting conditions
40 7
on when a state is entitled to argue for the exception.
Prior GATT litigation never fully interpreted Article XXI.408
Consequently, if the dispute had gone ahead of the WTO, the parties might have been forced to submit to a panel for determination
of the crucial issues of WTO competence to hear "national security" disputes.409 The other major interpretive decision would have
been whether a WTO Member State invoking the exception has the
power to define for itself (auto-define) what constitutes an "essential security interest." 410 Neither the United States nor the EC
See Appellate Body Report, United States- Standardsfor Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) (criticizing the panel report
for not following the "fundamental rule of treaty interpretation" by applying the
General rule of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, Art. 31, and thus failing to "take adequate account of the words actually
used by Article XX in its several paragraphs.").
407 Under Article XXI, a country is not barred from taking action which it considers "necessary for the protection of its essential security interests" (emphasis
added). In addition, Article XXI specifies the type of situation that must be in
place for the country to claim such protection -matters relating to fissionable materials, to traffic in arms, ammunition, or implements of war, or taken in time of
war or other emergency. GATT art. XXI(b).
408 See Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, "Constitutionalization" and
Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 424, 430-38 (1999) (discussing GATT experiences with Article XXI).
409 Schloemann & Ohlhoff find no support for the idea of Article XXI providing a direct jurisdictional defense. Id. at 438-41.
410 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Minutes of Meeting Held in the
Centre William Rappard on 17-19 July 1985, C/M/191 (Sept. 11, 1985), cited in
GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATF LAW AND PRACTICE 561 (6th. ed. 1994)
(summarizing the U.S. argument for such auto-definition in the lead-up to the establishment of a panel in US-Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua); see also
Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 408, at 442-48 (discussing whether Art. XXI
provides an indirect jurisdictional defense); Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, Inter406
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would necessarily want the second issue answered if the answer
ended up severely limiting a state's power to define its security interests. Undoubtedly this is one of the reasons why each side
pressed so hard for a negotiated settlement.
2.3.3.3. Aftermath of Avoiding a Dispute
The issue of a WTO dispute does appear to have been resolved.
The EC has not re-opened the dispute. In other ways, however, the
1998 Understanding failed to produce some of the results the two
parties intended. 41 ' Congress refused to grant a waiver for Title IV
and instead asked for stricter enforcement of its provisions. 412 The
EC protested but did not take any other action. 413 Scholars examining the 1997 and 1998 Agreements have concluded that the U.S.
position on the overall issues was actually strengthened. The EC
adopted a resolution to the dispute that did not require the United
States to abandon the positions it had taken in the Helms-Burton
Act. In addition, the EU/U.S. resolution applies only to EC companies rather than all affected states. 414 During his terms in office,
415
President Bush has regularly extended Title III waivers.
national Adjudication on National Security Issues: Mhat Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J.
INT'L L. 365, 381-85 (2003) (rejecting the arguments that conclude that the wording
of Art. XXI leads to "an entirely ... self-judging exception," as well as the argument "that national security questions are essentially political questions and inherently matters to be decided by the State .... ); Kelly, supra note 68, at 104
("The competing interpretive views diverge upon whether this exception is selfjudging, whether the invoking state may unilaterally declare the exception, or
whether the WTO may assess its validity.").
411 See Paemen, supra note 376, at 367-69 (explaining why the Understanding
failed); see also Smis & Van Der Borght, supra note 371, at 231-36 (discussing the
1998 Agreement generally, and how the Agreement "leaves many questions unanswered," such as whether this non-legally binding "soft law agreement may
prove to have more legal force than intended by the participants.").
412 See Paemen, supra note 376, at 367 ("The US Congress, rather than granting the legislative waiver, asked for a strict implementation of Title IV.").
413 Id. (noting the EU's "strong opposition" as set forth in its "Unilateral
Statement.").
414 Id. at 368-69 ("It is difficult to assess what the real impact of the HelmsBurton legislation has been on foreign investment in Cuba," though it appears
that, according to researcher Paolo Spadoni, "the Helms-Burton law has deterred,
to some extent, new investors from doing business in Cuba."); see also Smis & Van
Der Borght, supra note 371, at 235 (the 1998 Agreement "serves to end the [U.S.
Acts'] negative consequences only for the European Union but leaves the circumstances for other states unaltered.").
415 See Paemen, supra note 376, at 369 (observing that President Bush has
regularly decided to extend the Title III waiver at each six-month interval).
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2.3.4. Film
2.3.4.1. Background
The Film dispute416 marked the culmination of a protracted
fight between the United States and Japan over the relative openness of the Japanese market. The U.S. view, put forward in its use
417
of Section 301 against, and demands for, negotiations with Japan,
was that despite the lack of traditional trade barriers (tariffs or
quotas) Japan's market was effectively closed to some U.S. goods.
The Japanese market was itself structured, through its heavily
regulated distribution system and its lack of strong antitrust poli418
cies and enforcement, to shut out competing goods.
The very nature of these concerns about Japan makes the Film
case very different from the other impossible cases pursued by the
United States.

In those disputes - Bananas III and Hormones - the

419
United States could point to a clear GATT or WTO violation.
42
0
Moreover, it is
There are no GATT rules on competition policy.
commonplace for countries with competition regimes to have very
different interpretations of what competition means. 4 21 Finally,
competition law governs private party conduct while GATT/WTO

416 Panel Report, Japan-MeasuresAffecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Film Panel Report].
417 See Taylor, supra note 34, at 238-42 (describing how the U.S. strategy of
dealing with Japan in the 1980s and 1990s differed from its use of Section 301 regarding developing countries).
418 See id. at 238 (describing the U.S. frustration with Japan).
419 See discussion supra Sections 2.3.1.3, 2.3.2.3 (discussing the legal issues in
the BananasIII and Hormones disputes).
420 See Mitsuo Matsushita, Basic Principlesof the WTO and the Role of Competition Policy, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 363, 370 (explaining that in Film, "the
U.S. action failed ...due to the fact that it aimed at the wrong target" because the
issue involved was private conduct-the distribution policy of Fuji-and the
WTO does not have the power to deal directly with private conduct).
421 See Report (2000) of the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and
26, 31, WT/WGTCP/4 (Nov. 30, 2000)
Competition Policy to the General Council,
(finding that national competition policies vary greatly as a result of differences in
"history and stage of development, socio-economic circumstances, legal contexts
and cultural norms"); see also Julian Epstein, The Other Side of Harmony: Can Trade
and Competition Laws Work Together in the InternationalMarketplace?, 17 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 343, 361 (2002) (noting that the Japanese distribution system is largely controlled by "[i]nterlocking vertical relationships -often referred to as Keiretsus,"
which "are an important part of the economic fabric in Japan but might be considered verboten" by U.S. and European rules).
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law constrains government action. 422 The United States, therefore,
never pursued its concerns about Japan's market into the GATT
dispute settlement system.
Given the strength of Japanese companies in the U.S. market
and the resulting high trade deficit, however, the United States did
feel compelled to take unilateral action against the closed nature of
Japan's market. 423 The Section 301 statute was amended in 1988 to
add to the list of "unreasonable" practices government toleration
of "systematic anti-competitive activities" against which USTR
could pursue investigations, make determinations, and if necessary, use threats of sanctions or sanctions. 424 In that same revision
of the statute, Super 301 was also adopted. This new trade action
was originally designed to be used by USTR for two years to identify both the priority countries and practices that posed the most
significant trade barriers. 425 The plan by Congress was always to
target Japan with Super 301.426 Over the two years of the statute's
life, the United States did bring several trade actions against Japan
427
and settled each one under the threat of retaliatory sanctions.
During the same time period, however, the United States also tried
to pursue its market opening strategy by creating negotiation initiatives. The most significant of these efforts was the Structural
422 See John Linarelli, The Role of Dispute Settlement in World Trade Law: Some
Lessons from the Kodak-Fuji Dispute, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 263, 266 (2000) (detailing a U.S. claim to the DSB relating to Japanese competition policy and restrictive business practices).
423 See Taylor, supra note 34, at 238-39 (describing the U.S. action against Japan); see also THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTr, RECIPROCITY AND
RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLIcY 33 (1994) (explaining the "Japan Problem");
Patricia Isela Hansen, Antitrust in the Global Market: Rethinking "Reasonable Expectations," 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1601, 1614-18 (1999) (discussing the development of the
policy of "aggressive unilateralism" -"the aggressive use of economic threats to
pressure foreign governments to negotiate solutions to international economic
disputes" -and explaining how the United States used aggressive unilateralism in
its Section 301 dispute over semiconductors, the pressure from which contributed
to the establishment of the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII)).
424 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§
1301-04, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-82 (1988); see infra Section 2.3.7 for a more complete
description of the Section 301 statute.
425 See id. § 1303.
426 Taylor, supra note 34, at 239 (positing that President Reagan agreed to enact Super 301 and target Japan "in order to avoid even more protectionist legislation that had passed in the House").
427 The three trade actions against Japan alleged "exclusionary government
procurement in supercomputers and satellites and the alleged erection of technical barriers to trade in forest products." Id. at 239.
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Impediments Initiative (SII) aimed at focusing on issues such as
distribution policies and competition policy.428 The SII negotiations produced some results regarding competition policy-Japan
agreed to increase enforcement under its competition law.429 The
SII talks, however, never completely resolved U.S. concerns. Consequently, President Clinton agreed to the reenactment of Super
301 in 1994.430
The Uruguay Round negotiations were completed in 1994
without adding any new discipline regarding competition policy.
The United States, however, kept Section 301, taking the position
that "unreasonable" cases were not covered by its new obligations
under the WTO's DSU. The common view about the competition
issue was that there was no real way to apply U.S. antitrust law on
an extraterritorial basis to deal with the Japan problems. 431 The
United States, therefore, brought cases under the provision of Section 301 that allowed for action against "unreasonable" practices. 432
The two cases were Auto Parts433 and PhotographicFilm and Paper.434
428 See U.S., Japan Launch StructuralImpediments Initiative, 89 DEPT. ST. BULL. 78
(1989) (detailing the Bush-Uno meeting and agreement on the SI).
429 See Mitsuo Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan, in GLOBAL
COMPETITION POLICY 151, 155-56 (Edward M. Graham & J. David Richardson eds.,
1997) (describing the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII)); see also Spencer Weber Wailer, Can U.S. Antitrust Laws Open InternationalMarkets?, 20 Nw. J.INT'L L. &
Bus. 207, 211 (2000) (discussing U.S. antitrust laws in foreign competition).
430 See Clinton Renews Super 301 Measure; Provision Seeks Market Opening, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 367 (Mar. 9, 1994); see also Taylor, supra note 34, at 239-40
(noting that while the SII talks resolved U.S. concern over some issues, like distribution, U.S. concern over other issues, like antitrust, prompted President Clinton
to reenact Super 301 in 1994).
431 See David A. Gantz, Lessons From the United States-Japan Semiconductor
Dispute, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 91, 122 (1999) ("[lIt [is] unlikely that the
U.S.... would seek to expand its foreign antitrust activities to cover such situations."); Epstein, supra note 421, at 352 (discussing the skepticism surrounding the
ability of U.S. antitrust laws to penetrate market access barriers).
432 See Taylor, supra note 34, at 277-88 (discussing how the United States uses
the "unreasonable" practices provision in Section 301 to pursue structural barriers).
433 See Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment: Barriers to Access to the Auto Parts Replacement Market in Japan, 59 Fed.
Reg. 52,034 (Oct. 13, 1994) (initiation); Notice of Determination and Request for
Public Comment Concerning Proposed Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: Barriers to Access to the Auto Parts Replacement Market in Japan, 60
Fed. Reg. 26,745 (May 18, 1995) (determination) [hereinafter Section 301 Auto
Parts].
434 See Initiation of Investigation Pursuant to Section 302 Concerning Barriers
to Access to the Japanese Market for Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 60
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In the Section 301/Auto Parts the United States argued that the
Japanese government tolerated the Keiretsus (the interlocking distribution networks that operated throughout the economy) and allowed a market setup that shut out the U.S. auto parts from the
market. 435 The dispute ended in a negotiated settlement arrived at
only after the United States threatened Japan with a one-hundred
percent tariff increase on luxury automobiles. 436 Japan filed for
consultations in the new WTO, contending that this use of Section
301 retaliation violated U.S. commitments under the GATT as well
as under Article 23 of the DSU. 43 7 The two countries reached a set-

tlement under which the United States withdrew its threat and Ja38
pan dropped the WTO dispute.4
In the Section 301 Photographic Film dispute, the USTR determined that the Japanese government "established and tolerated a
market structure that impede[d] U.S. exports of consumer photographic materials to Japan. .. ."439 The Japanese government refused to negotiate with the United States because the United States
had again both used Section 301 and threatened sanctions. 440 Japan

Fed. Reg. 35,447 (July 7, 1995) (initiation) [hereinafter Section 301 Initiation]; Section 304 Determinations: Barriers to Access to the Japanese Market for Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,929 (June 18, 1996) (determination)
[hereinafter Section 301 PhotographicFilm].
435 Section 301 Auto Parts,supra note 433.
436 See U.S. Threatens Duties on Luxury Cars Worth $5.9 Billion in Japan 301 Dispute, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 848 (May 17, 1995).
437 Request for Consultations by Japan, United States - Imposition of Import Duties on Automobiles from Japan Under Sections 301 and 304 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS6/1 (May 22, 1995). Japan contended that the threatened U.S. retaliationlisting products that would be covered by the tariff increase -would violate U.S.
obligations under GATT Article I (MFN) and Article II (Tariff Binding). Japan
also claimed that the announcement and implementation of the Section 301 determination were "inconsistent with the obligations of the Government of the
United States under Article 23 of the DSU[,] which seeks [to] 'strengthen[] the
multilateral system' by specifically prohibiting recourse to unilateral actions." Id.
438 The United States had wanted Japan to guarantee it a share of the Japanese auto parts market. Japan refused to do so but did offer pledges of liberalization that the two countries would review bi-annually. For a thorough review of
the Auto Parts dispute and the DSU issues it raises, see Eleanor Roberts Lewis &
David J. Weiler, Will the Rubber Grip the Road? An Analysis of the U.S.-JapanAutomotive Agreement, 27 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 631 (1996), and Jagdish Bhagwati, The U.S.Japan Car Dispute:A Monumental Mistake, 72 INT'L AFF. 261 (1996).
439 Section 301 PhotographicFilm, supra note 434.
440 Japanese Refusal to Negotiate on Film, Chips Causes Concern, 13 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 165 (Jan. 31, 1996); Andrew Pollack, Japan's Tack on Trade: No More 1on-i, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 1996, at D1.
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also took the position that the subject matter of the dispute was inappropriate for Section 301 and that any complaint should have
been filed with the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) because
the dispute concerned Japan's failure to enforce its antimonopoly
law.441
Faced with this intransigence the United States brought the
Film dispute to the WTO. 442 The claims in the Film dispute were
that a series of Japanese laws and regulations affecting the distribution and internal sale of photographic film and paper violated
GATT Articles III and X, and that they also nullified and impaired
GATT benefits under Article XXIII(1)(a) and (b).443 The nonviolation nullification and impairment claims (those under Article
XXIII(1)(b)) were the first such claims the United States had
brought before the DSU system. The United States had to base
most of its case on these claims given the absence of GATT rules on
competition policy.
One of the major forces driving the Section 301 and WTO cases
on film was the U.S. decision to support its major film producer,
Kodak. Kodak had long accused its major Japanese competitor,
Fuji, of benefiting from the closed Japanese market. Kodak, therefore, sought out a Section 301 case by petitioning the USTR. 444 Both
Kodak and Fuji launched extensive public relations campaigns in
an attempt to influence U.S. government views about the case and
whether it should pursue it before the WTO rather than unilaterally under Section 301. 445 Just as in Bananas III, the United States
441 Linarelli, supra note 422, at 272; see also Epstein, supra note 421, at 353 (analyzing the Film panel's findings).
442 Request for Consultations by the United States, Japan- Measures Affecting
Consumer PhotographicFilm and Paper,WT/DS44/1 (Jun. 21, 1996) [hereinafter Film
Consultation]. The United States also brought another request for consultations
with Japan on its limitations of distribution services due to the operation of the
country's Large Scale Retail Store Law. Request for Consultations by the United
States, Japan - Measures Affecting DistributionServices, WT/DS45/1 (Jun. 20, 1996).
This case involved more than just restrictions on the distribution of photographic
film and paper. It was never pursued by the United States after the Film case was
resolved. Id.
443 Film Consultation, supra note 442.
444 Section 301 Initiation, supra note 434. It is normal for industries going to
the USTR to present it with a brief containing not only legal arguments but a detailed factual basis for the case. See Shaffer, supra note 188, at 34 (evincing the normality of briefs containing a detailed factual basis for the case).
445 See JAMES P. DURLING, ANATOMY OF A TRADE DIsPUTE: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE KODAK-FUJIFILM DisPuTE 63-148 (2000) (providing an extensive set
of materials created by both Kodak and Fuji in the public relations campaign).
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stood behind the major U.S. industry pushing for the case. In the
446
Film dispute, however, the USTR made a major miscalculation.
After an aggressive litigation, the United States lost on every claim.
2.3.4.2. The Film Dispute
The Film dispute rivals Bananas III in the complexity of the legal
measures placed under attack. 447 The United States introduced
thousands of documents in an attempt to fully set out and prove its
claims. The evidence included twenty thousand pages of original
Japanese-source documents. 448 The United States alleged that the
Japanese government
used eighteen measures 449 (eight distribution
"countermeasures," 450 two measures regarding large scale stores, 451
and eight promotion "countermeasures" 45 2), some going back to
1967, to violate individually and collectively the GATT and to nullify or impair benefits the United States expected from three different rounds of GATT tariff negotiations.453 The U.S. claims were (1)
446 Shaffer, supra note 188, at 34 (noting that a costly loss in Film left the USTR
in a weakened negotiating position with regard to Congress when it was considering whether to renew fast track negotiating authority).
447 See supra Section 2.3.1 for a more thorough discussion of BananasIlI.
4W Alan Wm. Wolff, Reflections on WTO Dispute Settlement, 32 INT'L LAW. 951,
956 (1998).
449 Over the course of the litigation the United States refined its list of the
government measures it was contesting. Film Panel Report, supra note 416. The
panel ultimately examined eighteen of them in its report. The panel report sets
out a description of each measure as described by the United States. Id.
2.11.52.
450 The distribution "countermeasures" were adopted to counter the liberalization Japan had agreed to in new commitments made to the OECD. The eight
distribution measures were: 1) The 1967 Cabinet Decision; 2) The JFTC Notification 17; 3) Distribution Committee Sixth Interim Report; 4) Distribution Committee Seventh Interim Report; 5) 1969 Survey on Transaction Terms; 6) 1970 Guidelines for Rationalizing Terms of Trade for Photographic Film; 7) 1971 Basic Plan;
and 8) 1975 manual. Id. 10.23.
451 The two measures were the Large Stores Law (with its regulations and
administrative measures) and a 1979 Amendment by the Japanese Diet to the law.
Id.
452 The Premiums Law/promotion countermeasures were: 1) 1971 JFTC Notification 34; 2) 1977 JFTC Notification 5; 3) 1981 JFTC guidance on dispatched employees; 4) 1982 Self-Regulating Rules; 5) 1982 Establishment of Fair Trade Promotion Council; 6) 1983 JFTC guidance on advertising rules; 7) 1984 Self-Regulating
Standards; and 8) JFTC Approval of 1987 Retailers Code. Id.
453 The United States argued that the distribution measures violated Article
III of the GATT (National Treatment). The unpublished enforcement actions by
the JFTC and its unpublished guidance regarding the applicants for stores under
the Large Scale Stores law violated Article X(1) (transparency requirement). All of
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that the distribution measures encouraged and facilitated "the
creation of market structures for [photographic] film and paper in
which imports are excluded from traditional distribution channels," (2) that the restrictions on allowing large scale stores limited
the "growth of an alternative distribution channel for imported
film," and (3) that the promotion measures disadvantaged imports
"by restricting sales promotions" and together nullified and impaired U.S. benefits under Article XXIII(1)(b).44 The United States
also argued that the distribution measures were inconsistent with
Japan's obligations under the GATT rule on National Treatment
(Article 111(4)) and that Japan had failed in its obligations to make
its laws and regulations transparent (Article X(1)).455 Japan denied
56
all of the allegations.4
The parties, in their submissions to the panel, focused on the
non-violation claims; consequently, the panel took up these claims
first and devoted most of the report to these claims. 4 7 The decision
to focus on these claims became the most important aspect of the
case. To prevail, the United States would have to argue that, regardless of whether Japan had violated GATT rules, Japan had denied the United States benefits the United States expected from
participation in the GATT/WTO.
The Article XXIII(1)(b) basis for claims has existed since the beginnings of GATT. Even when the DSU was adopted, the Member
States left this form of jurisdiction in place. By allowing such
claims, the WTO countenances substantial leeway for interpreta4
tion by panels of when a complaining country is entitled to relief. 58
As a result, the earlier GATT panels had been fairly strict in their
interpretations of when relief should be provided. In the eight
non-violation cases argued prior to Film, the panels found only

the eighteen measures combined to nullify and impair benefits under Article
XXIII(1)(b). Id. 10.24.
454 Id.
10.22, 10.24.
455 Id. 10.24.
456 Id. 10.25.
457 According to the panel, the parties began with the non-violation claims in
their oral and written submissions and "devoted the lion's share of their arguments to this portion of the case ..
" Although the panel normally would have
dealt with the GATT violation claims first, it chose to follow what the parties had
done. Id. 10.26-27.
458 See Trachtman, supra note 63, at 370 (explaining that the non-violation
theory "authorizes substantial construction of norms by dispute resolution").
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twice that the complaining party had proven its case. 45 9 The Film
panel began with the finding that the United States bore a special
burden of proof on the non-violation claims. 460 The panel then
turned its attention to the non-violation remedy. 461 The panel drew
the purpose of Article XXIII(1)(b) from the last non-violation case
decided in the GATT dispute system, EC-Oilseeds.462 The Film
panel agreed with the earlier GATT determination that XXIII(1)(b)
was designed to safeguard the tariff concessions negotiated by
countries. 463 As explained in Oilseeds, the non-violation remedy
acts as a restraint on government actions that would undermine
one country's tariff liberalization commitments and cost the other
country the competitive relationship it expects to gain from such
commitments. 464 The Film panel's review of the previous GATT
non-violation cases led it to the conclusion that the non-violation
remedy had to be "approached with caution and treated as an exceptional concept." 465 Although the facts of the Film dispute did
not correspond to the earlier non-violation cases, 466 the panel found
that facts alleged in the U.S. complaint could qualify as nonviolation measures. The panel refused to forbid any government
actions ("financial or non-financial, direct or indirect")467 and noted

459 See Taylor, supra note 34, at 279-83 (detailing the history and different elements of non-violation cases); Trachtman, supra note 63, at 371 (noting that there
have been only nine cases - including Film - brought using the non-violation concept).
460 As the complaining party the United States would naturally bear the burden of proof. Given the fact that the non-violation remedy is an exceptional one,
however, the panel pointed out that the complaining party had to provide a "detailed justification" to support its allegations. Film Panel Report, supra note 416,
10.30. The requirement for this special burden of proof comes from Article 26.1 of
the DSU and had come into that understanding from prior GATT practice. Id.
10.30-31.
461 Id. 10.35-.36.
462 Id.
10.36; Report of the Panel, European Economic Community-Payments
and Subsidies Paid to Processorsand Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, L/6627 (Jan. 25, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 (1991).
463 Film Panel Report, supra note 416, 10.35.
464 See Id. (drawing from the panel's quotation from Oilseeds).
465 Id. 10.36. The reason for the caution in granting the remedy is that countries negotiate for the rules they agree to follow and therefore "only exceptionally
would expect to be challenged for actions not in contravention of those rules." Id.
466 All of the earlier GATT non-violation claims had involved a country offering or modifying a subsidy on a product following the grant of a tariff concession
on that same product.
467 Film Panel Report, supra note 416,
10.38.
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that "a Member's industrial policy, pursuing the goal of increasing
efficiency in a sector, could in some circumstances upset the competitive relationship in the market place between domestic and
imported products . *..."468
The reasoning suggests the broadest
possible reading for what can constitute a non-violation measure
469
by a government.
As it worked its way through the requirements to establish a
non-violation claim- a government "measure" affecting a
GATT/WTO "benefit accruing" to another country that is "nullified or impaired" as a result of the application of the measure -the
panel adopted broad readings of two of them. Each of these interpretations is the one argued for by the United States. In conducting this analysis, the panel closely examined the text of Article
XXIII(1)(b) and the earlier GATT non-violation cases.
The panel determined that the phrase "measure" encompassed
more than legally binding laws and regulations and could cover
administrative guidance. 470 The panel rejected Japan's argument
that the measures under examination had to constitute legally
binding obligations and adopted a broad definition. 471 The panel
believed such a reading was necessary to achieve the goals of the
non-violation remedy 472 and covered even private party action if
there was "sufficient government involvement." 473 The broad
reading of "measure" ensured that most of Japanese measures isolated by the U.S. were, in fact, examined by the panel. The panel
report also gave a broad reading to the "benefit" requirement under Article XXIII(1)(b).474 The U.S. case was aided here as well

w Id.
469 See Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert W. Staiger, It's a Question

of Market Access, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 66 (2002) (explaining how the Film panel accepted the notion that "regulatory subsidies" such as tax enforcement of antitrust
law could be the basis of a non-violation claim); see also Gantz, supra note 431, at
118 (suggesting that one of the legal "wins" by the United States was that government actions other than subsidies could nullify and impair benefits).
470 The panel took notice of the Japanese government practice of providing
such administrative guidance to firms and expecting compliance with such guidance "in light of the power of the government and a system of government incentives and disincentives arising from the wide array of government activities and
involvement in the Japanese economy." Film Panel Report, supra note 416, T
10.44.
471

Id.,

472

Id.

10.49
10.50

473 Id. IT 10.52-.56.
474 Id. 10.61-.70. The benefits at issue in all of the non-violation cases in-
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since it claimed "legitimate expectations" 475 arising from liberalization commitments made by Japan in three successive GATT negotiating rounds: the Kennedy (1967), Tokyo (1979) and Uruguay
(1994) Rounds. 476 The panel adopted the U.S. argument that earlier
concessions were incorporated into WTO obligations and that reasonable expectations could exist with regard to concessions from
successive tariff rounds. 477 The United States was required to
prove, however, that it could not have reasonably anticipated
Japanese measures at the time the tariff concessions were granted
in each round.478 Given this requirement, even with a broad reading of "benefit," the United States would have a tough, and what
479
proved to be impossible, proof problem.
With regard to the final XXIII(1)(b) requirement- causality, or
proving the nullification and impairment of benefits occurred because of the government measures -the United States was also assigned a heavy burden.480 According to the panel, for the United
States to prevail it had to show a "clear correlation between the
measures and the adverse effect on the relevant competitive relationships." 481 The government measures at issue had to "upset the
competitive relationship between domestic and imported" products. 482 The panel isolated this requirement of Article XXIII(1)(b) as
the most "factually complex" area of examination and noted that
cluding the Film dispute have been expectations of improved market access opportunities coming from tariff concessions.
475 Prior GATT cases had determined that these "expectations" had to be legitimate- they had to take into account all of the measures of the country making
the concessions "that could have been reasonably anticipated at the time of the
concession." Id. 10.61-70.
476 Id.
10.63.
477 Id.
10.64, 10.70.
478 Id. 10.65.
479 See Trachtman, supra note 63, at 371 n. 176, 373 (contending that "[bly imposing the burdens of proof as to the legitimacy of expectations and anticipation
of the subject measures, the panel substantially constrains the scope of NVNI
[non-violation nullification and impairment].").
480 Film Panel Report, supra note 416,
10.82.
481Id.
482 Id. It has been argued that this type of causality would be difficult to establish for competition type claims as they involve measures that do not target a
specific action. See Seung Wha Chang, Interaction Between Trade and Competition:
Why a MultilateralApproach for the United States? 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 29
(2004) ("Competition-related government measures tend to be long-term measures of general application not intended to target a specific action, similar to those
at issue in the Kodak-Fuji Film dispute.").
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several earlier non-violation cases had failed because they could
not prove this causal connection. 483
The panel then devoted the bulk of its report to a measure-bymeasure analysis of whether the United States could prove the
three required elements for each claim. The parties focused most
of their arguments on the facts underlying the claims. 48M In its examination of each measure, the panel found that the United States
failed to establish all of the required elements ("measure," "benefit" or causality) for any of them. Because the United States failed
to meet the evidentiary burden for the non-violation claims, it
could not prove that the Japanese government's actions (as opposed to other factors) upset the competitive relationship between
imported and domestic film and paper in the Japanese market. 48 5
The panel also found that the Japanese measures did not provide
less favorable treatment for imported products under Article 111(4)
or violate Article X.486
The panel thus handed the United States a complete repudiation of its claims about the Japanese government actions regarding
its domestic film market. The United States chose for the first time
after a loss not to appeal. There are theories about why the United
States responded as it did. Some contend that given the nature of
the panel report - the United States' failure to prove its case - there
was very little for an Appellate Body to review. 4 7 Others view the
483 Film Panel Report, supra note 416,
10.83. The panel found that when establishing causality, the complainant could: 1) show the measure made a de
minimis contribution to nullification or impairment; 2) rely on de facto as well as
de jure forms of discrimination; and 3) proceed without showing intent to cause
harm. Id.
10.84-.87. The United States was also allowed to argue that measures should be looked at collectively as well as individually. Id. 10.88.
484 James P. Durling & Simon N. Lester, Original Meanings and the Film Dispute: The DraftingHistory, Textual Evolution and Application of the Non-violation Nullification or Impairment Remedy, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 211, 260, 268-69
(1999) (relating how Durling and Lester, both of whom represented Fuji in the
Film dispute, contended that the parties to the case focused on facts rather than
issues of legal interpretation).
485 With regard to the distribution countermeasures the panel found that the
United States could not prove causality "principally because single-brand distribution appears to have occurred before and independently of those 'measures,'
but also because the United States has not demonstrated that these 'measures' are
directed at promoting vertical integration or single-brand distribution." Film
Panel Report, supra note 416, 10.204. The panel found a similar failure to establish causality with respect to the Large Scale Stores Law and the promotion measures. Id. IT 10.233, 10.349.
486 Id. 9 10.382, 10.404.
487 Durling, supra note 445, at 648; Gantz, supra note 431, at 118.
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manner of interpretation as one which limited the use of the theory
for cases in which the target country had a non-transparent economy with close government-industry connections. 488 The United
States officially took the position that the panel had ruled against it
on factual points but not on the legal issues. 489 The United States
followed up on the Film dispute by setting up an inter-agency
monitoring of the Japanese film market. The basis for the U.S.
monitoring was its belief that Japan had made commitments about
having an open film market due to Japanese representations to the
490
WTO panel.
The aftermath of the case left in place yet another interpretation
of the non-violation nullification and impairment theory, a failed
491
case for it on the facts, and a higher threshold for future cases.
488 See Alan W. Wolff, America's Ability to Achieve its Commercial Objectives and
Operation of the WTO, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1013, 1025 (2000) (contending that
the WTO was completely ineffective in such a case and that this could have been
foreseen at the end of the Uruguay Round); Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner?
The United States and the World Trade Organization,1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 49, 59-60 (2000)
[hereinafter Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner?] (noting that the Film panel refused to
impute a potential for anticompetitive effects coming from collaborative government-industry activity and that "[g]overnments that obstruct and obfuscate but
avoid confrontation act within the scope of prerogatives reserved in the GATT
bargaining process"); see also Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance,Antitrust, and the
Limits of International Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 200 (2005) ("Conversely, when regulation takes the form of case-by-case application of general
standards that are shaped by complex policy goals and that carry significant potential for international wealth redistribution, those affected by the regulation and
those who impose it cannot easily commit to a mutually beneficial agreement.").
489 Mark Selinger, WATO Panel Sides with Japan in Kodak-Fuji Film Case, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA) (Dec. 9, 1997) (discussing how according to Ambassador
Barshefsky, the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"), the panel "ignored
what is happening in Japan's restricted domestic marketplace by focusing on narrow, technical issues instead of the 'real issues' in the case").
490 See Mark Selinger, USTR Statement on Japan Film (Feb. 3, 1998) reprintedin
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, at 9-12 (Feb. 6, 1998); Mark Selinger, EU Joins U.S. In Pledging
To Test Japan's Film Market Claim, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) at D2 (Feb. 10, 1998)
("Japan stated that it had a policy of ensuring non-discriminatory access to the
Japanese distribution system and improving market access in the photographic
film sector and other sectors .... "); see also Gary Yerkey, U.S. Says Japan Still Not
Doing Enough to Open Film Sector Despite Pledges to lATO, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1446 (Aug. 26, 1998) ("The United States ... called on Japan to take additional 'aggressive' action to open its domestic market to sales of foreign photographic film
and paper, accusing Tokyo of not following through on its representations to the
World Trade Organization over the past few years.").
491 See Steinberg, supra note 13, at 252 n.35 ("The panel interpreted the nonviolation nullification or impairment standard in GATT Article XXIII(1)(b), clarifying ambiguities in a way that left a narrow basis for claims based on that standard."); Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner?,supra note 488, at 60 ("By requiring specific
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The United States was forced to return to its earlier posture for
dealing with its problems with the structure of Japan's economy492
long-term negotiations.
2.3.5. Shrimp/Turtle
2.3.5.1. Background
Like other impossible cases, the ShrimpTurtle dispute was
bound to provoke extended and controversial litigation in the DSU
system. The dispute involved a challenge to a U.S. trade measure
aimed at protecting the environment, in this case endangered sea
turtles. The U.S. approach in designing this environmental protection- setting the appropriate standard for protection and attempting to coerce other states to adopt that standard by limiting U.S.
market access- had been under attack for years 493 as an illustration
of aggressive unilateralism. 494 The history of the Shrimp/Turtle dispute actually involved a unilateral measure similar in design and
effect 495 that had been challenged in the GATT in the 1990s. 496 Both
evidence of anticompetitive collusion between government and industry ... it
signaled a tolerance of protectionist policies that depend on relationships rather
than positive laws."); Trachtman, supra note 63, at 373 ("By imposing the burdens
of proof as to the legitimacy of expectations and anticipation of the subject measures, the panel substantially constrains the scope of NVNI [non-violation nullification and impairment]."); Hansen, supra note 423, at 1604 ("[Tlhe panel created
significant barriers to any future claims involving antitrust concerns.").
492 Gantz, supra note 431, at 121.
493 Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A
New Legal Baselinefor the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 491,
491-92 (2002).
494 Sanford Gaines, The W/TO's Reading of GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 739, 749
(2001) ("Thailand, Malaysia, and their Asian neighbors seem to have been motivated to bring the dispute by broader policy concerns about U.S. environmental
unilateralism (which could apply to other products important to them, such as
timber) and by a keen desire... to establish clear GATT restraints on trade restrictions for environmental purposes.").
495 See Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products,
7.11-.12, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp
Panel Report] (describing India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Thailand's claims regarding the violation of GATF 1994 Article XI(1)).
496 See Report of the Panel, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter
Tuna/Dolphin f]; Report of the Panel, United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
DS29/R (June 16, 1994), 33 l.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna/DolphinII] (describing the U.S. embargo of imported fish harvested in purse-sein nets).
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panel decisions in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute had gone against the
United States but the decisions had not been adopted by the GATT.
Consequently, the question of whether a country could adopt such
measures and justify them under the GATT had never been definitively determined.
At issue in the GATT cases was U.S. legislation, the Marine
Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), aimed at protecting dolphins
by prohibiting tuna imports unless they were caught by dolphinfriendly methods. 497 The Tuna/Dolphin I case was brought by Mex498
ico when its tuna imports into the United States were banned.
The GATT panel found the MMPA violative of the GATT Article
III (National Treatment) rule and not excused by either relevant
499
general exceptions (Article XX(b) and (g)) to the GATT rules.
The panel's controversial and heavily critiqued holding regarding
Article XX500 was that neither exception allowed governmental
measures to protect the environment beyond the territorial juris-

497 The Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA") required the government
to limit the incidental killing of dolphins by commercial fishing. In order to
achieve this goal, the MMPA placed restrictions on the methods U.S. fishermen
could use to catch tuna and required the Secretary of Commerce to certify that the
appropriate method was used. The MMPA also empowered the Secretary of
Commerce to prohibit the importation of tuna products from countries whose
dolphin kill ratio exceeded that of the U.S. fishermen by a certain measure. Maine
Mammal Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972); see also Earth Island v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (1991) (ordering enforcement of the MMPA
against Mexican tuna imports).
498 At issue in the dispute was tuna imported from Mexico which had been
caught using purse-seine nets which did not allow for the escape of dolphins.
DANIEL C. EsTy, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 29
(Inst. Int'l Econ. 1994); see also Gaines, supra note 494, at 752.
499 Article XX(b) allows GATT Contracting Parties to adopt measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health." Article XX(g) allows a Contracting Party to adopt measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption." GATT art. XX(b), (g).
500 See Howse, supra note 493; see also Howard F. Chang, Towards a Greener
GATT: Environmental Trade Measures and the Shrimp/Turtle case, 74 S. CAL. L REV.
31, 32 (2000) (characterizing the GATT litigation as hostile towards environmental
trade measures and the Shrimp/1urtle Appellate Body decision as bringing "GATT
case law much closer to a reasonable balance between environmental and trade
interests"); Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the
Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2141-49, 2170-98 (1915) (pointing out how
the panel "strained to reach its conclusions regarding Article XX" and applied
"dubious reasoning with respect to Article XX(g)"); Howard F. Chang, Carrots,
Sticks and InternationalExternalities,17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 309 (1997) (suggesting
that the regime suggested by the GATT would create perverse incentives).
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diction of the enacting state.5 01 When Mexico did not push for the
adoption of the panel report,5 02 the EC almost immediately brought
a second GATT case challenging the MMPA for its secondary boycott provision, which banned tuna imports from any country engaging in tuna trade with an embargoed country.
The
Tuna/DolphinII panel report rejected the jurisdictional limitation on
50 3
the Article XX exception decided by the Tuna/Dolphin I panel.
Instead the panel found the United States did not qualify for an exception to GATT obligations since any government measure that
would be effective only if other countries were forced to change
their policies could never satisfy Article XX. 50 4 Since neither
Tuna/Dolphin panel report was adopted, they did not come to represent GATT law on such measures. Nevertheless, the litigation
and the contested interpretations of Article XX 505 provoked a backlash from environmental groups 5 0 6 concerned that the logic of the
decisions would severely limit the power of a government to pursue environmental policies.
Another environment/species protective piece of legislation
from the same time period was the U.S. measure aimed at limiting
the number of endangered sea turtles killed in the course of commercial fishing. The measure, Section 609,507 was an amendment to
the Endangered Species Act that required that U.S. and foreign
fishing vessels be equipped with Turtle Excluder Devices ("TEDs")
501 Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 496,
502 ESTY,supra note 498, at 31, 269.

5.25-.26, 5.31-.32.

503 Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 496,
5.15 ("[T]he text of Article XX(g) does
not spell out any limitation on the location of exhaustible natural resources to be
conserved."); Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 496, T 5.20 (contending that there is "no
valid reason supporting the conclusion that the provisions of Article XX(g) apply
only to... resources located within the territory of the contracting party invoking
this provision").
504 Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 496,
5.23-.27; See Gaines, supra note 494, at
757 ("[T]he panel concluded that the U.S. tuna embargo did not qualify under
XX(g) because it did not protect the dolphin resource directly but operated by putting trade pressure on other governments to change their policies with respect to
dolphin protection.").
505 See Howse, supra note 493 (displaying a critique of each case).
506 See id. at 494; ESTY, supra note 498, at 31 (arguing that current international
trade rules must be significantly reformed to address environmental concerns
while still promoting economic growth).
507 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103 Stat. 988,
1037-39 (codified at Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1537
(1994)) [hereinafter Section 609].

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss2/2

2007]

IMPOSSIBLE CASES IN THE WTO

by 1989 that would allow the turtles to escape shrimp fishing nets.
Section 609 authorized the State Department to follow two major
courses of action in order to achieve U.S. goals. First, the State Department was empowered to commence negotiations to obtain bilateral and multilateral agreements aimed at protecting sea turtles.508 Second, in the trade-related portion of Section 609, State
Department was required to certify that any shrimp importing
countries either had a regulatory program comparable to that of
the United States (use of TEDs) or that the fishing environment did
not pose a risk to sea turtles. 509 If the State Department did not certify the country, then shrimp imports were to be banned. The State
Department developed implementing guidelines and regulations
for Section 609510 that concentrated on enforcing the sea turtle
measures throughout the Caribbean. 511 Dissatisfied with this limited application of the statute, major environmental nongovernmental organizations 512 pushed for further action by bringing litigation against the State Department. The Court of International Trade determined that the terms of the statute required the
513
State Department to apply its certification program worldwide.

508 Id. § 609(a)(1)(a).

509 See id. § 609(b)(a)(2) (creating regulatory program requirements for importation).
510 See Revised Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 58 Fed.
Reg. 9015, 9016 (Feb. 18, 1993) (implementing guidelines for following Section
609).
511 See Gaines, supra note 494, at 765 (discussing the reasons that the State
Department selected a limited geographic scope for the certification program).
512 The litigation in which the environmental group ultimately prevailed was
before the Court of International Trade. See Earth Island Institute v. Christopher,
913 F. Supp. 559, 580 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) (providing the full text of the opinion in
which the court ruled for the environmental group). The groups filing as plaintiffs (in addition to Earth Island Institute) included the ASPCA, the Humane Society, the Sierra Club, and the Georgia Fisherman's Association. The case actually
had been brought the first time in a federal district court in California but had
been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Earth Island Inst. v.
Christopher, 6 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1993) (dismissing the case in California prior to
its filing in the Court of International Trade).
513 See Earth Island, 913 F. Supp. at 575 ("No language of section 609 restricts
its geographical purview, nor can the court accept the premise that the statute is
simply silent on the matter."); see also Earth Island Inst. Christopher, 922 F. Supp.
616 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (denying the State Department's request for an extension
on the timeframe for complying the court's order).
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Just after the U.S. litigation concluded and the State Depart515
ment regulations 514 were revised to extend to all foreign nations,
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand sought consultations5 16 on
Section 609 and the revised guidelines and later the establishment
of a panel.5 17 The panel found that the import ban on shrimp violated GATT Article XI (the prohibition on Quantitative Restric5 19
tions)sl 8 and was not justified under the Article XX exceptions.
The basis for the panel ruling was that the U.S. measure was not
justified under the terms of the chapeau (or introductory section)
of Article XX as that provision did not allow unilateral trade meas5 20
ures taken to protect the environment.
2.3.5.2. The Shrimp/Turtle Dispute
The shape of the Shrimp/Turtle dispute was determined by its

514 See Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations,
61 Fed. Reg. 17,342 (Apr. 19, 1996) (providing the state department regulations for
specific fishing operations).
515 Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 495,
2.11.
516 Request for Consultations by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand,
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/1 (Oct. 14, 1996).
517 See, e.g., Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Malaysia and Thailand, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/6 (Jan. 10, 1997) (requesting input on Section 609); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Pakistan, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/7 (Feb. 7, 1997) (requesting input on Section 609); Request for Establishment of a Panel by India, United States -Import
Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/8 (Mar. 4, 1997) (requesting input on Section 609).
518 See Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 495,
7.11-.17 (discussing the belief
that the ban violated GATT Article XI).
519 See id.
7.31-.62 (discussing the belief that the ban violated GATT Article XX). The Panel found that Section 609 did not satisfy the chapeau to Article XX
and thus failed to reach the issue of whether the measure was justified under Article XX(g) or XX(b). Id. 7.63.
520 The Appellate Body stated:

In our view, if an interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX were to be
followed which would allow a Member to adopt measures conditioning
access to its market for a given product upon the adoption by the exporting Members of certain policies, including conservation policies, GATT
1994 and the WTO Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral
framework for trade among Members as security and predictability of
trade relations under those agreements would be threatened.
Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 495,
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focus on the U.S. defense -whether the United States was justified
in an obvious GATT violation by a GATT exception. The U.S. motive in appealing the panel decision was to protect its statute but
also to obtain a more coherent and liberal interpretation of the Article XX exception. Such an interpretation would allow a government power to pass environmental protection measures of the type
under attack here and still be excused.
The Appellate Body completely rejected the basis for the
panel's decision regarding Section 609.521 The Appellate Body report's main critique was that the panel failed to focus on the text or
the ordinary meaning of Article XX.522 The Appellate Body ultimately concluded that the panel had interpreted Article XX in a
way that would render it inutile for any government trying to justify an exception. 523 Given the panel's failure to confront Article
XX properly, the Appellate Body panel had to set out the proper
sequence of steps5 24 to be followed by any panel examining
whether a government measure was entitled to an exception. According to the AB, a panel should always see whether there is provisional justification for a measure under one of the paragraphs (aj), which set out the rationales for the GATT exception, and only
then determine whether the measure has been properly applied (in
a fashion which does not violate the chapeau) according to Article
XX.525
521 See Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 121, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
Shrimp AB Report]. This report states that:

The Panel formulated a broad standard and a test for appraising measures sought to be justified under the chapeau; it is a standard or a test
that finds no basis either in the text of the chapeau or in that of either of
the two specific exceptions claimed by the United States. The Panel, in
effect, constructed an a priori test that purports to define a category of
measures which, ratione materiae, fall outside the justifying protection of
Article XX's chapeau.
Id.
522 See id.
115 (discussing the failures of the panel); Chang, Toward a Greener
GATT, supra note 500, at 37.
523 Shrimp AB Report
121.
524 The Appellate Body Report relied on its first decision in the Gasoline case,
which also involved an environmental measure and which set out the proper sequence. The Shrimp panel had reversed this sequence by looking at the chapeau
first. The Appellate Body Report made it clear that this was unacceptable. See id.

77 118-19
525 According to the Appellate Body Report, "The sequence of steps indicated
above in the analysis of a claim of justification under Article XX reflects, not inad-
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After discarding the basis for the panel's opinion, the Appellate
Body panel then set out "to complete the legal analysis in this case
in order to determine whether Section 609 qualifies for justification
under Article XX."526 In earlier WTO disputes, the Appellate Body
had begun the practice of finishing the undone analytical work of
panels.5 27 The justification for this assertion of interpretive power
came from the lack of any remand authority in the DSU. If they
find the panel below to have applied the wrong test, an AB panel
must complete the case using the correct legal analysis in order to
5 28
issue a recommendation.
The Shrimp/Turtle AB report focuses throughout on interpreting
the operative phrases of both the Article XX exceptions and the
chapeau. In doing so, however, the AB panel freely reached the issue of how the world community had come to see the WTO signatories' commitment to environmental protection. The analysis in
the case began with a review of whether the United States could
use XX(g) as a justification for its measure. Countries are allowed
under XX(g) to adopt measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption ... "529 The AB report found that the protection of sea turtles
satisfied the requirement that the measure involve the conservation
of "exhaustible natural resources."5 30 In the course of doing so, the
panel recognized that living natural resources, although renewable, can be exhausted. 531 The Appellate Body panel here refused
to be limited to interpretations of Article XX's language which
came from the GATT's drafting history and that would have limited the scope of the exception.5 32 Instead, the AB panel determined that the ongoing commitment of the WTO to environmental
protection required an "evolutionary" understanding of the concept of natural resources. 533 One scholar has summarized this as a
vertence or random choice, but rather the fundamental structure and logic of Article XX." Id. 119.
123. The Appellate Body Report did find that the Shrimp panel had
526 Id.
developed enough facts for it to be able to complete the analysis. Id. 124.
527 Id.
123.
123-24.
528 Id.
529 GATT art. XX(g).
132-34.
530 Shrimp AB Report, supra note 521,
531 Id.
131.
532 Id. 130.
533 Shrimp AB Report, supra note 521,
130.
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"measured, analytical approach to teleological interpretation" and
a "more dynamic interpretation [designed] to fit modern circumstances."534
The United States was found to have a sufficient nexus with the
migratory sea turtles to be entitled to invoke XX(g).5 35 The AB report also found that the other XX(g) requirements -that the measure be one "relating to" conservation and done in conjunction with
domestic measures-were satisfied.5 36 Section 609 was also found
to be tailored in its purpose and thus not "disproportionately wide
in its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of protec537
tion and conservation of sea turtle species."
Although the United States could justify the purpose and design of its measure, the AB report determined that Section 609 was
not applied as required under the terms of the chapeau. 538 The AB
report prefaced its consideration of the U.S. measure with a discussion of what the chapeau is and what it is meant to do. In this part
of its analysis the AB report also credits panelists with a great deal
of interpretive power. Effectively, the chapeau requires interpreters "to mark out a line of equilibrium" between a Member State's
right to invoke an exception and another Member's substantive
rights under the GATT/WTO.39 Where that line of equilibrium
lies will vary in each case, depending on the kind and shape of the
540
measure and the facts of the case.
Section 609 was found to violate the two requirements of the
chapeau: that the
measure not be applied in a manner that created
"unjustifiable" 41 or "arbitrary" discrimination. 542 The administration of Section 609 constituted "unjustifiable" discrimination because it required all other Member States to adopt the U.S. regula-

534 Trachtman, supra note 63, at 364. But see Raustalia, supra note 68, at 406
(noting that it is hard to square the politically limited function of the AB panels not having the authority to add to or diminish the rights of parties- "with ideas
like an evolutionary doctrine of GATT interpretation.") Raustalia also notes that
this interpretation amounted to a new rule of international trade law. Id. at 412.
535 Shrimp AB Report, supra note 521,
143-45.
536 Id. 141.
537

Id.

Id. IT 161-76.
Id. 159.
540 Id.
541 Id.
161-76.
542 Id.
177-86.
538

539
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tory program regardless of the conditions in various states.5 43 The
United States also failed, with one exception (the Inter-American
Convention), at its self-assigned mission to negotiate turtle conservation with other countries. The failure was serious since the protection of the highly migratory turtles is the very type of issue
which demands multilateral efforts.5 4 4 The end result was that the
United States negotiated with some, but not other, WTO Members,
including all of the complainant states in Shrimp/Turtle that were
affected by Section 609 and thus discriminated unjustifiably.54 5 The
unilateral manner in which Section 609 had been applied -with the
processes established and administered by the U.S. alone - only
underscored its unjustifiability.5 46 Section 609 was found to constitute "arbitrary" discrimination because of its lack of transparent or
predictable certification process. Section 609 lacked appeal and review procedures and was applied in a manner that denied basic
547
fairness and due process.
The main conclusion of the Shrimp/Turtle dispute was that
while the measure itself (the import ban) was provisionally justified under Article XX(g), the United States had not applied its ban
(through its certification program) in keeping with the chapeau requirements. This result meant that the United States would not be
required to abandon or even amend Section 609, and thus eliminate the ban, but instead could revise its implementing regulations
to reflect the concerns raised by the AB report.5 48
2.3.5.3. Implementation and Surveillance Phase
In November 1998 the DSB adopted the AB report on the
Shrimp/Turtle dispute. The parties agreed to an implementation

543

Id.

172.

544 Id.

Id.
Id. 181.
547 Chang contends that this resulted in the Appellate Body determining that
a case-by-case analysis was the only proper way to look at the chapeau requirements. Having chosen this approach, the report is then "explicit regarding precisely which particular features of the trade measures in question amount to 'arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination."' Chang, Toward a Greener GATT, supra note
500, at 39-40.
548 Id. at 45-46.
545

546

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss2/2

2007]

IMPOSSIBLE CASES IN THE WTO

403

period of thirteen months. 549 During this period the United States
revised the implementing regulations for Section 609 with the goal
of satisfying the criticisms found in the AB report. 55 0 By the time
the United States issued its final status report in November 1999 on
how Section 609 would be brought into compliance, it stated that
the newly revised guidelines were already in use with regard to
55 1
requests from countries about certification.
Not all parties to the dispute were satisfied with the U.S. response. Malaysia pursued its concerns about the new U.S. approach to implementation of Section 609 to an Article 21.5 compliance proceeding in October 2000.552 Panel and AB reports55 3 were
issued on the question of whether the revised guidelines for Section 609 met U.S. compliance requirements. In both decisions, the
revised guidelines were found to satisfy the chapeau requirements- that the regulations were being applied without arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination.5 54 The gist of Malaysia's argument
against Section 609 and the revised guidelines was that both were
simply unallowable. By continuing to apply the unilateral ban after the end of the reasonable period of time to comply, the United
States was acting inconsistently with its GATT obligations and DSB
recommendations. 555 Malaysia particularly objected to the 21.5
panel's reliance on the AB report arguments on Shrimp/Turtle in its
analysis of the revised guidelines.5 56 The 21.5 AB report declared
that the panel had been right to use rulings from the Shrimp/Turtle

549 See Status Report by the United States, United States- Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/15 (July 15, 1999) (agreeing to an
implementation period).

550

Id.

Status Report by the United States, United States- Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,WT/DS58/15/Add. 4 (Jan. 17, 2000).
552 Panel Report, United States - Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, 1.4, WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter 21.5 Panel].
553 Appellate Body Report, United States- Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter 21.5 AB Report]. In its review of the U.S. actions, the AB stated that the measure at issue in
the compliance dispute consisted of Section 609, the revised guidelines and the
application of the revised guidelines. Id. 79.
554 21.5 Panel, supra note 552, 7 5.42-.114, 6.1-2; 21.5 AB Report, supra note
551

553, TT 111-54.
21.5 Panel, supra note 552, 1.4.
21.5 AB Report, supra note 553. Malaysia argued, in effect, that the 21.5
Panel had failed to fulfill its obligations in conducting the compliance review. The
AB Report completed vindicated the panel on this issue. Id. 153(a).
555

556
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AB report and to rely on them in its review of U.S. compliance.55 7
According to the 21.5 AB report, Malaysia had six disagreements
with the panel's report-three going to U.S. obligations regarding
the negotiation of international agreements and three regarding
whether the revised guidelines were sufficiently flexible to satisfy
the chapeau requirements.5 58 The main argument Malaysia made
about the international agreements was that the United States
should have concluded an agreement rather than just negotiating
about the protection of the endangered sea turtles with countries. 559
The 21.5 AB report found that there was no obligation to conclude
an agreement 560 but only one to make good faith efforts to reach
comparable 561 international agreements with different regions regarding the protection of the sea turtles.
With regard to the flexibility of the revised guidelines, Malaysia attempted to re-invoke its argument that Section 609 would inevitably constitute arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination as
long as it conditioned market access on unilateral standards.5 62 The
21.5 AB report made it clear that the earlier Shrimp/Turtle AB holding that unilateral aspects of a given measure were common features of a measure that would fall within Article XX was not dicta
but "a principle that was central to" the ruling in Shrimp/Turtle. 63
The 21.5 Appellate Body Report found a crucial difference between
the previous U.S. guidelines (requiring countries to adopt essentially the same program as the United States) and revised ones that
557 Id. 109.
558 See id. TT 113-14 (listing Malaysia's six arguments against the Panel's
finding).
559 Id. 115.
560 See id. 124, which states that:
[I]t is one thing to prefer a multilateral approach in the application of a
measure that is provisionally justified under one of the subparagraphs of
Article XX of the GATT 1994; it is another to require the conclusion of a
multilateral agreement as a condition of avoiding "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" under the chapeau of Article XX. We see, in this
case, no such requirement.
561 See id.
122 ("[Tihe United States, in our view, would be expected to
make good faith efforts to reach international agreements that are comparable
from one forum of negotiation to the other.").
562 Id. 136.
563 Id.
138. According to Gaines: "The Appellate Body has thus put itself
clearly on record for the first time, that a measure is not disqualified under Article
XX merely because it is imposed unilaterally by the importing country." Gaines,
supra note 494, at 793.
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conditioned market access on countries adopting a program comparable in effectiveness 564 to the U.S. program. The latter is allowable because it provides Member States subject to the measure
"sufficient latitude" with respect to the program they will adopt
and to allow them to adopt one "suitable to the specific conditions"
prevailing in each country. 565 The measure a country adopts in order to satisfy Article XX chapeau requirements must have sufficient flexibility to take into account the "specific conditions prevail566
ing in any exporting" Member State.
The final conclusion of the 21.5 Appellate Body Report was that
the panel had been correct in finding that Section 609, the revised
guidelines, and the U.S. application of both were justified as long
as the conditions and findings of the WTO reports, particularly the
need for ongoing good faith negotiations for an international
567
agreement, continued to be satisfied.
2.3.6. Foreign Sales Corporations(FSC)
2.3.6.1. Background
Three interrelated aspects of the FSC case, WT/DS108, underscore why it was bound to become an impossible case. 568 First, the
dispute has an elaborate pre-history that uncovered the vastly different views held by the EC and the United States over whether the
method of foreign earned income could constitute an export subsidiary. The FSC legislation was passed by Congress in 1984569 to
resolve a by then long-standing dispute between the two over
predecessor legislation, the Domestic International Sales Corporation ("DISC").570 The United States and the EC engaged in a GATT
dispute over the DISC legislation that lasted from 1976 until a ne-

564 See 21.5 AB Report, supra note 553,
144 ("[T]here is an important difference between conditioning market access on the adoption of essentially the same
programme, and conditioning market access on the adoption of a programme
comparable in effectiveness").
565 Id.
566 Id.
149.
567 See Id.
153(b) (upholding the panel's finding).
568 See Robert E. Hudec, Industrial Subsidies: Tax Treatment of 'Foreign Sales
Corporations,'in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES, supra note 163, at 175, 203.
569 The FSC system was part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98369, § 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
570 Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §501, 85 Stat. 497, 535 (1971).
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gotiated settlement in 1981. 571 The DISC case was the original
"wrong case" used by Hudec to illustrate his thesis about the phe572
nomenon.
Second, the FSC case was brought by the EC as a strategic response to the aggressive approach the United States had taken in
its DSU litigation. During the first two years of the DSU System,
the United States challenged the EC on two highly politicized issues- the regulatory health standard in Hormones and a major aspect of its preferential trading regime in Bananas 111.573 When the
EC began the FSC case, the United States had prevailed or was
about to prevail in the other two disputes. The EC knew that if it
lost the FSC case, compliance would be difficult if not impossible
for the United States. 74 Major U.S. companies (e.g., Boeing, GE,
Mars, Nike and Proctor & Gamble) were major beneficiaries of the
FSC program. 575 The EC was also convinced that if the DSB authorized retaliation in the other two disputes, the United States
would use it.576 Consequently, the EC resuscitated the underlying
dispute from the earlier GATT litigation-that the U.S. treatment

57 See Hudec, Industrial Subsidies, supra note 568, at 176-80 (examining the
origins of, and the legal situation resulting from, the DISC case).
572 See Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round, supra note 20, at
164-66 (citing the DISC case as a type of "wrong case" that involves "issues arguably beyond the decision-making capacity of the panel procedure"). See also
Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GA7T Adjudication Procedures:The Lessons of the DISC
Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1487 (1988) (discussing the impact that the DISC case
had on the improvement of the GATT legal practice).
573 According to Hudec, the EC actions came in response to its perception
that it had been improperly attacked. "The EC had considered the U.S. complaints
in both cases to be unjustified- Bananasas inappropriate interference in a dispute
between the EC and the Latin American countries producing bananas, Hormones
as a litigious attack on a non-protectionist health measure based on very strong
public health concerns." Hudec, IndustrialSubsidies, supra note 568, at 181.
574 See Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement, supra note 156, at 418 (explaining how the EU brought the FSC case "because dispute settlement had given
the United States... a right of retaliation against European products, which the
United States exercised.").
575 See Geoff Winestock, EU Aims for Huge Sanctions on the U.S. - Claim of
$4.04 Billion Made to WTO is in Response to Tax Break in Dispute, WALL ST. J., Nov.
20, 2000, at A2 (noting how the companies strenuously resisted losing the FSC
program, and how the United States was attempting to appease them even when
it adopted its final regulatory fix but it was thwarted in this effort).
576 See Hudec, Industrial Subsidies, supra note 568, at 181 (explaining that one
of the purposes of the FSC complaint was to deal with a concern over "what
seemed to be a public commitment by U.S. authorities to employ trade retaliation
whenever WTO legal rulings were not obeyed in a timely manner.").
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of foreign earned income constituted a prohibited export subsidy577 -as a perfect case for the United States as a defending party.
Third, there is the belief that taxation issues go to the heart of
sovereignty of a nation.578 Subjecting a major aspect of a country's
taxation system to DSU review thus allows the WTO to intrude
deeply into how a country chooses to structure these laws and in
issuing opinions to have a large impact on its law-making. 579 The
playing out of the DISC litigation (years of impasse until a negotiated settlement) and the FSC dispute (three rounds of litigation
over the legislation that kept the form of the U.S. tax measure until
its removal) lend some support to this idea.
The DISC legislation was enacted in 1971 in an attempt to bring
to U.S. companies the same type of tax advantages earned by European firms with export earnings.5 80 European countries have a
value added tax ("VAT") system that only taxes income earned
within the territory of the country. EC companies were thus able
to avoid income tax on part of their export earnings.5 81 The DISC
system was designed to allow U.S. companies the same advantage
even though the United States had a worldwide tax policy. Export
sales would be run through the DISC, which was, as the name indicates, a domestic subsidiary of the export corporation, and a certain percentage of the income would be considered exempt from
income tax.582 The EC brought the DISC case at least in part to
577 See HUDEC, supra note 3, at 59-100.

578 See Paul R. McDaniel, Trade Agreements and Income Taxation: Interactions,
Conflicts and Resolutions, 57 TAX L. REV. 275, 297 (2004) ("[F]ew problems touch
more sensitive sovereignty issues than taxation."); see also Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner?, supra note 488, at 61-65 (discussing the consequences of WTO review given
the nature of the U.S. taxation system).
579 The Appellate Body tried to limit the impact of its decision in the FSC case
by explaining, after offering its recommendation, what it was not saying: " [T]his is
not a ruling that a Member must choose one kind of tax system over another so as
to be consistent with that Member's WTO obligations. In particular, this is not a
ruling on the relative merits of 'worldwide' and 'territorial' systems of taxation."
Appellate Body Report, U.S. - Tax Treatment of "Foreign Sales Corporations," 179,
WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000) [hereinafter FSC AB Report].
580 See Hudec, Industrial Subsidies, supra note 568, at 176 ("DISC was meant to
offset ... tax advantages [of European exporters] by allowing U.S. exporters to
escape taxation on a similar portion of their export income.").
581 See James Joseph Shallue, An Analysis of Foreign Sales Corporationsand the
European Communities' Four Billion-Dollar Retaliation, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
179, 192-95 (2002) (explaining the difference between Europe's territorial system
of taxation and the United States' worldwide system).
582 See Hudec, Industrial Subsidies, supra note 568, at 176 (explaining how the
DISC system operated to allow companies indefinitely to defer paying taxes on
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chasten the United States for what it considered the overly aggressive litigation strategy the United States had been pursuing in the
GATT at that time.583 The U.S. response was to argue that if the
DISC legislation was violative of the GATT Article XVI(4) prohibition on export subsidies, the tax legislation systems of three other
EC countries were also violative. The United States brought what
amounted to a GATT countercomplaint on each of these three tax
systems. The GATT panel decisions reviewing the EC statutes actually adopted the U.S. view on this issue while others found the
DISC to be GATT-violative as well. 84 The United States argued
that the DISC should be allowed to remain as a matching subsidy
against the ones provided by the EC countries. When the EC refused to accept that solution, the parties remained at an impasse
until a negotiated settlement was completed in 1981. The GATT
Council ultimately adopted the four panel reports and an under585
standing reached by the parties ("Understanding").
The United States finally enacted the FSC legislation to satisfy
its GATT obligations in 1984. Corporations were required to create
a foreign sales corporation and to conduct a certain amount of their
export sales activity abroad. The purpose of the legislation was to
conform to the GATT decision but not change much about its substance. 586 The FSC system, however, was built around one lesson
the foreign earned income and thus export more profitably); see also Hunter R.
Clark, Amy Bogan & Hayley Hanson, The WTO Ruling on Foreign Sales Corporations: Costliest Battle Yet in an Escalating Trade War Between the United States and the
European Union?, 10 MINN. J.GLOBAL TRADE 291, 297-98 (2001) (detailing the taxation scheme underlying the DISC system).
583 See Hudec, Industrial Subsidies, supra note 568, at 177 ("[M]any observers
suspected that the primary purpose of the EC's legal complaint was not the removal of DISC but rather to dissuade the U.S. from overly aggressive use of the
dispute settlement process.").
584 See Report of the Panel, Income Tax Practices Maintained by France, L/4423
(Nov. 12, 1976), GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 114 (1977) (concluding that French
income tax practices were contrary to GATT); see also Report of the Panel, Income
Tax PracticesMaintained by the Netherlands, L/4425 (Nov. 12, 1976), GATT B.I.S.D.
(23d Supp.) at 137 (1977) (concluding that the Netherlands' income tax practices
were contrary to GATT).
585 See Hudec, Industrial Subsidies, supra note 568, at 178-79 (discussing how
the 1981 Understanding provided that the GATT reports with regard to the case
and the other three panel reports were being adopted).
586 See id. at 203-05 (emphasizing that even if the change to the FSC did not
alter the export subsidy it was a clear effort to alter a U.S. law to make it a compliant against GATT); see also Harold S. Peckron, Uniform Rules of Engagement: The
New Tax Regime for Foreign Sales, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 8-13 (2001)
("As any good architect, the Treasury designed a plan using the actual GATT
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from the DISC case: that the relevant economic activities that
qualified a company for tax exemptions had to take place outside
the United States. 87 Arguments were still made that the FSC statute did not satisfy the 1981 Understanding.588 Nevertheless, from
1984 to 1997 there was no legal challenge. The EC filing of the
WTO case, therefore, came as a surprise to the United States and
the WTO because it was widely believed that the EC had come to
accept U.S. legislation.5 89 Had the EC not perceived the U.S. litigation in Hormones and Bananas III to be overly aggressive, 590 that
might have been the case. Once it was clear, however, that the
United States intended to follow through with its announced policy 591 of "aggressive rule enforcement,"5 92 the EC saw the advantage in pressing a case in which it might teach the United States a
5 93
lesson about the strategic use of WTO dispute settlement.
2.3.6.2. The FSC Dispute
The panel found that the FSC exemption was an exportcontingent subsidy and as such violated Article 3.1(a)5 94 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement ("SCM Agree-

Council's unanimous understanding of the five parties, which led it to suggest to
Congress the... [FSC].").
587 See McDaniel, supra note 578, at 279 (analyzing the exemptive aspects of
the FSC system).
588 See Hudec, Industrial Subsidies, supra note 568, at 180 ("In the view of most
observers, the FSC exemption did not meet the requirements of the 1981 Understanding.").
589 See id. (noting that this wide belief was based on the fact that "the EC had
not complained about FSC's GATT legal problems since 1985").
590 See Asif H. Qureshi & Roman Grynberg, United States Tax Subsidies Under
Domestic International Sales Corporation,Foreign Sales Corporation and Extraterritorial
Income Exclusion Act Legislation within the Framework of the World Trade Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 979, 990-91 (2002) (noting that the resurrection of the issue
in the late 1990s could be "attributed to" the rulings against the EC in Hormones
and Bananas IlI).
591 See H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1033 (1994) ("The Administration intends to
use Section 301 to pursue vigorously foreign unfair trade barriers that violate U.S.
rights or deny benefits to the United States under the Uruguay Round agreements
...
[and] to use Section 301 to pursue foreign unfair trade barriers that are not
covered by those agreements.").
592 Hudec, Industrial Subsidies, supra note 568, at 182.
593 See id. at 181 (" [T]he EC had much to gain from a legal victory, even an
unenforceable one.").
594 Panel Report, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations,"
7.130, WT/DS108/R (Oct. 8, 1999) [hereinafter FSC Panel].
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ment").s95 The SCM Agreement prohibits almost all export subsidies.596 Such subsidies are prohibited because they distort the
terms of trade and have no other purpose.597 According to the
SCM Agreement, if the contested measure is found to be a prohibited subsidy, the panel must recommend that the subsidizing
Member State withdraw the subsidy without delay and specify a
time frame for the withdrawal. 598 The FSC panel recommended
that the United States receive a one year period in order to withdraw the subsidy program. 599
The United States immediately appealed the FSC panel decision. The Appellate Body panel upheld the major findings of the
panel report as well as its method of interpretation. According to
the AB report, the proper way of interpreting the question was to
determine first whether the U.S. measure was a "subsidy" within
the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, and then whether
it was a prohibited "export subsidy" within the meaning of Article
3.600

A financial contribution by a government is a "subsidy" when
601
a government foregoes revenue it would otherwise be due.
Since the U.S. government would have collected more tax revenues
if the foreign sales corporations did not exist, revenue was foregone. 60 2 The Appellate Body agreed with the panel report that
what is "otherwise due" must be measured against the rules of
taxation of the Member State. 60 3 The Appellate Body also adopted
the panel's "but for" test -that but for the measure there would be

595 For the other contemporaneously-enacted WTO agreements, see supra
note 68.
596 SCM Agreement art. 3.2.
597 See id. art. 3.1(a) ("Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture,
the following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited: (a)
subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other
conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I.").
598 Id. art. 4.7.
599 FSC Panel, supra note 594,
8.4-.8.
600 FSC AB Report, supra note 579,
90.
601 Id.
90; see also SCM Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii) ("[Flor the purposes of
this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if ... government revenue that
is otherwise due is foregone or not collected.").
602 See McDaniel, supra note 578, at 281 (summarizing the EC arguments
about the FSC scheme to the panel).
603 FSC AB Report, supra note 579, 90.
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additional revenues for the government-for judging whether
604
there was an export subsidy in the case.
The U.S. defense to the subsidy argument was not based on the
text itself; rather, the United States argued that the general definition of what was "otherwise due" was qualified by footnote 59 to
605
the SCM Agreement, which provided the controlling legal rule.
The AB report interpreted the U.S. argument as one for an exception to the general interpretation of "subsidy" and rejected this notion, finding that, at most, footnote 59 spoke to the issue of export
subsidies. 606 This meant that the U.S. measure did qualify as a subsidy, particularly since the United States admitted that foreign
sales corporations represented a departure from the normal rules
of taxation and that without this device the tax liability of export607
ing companies would be higher.
The AB report then went on to disagree with the other U.S. arguments pertaining to footnote 59. The United States contended
that footnote 59 was confirmed by the 1981 Understanding that resolved the DISC case, which supported the idea that the U.S. statute was not an export subsidy under Article 3.608 The AB reviewed
footnote 59 sentence-by-sentence and found that none of the statements aided the United States.609 The ultimate conclusion of the
AB panel was that the United States had mischaracterized the issue
in the case. The proper issue is whether the United States was
permitted, under Article 3.1(a), to "carve out" an export contingent
exemption from the category of foreign-source income that is taxed
610
under its other tax rules.
The final U.S. argument on appeal was a significant one and
linked directly to the DISC case. The United States argued that the
1981 Understanding constituted a GATT decision and thus was
part of GATT 1994 and binding on all Member States. 611 In determining the status of the 1981 Understanding and its textual ambi604 Id. T 91. The Appellate Body panel was satisfied with a "but for" test
here-but for the FSC how would taxes have been paid-because "it is not difficult to establish in what way the foreign-source income of an FSC would be taxed
'but for' the contested measure." Id.
605
606

607
608
609

Id. 92.
Id. TT 93-94.
Id. T 95.
Id. T 96.
Id. IT 97-103.

610 Id.
611 Id.

99.

7 104.
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guity,612 the

AB report examined not only the text itself but also the
circumstances of its adoption (whether it was a settlement document for the tax cases or spoke to general issues) and the statement
of the Chairman of the GATT Council attached to the Understanding itself.61 3 The AB report focused on the Chairman's statement
that the adoption of the dispute settlement report with the Understanding did "not affect the rights and obligations of Contracting
Parties under the General Agreement." 614 According to the AB
panel, if the Contracting Parties had intended an authoritative interpretation of export subsidies, "they would have said so in reasonably recognizable terms." 615 The Chairman's statement, therefore, was consistent with the view that the tax cases were to be
resolved privately between the parties. 616 The AB report also found
no guidance from the SCM Agreement or its predecessor, the Subsidies Code, on the issue presented by the case. 617 Moreover, even
if it had agreed with the United States about the 1981 Understanding, it still would not resolve the issue of the case as presented by
the AB panel. 618 Consequently, the AB report affirmed the panel
ruling that the FSC tax exemptions amounted to subsidies contingent upon export performance. 619 The AB recommendation was
that the FSC measure be brought into conformity with U.S. obliga620
tions under the SCM and Agriculture Agreements.
The consequence of the AB report for the United States was
that it had to eliminate or revise the FSC program so that there
would not be a tax deferral that would be revenue otherwise foregone. 621 The "but for" test developed by the panel and adopted by
612 The Appellate Body noted that the opening phrase of the Understanding
stated: "The Council adopts these reports [on the DISC cases] on the understanding
that with respect to these cases, and in general .... " Id. 105.
613 Id. 7 110-12. The Appellate Body report expressly noted that the panel
was correct in examining the circumstances of the adoption of the 1981 Understanding. Id. 111.
614 Id. 112.
615 Id.
616

Id.

Id. TT 115-18.
Id. 120.
619 Id. 121.
620 Id. T 178.
621 See Peckron, supra note 586, at 27 ("From a pure tax standpoint, it was
clear in the Appellate Report that whatever the United States devised to respond
to the export subsidy charge, it had to address both reports' concerns that the FSC
tax regime resulted in a reduction of revenues 'otherwise due.'").
617
618

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss2/2

20071

IMPOSSIBLE CASES IN THE WTO

the AB panel, however, does not provide any useful guidance to
Member States about what constitutes a tax subsidy. 622 So the
United States was in the position of either trying to craft a solution
without real guidance about how to do so, or abandoning a highly
popular and widely used tax system.
2.3.6.3. Implementation and Surveillance Phase
The United States responded to the AB report in April 2000, by
announcing its intention to comply. 623 The United States then
passed new legislation within nine months, 624 the FSC Repeal and
Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act ("ETI Act"). 625 The United
States then argued that it crafted a provision that met the problems
noted by the panel and AB panel in the FSC case. 626 The EC, however, immediately challenged the new legislation before an Article
21.5 compliance panel. The United States litigated and appealed
the panel judgment that this scheme also constituted a prohibited
export subsidy, just like the FSC system in 2002.627 Most scholars
examining the ETI Act did not see how it solved the problems
found in the FSC legislation. 628 By submitting new legislation that
622 See Hudec, supra note 568, at 185-88 (explaining why the "but for" test is
problematic and why the WTO still lacks an interpretation of "otherwise due" in
SCM Article 1); McDaniel, supra note 578, at 290-94 ("This test had no normative
power at all.").
623 Robert Goulder, U.S. Will Comply with WTO Ruling on FSC Regime, but Details Remain Unclear,WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Apr. 11, 2000.
624 See Hudec, supra note 568, at 192 (pointing out that the new legislation
was enacted in "remarkable time" -nine months from the AB decision to the
President's signature).
625 FSC repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000).
626 See Hudec, supra note 568, at 192 (noting the U.S. argument that (1) since
ETI income was excluded from gross income it was not a tax subsidy, (2) since the
ETI system was available to any U.S. producer it was no longer contingent on exports, and (3) the ETI was designed to avoid the double taxation of foreign source
income).
627 The panel found that the new act also resulted in the surrender of revenue
otherwise due and that the act made exporting a precondition to qualifying for the
subsidy. Panel Report, United States -Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations,"
8.43, 8.61, WT/DS108/RW (Aug. 20, 2001) (exercising recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU); Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatmentfor "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002) (using DSU Article
21.5). The Appellate Body panel upheld the panel regarding the "subsidy" issue,
id. 106, and the export-contingent subsidy in violation of Article 3, id.
118-20.
628 See Hudec, supra note 568, at 192-201 (discussing the FSC legislation);
Qureshi & Grynberg, supra note 590 (discussing solutions).
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it claimed did comply, however, the United States was able to delay EC efforts to retaliate. Once the litigation was over, the EC resought authorization to retaliate against the United States. 629 After
an arbitration on the appropriate amount for such a suspension, 630
the DSB authorized the EC to suspend concessions valued at just
over $4 billion per year against the United States. The retaliation
authorization was then and remains the largest amount authorized
in a WTO dispute. The size of the authorization revealed just how
much U.S. corporations benefited from the FSC program and the
limits of a dispute settlement system backed up by retaliation.631
The sheer size of the authorization posed real problems for the EC.
It was too heavy a weapon to wield against the United States without significant potential for backlash.
Consequently, the EC postponed proceeding with retaliation
until 2004, and even then it chose to suspend only a small portion
of the $4 billion authorization. The EC had to think creatively
about how to use a suspension authorization in a way that might
actually prompt a quick response from the United States. The EC
designed its retaliation measure, therefore, to act as a leverage device against Congress. 632 It was Congress that remained resistant
to passing new legislation that would finally resolve the FSC dispute. 633 The EC tariffs were to begin in March 2004 and to cover
629 This request for an authorization to suspend sanctions was actually the
second effort. The first EC request for authority to retaliate came after the United
States passed the ETI Act. See Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Centre William
Rappard on 7 May 2003, WT/DSB/M/149 (July 8, 2003) (discussing the EC dialogue of the events in the FSC litigation).
630 See Decision of the Arbitrator, U.S. - Tax Treatmentfor "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002) (explaining the Recourse to Arbitration
by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU).
631 See Warren Vieth, EU Imposes 1st Tariff Penalties on U.S. Goods, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2004, at C1 (noting that, as of 2004, U.S. companies saved about $5 billion a
year under the FSC program).
632 See Jonathan Weisman, EU to Begin Sanctions on Some U.S. Goods; Action
Comes Four Years After Ruling by WTO, WASH. PosT, Feb. 27, 2004, at El (citing EC
Trade Minister Pascal Lamy as noting that the ratchet effect of the sanctions
measure was designed to "focus the mind on the necessity to repeal").
633 See id. (noting that there were competing bills in the House and Senate);
see also William Chou, Comment, The $4 Billion Question: An Analysis of Congressional Responses to the FSC/ETI Dispute Under WTO Export Subsidy Standards, 25
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 415 (2005) (analyzing the competing bills before Congress).
There was an intense political fight because various large corporations argued
that the two proposed bills would harm them. It was clear that the previous corporate beneficiaries of the FSC would no longer receive most of the benefits from
the new tax provision. See generally Edmund L. Andrews, A Civil War Within a
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only five percent of the list of products (many considered to be politically sensitive to President Bush in his campaign for reelection)
the EC had previously identified in 2003. The leverage effect was
achieved by arranging for the sanctions to continue to climb one
634
percentage point for each month Congress failed to act.
Within eight months, Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ("JOBS Act"). 635 The JOBS Act partially eliminated
the ETI Act (subject to transition provisions) and put in its place a
ten percent tax reduction for companies that manufacture in the
United States. 636 The legislation thus eliminated the U.S. program
that had created the extended GATT and WTO litigation. The passage of the bill, however, illustrates exactly what happens when
Congress tries to take away important subsidies to powerful industries during an election year. In addition to the new tax rate, the
930-page bill contained other tax benefits worth $170 billion for
corporations. 637 More importantly for the purposes of the WTO
litigation, however, the JOBS Act contained transition provisions
which allowed the prohibited exports to stay in place until the affected U.S. industries had the opportunity to adjust to their removal. Once the JOBS Act was enacted in October 2004,638 the EC
announced that it would withdraw its sanctions by January 2005
without seeking DSB oversight. 639 While the EC was willing to
withdraw its sanctions, however, it did seek a compliance panel
(under Article 21.5 of the DSU) on Section 101 provisions for transiTrade Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2002, at C1 (discussing both the political battle
over the various bills and the complaints of corporations that would stand to lose
tax benefits).
634 See Weisman, supra note 632 (noting the leverage effect of the rising sanction).
635 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418
(2004) [hereinafter Jobs Act].
636 Id. §§ 101-02.
637 See Jonathan Weisman, Special-Interest Add-Ons Weigh Down Tax-Cut Bill,
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2004, at Al (describing these other tax benefits as constituting "one of the most complex, special-interest-riddled corporate tax bills in years.
638 Press Release, European Communities, Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC):
U.S. to Repeal Illegal Export Subsidies as from 2007 (Oct. 11, 2004), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/october/tradoc_119403.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 2, 2007).
639 Press Release, European Communities, Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC):
EU Welcomes US Repeal of Illegal Export Subsidies (Oct. 25, 2004), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/october/tradoc_119759.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 2, 2007).
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tion periods. The first transition period under the JOBS Act, which
provided for companies to receive a portion of exemptions from
income tax breaks, 640 effectively continued the ETI program until
2006.641 The second transition period, for companies with long
production schedules, allowed companies to continue to claim ETI
exemptions on any order for sales signed before September 2003
642
and was not time limited.
Following unsuccessful consultations, the EC requested a panel
in January 2005,64 3 arguing that the two transition periods in the
JOBS Act allowed "U.S. exporters to continue benefiting from the
tax exemptions already found to be WTO incompatible (a) in the
years 2005 and 2006 with respect to all transitions, and (b) for an
indefinite period with respect to certain contracts." 644 The EC
claimed that this aspect of the JOBS Act violated Article 4.7 of the
SCM Agreement (which requires a party to withdraw prohibited
subsidies), Articles 19.1 and 21.1 of the DSU (which require a
Member to implement DSB recommendations) and that it continued to violate Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement (the provisions against export subsidies).645
The second 21.5 compliance proceeding of the FSC dispute required the panel and Appellate Body to examine the very nature of
the functions required by WTO adjudicators. The extended litigation deriving from the FSC dispute resembles what happened following the Hormones dispute. The United States and the EC extended litigation in both disputes into later proceedings in which it
asked DSU panels to define the outside parameters of DSU procedures themselves. In the Continued Suspension dispute, the fight
was over the requirements of Article 23.646 In the FSC 21.5 II dis-

640 JOBS Act § 101(d), (f); see Paul Meller, European Trade Chief Says Sanctions
on U.S. Will End, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at C2 (noting that the EC trade commissioner "balked" at the transitioning provisions).
641 See Meller, supra note 640 ("The legislation allows the United States to give
$4 billion, or 80 percent of the amount distributed under the [FSC] program, to
American companies [in 2005]. In 2006 this will fall to $3 billion, or 60 percent.").
642 See id. (discussing the transitioning stipulations in the U.S. legislation).
643 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities,
United States- Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/29 (Jan.
14, 2005).
644 Id.
645 Id.
646 See supra Section 2.3.2.4 for a discussion of the Continued Suspension case
and how it serves to extend the Hormones litigation.
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pute, the fight was over how panels are supposed to determine
what compliance means under Article 21.5.
Before the FSC 21.5 II panel, the United States defended its inclusion of the transition provisions in the JOBS Act in two ways.
First, it argued that the Article 21.5 compliance report on the ETI
Act had not contained a new recommendation under Article 4.7 of
the SCM Agreement (to withdraw the Act 647) and thus the United
States has not failed to comply. The panel rejected this defense,
first pointing out that nothing in the text of Article 21.5--the mandate of the earlier compliance panel-contains a requirement that
the panel make such a recommendation. 648 According to the panel,
its interpretation was bolstered by the purpose of Article 21, to
provide for the "[s]urveillance of recommendations and rulings." 649
Article 21.5 compliance reviews come after the DSB has made the
recommendations and rulings in a case. 650 Adopting the U.S. position would require a panel to "tell a Member to remove a situation
65
of WTO-inconsistency that it has already been told to remove" 1
and give the non-implementing Member an additional time period
to bring itself into conformity. 652 Handling the Article 21.5 process
in such a way would actually risk undermining the DSB "by revisiting an issue already addressed and definitively resolved by the
DSB."653 The panel thus rejected the U.S. argument as one that
would undermine the effective operation of the DSU. Such an interpretation would encourage a cycle of non-implementing Members continuing "to adopt non-compliant measures in order to win
more time to comply with adopted DSB recommendations and rulings."654
Consequently, the panel found that the recommendations and
rulings that the United States is obligated to satisfy are those from
the original proceeding regarding the FSC statute that the WTO inconsistency caused by not fully withdrawing the prohibited subsi-

647Panel Report, United States- Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations,"
7.11, 7.37-39, WT/DS108/RW2 (Sept. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Art. 21.5 II Panel].
64wId.
7.40-.41.
649Id.

7.42.

650 Id.

7.43.

651

Id.

652 Id.

7.44.

653

Id.

7.45.

654

Id.

7.46.
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dies. 65 5 Seen in this light, the U.S. obligation to withdraw the ETI
subsidies came from the original DSB recommendation regarding
65 6
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement and the 2002 21.5 reports.
There was no need for a 21.5 panel to make a new recommenda7
tion.65
The United States did not argue about the nature of the JOBS
Act transition provisions and whether they extended the subsidies.
Accordingly, the panel found that the transition provisions in the
JOBS Act allowed the underlying violations, primarily the violations regarding export subsidies, found in the earlier Article 21.5
proceedings to persist. 658 The panel found indefinite grandfathering of the FSC subsidies for certain transactions would also occur
due to the JOBS Act.659 The panel argued that continuing subsidies
in both of the transition provisions was not consistent with the U.S.
obligation to withdraw the prohibited subsidies.660 No defense
was available for the government's failure, regardless of the contractual arrangements private parties (those companies benefiting
from and relying upon the subsidies) might have made. 661 By enacting these transition measures, the United States failed to fulfill
662
its WTO obligations.
In its appeal of the 21.5 II panel report,663 the United States
made two main arguments. The first argument reiterated that
there had never been a recommendation of the DSB under Article
4.7 of the SCM Agreement (requiring withdrawal of the subsidy)
with respect to the FSC 21.5 proceedings about the ETI Act. 664 As a
result, the panel had "erroneously transformed the original DSB
recommendation under Article 4.7... into a general obligation to
withdraw any future prohibited subsidies." 665 The 21.5 II Appellate Body panel characterized this basis for appeal as raising the
655

Id.

7.49.

Id. 7.53.
Id. 7.55.
658 Id.
7.60.
659 Id.
7.61.
660 Id. 7.62.
661 Id. 7.63.
662 Id.
7.64.
663 Appellate Body Report, Second Recourse to Article 21.5 by the European
Communities, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations",
WT/DS108/AB/RW2 (Feb. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Art. 21.5 Il AB Report].
664 Id.
20-21.
665 Id. 76.
656

657
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question of whether a recommendation made in original DSU proceedings remains in effect until the Member State has fully complied with recommendations and rulings in the original and subsequent compliance proceedings. 666 After reviewing the language of
Article 4.7, the panel concluded that recommendations under its
terms (that a subsidy be withdrawn "without delay" and that it be
done within a specified time) remain in effect until the Member
State has fully withdrawn the prohibited subsidy. 667 According to
this logic, U.S. compliance -replacement of a prohibited export
subsidy with a statute containing a transition period allowing the
668
subsidy to continue for a certain time period-is not complete.
The obligation to comply with the remedy for the violation and
withdraw the subsidy remains "even if several proceedings under
Article 21.5 become necessary." 669 The 21.5 II Appellate Body panel
adopted the panel's finding that allowing the U.S. argument to
prevail would have the effect of extending the time for a Member
State to comply and "lead to a potentially 'never ending cycle' of
dispute settlement proceedings and inordinate delays in the implementation of recommendations and rulings of the DSB."670
In reviewing the U.S. history of responses to the DSB rulings in
this dispute, the 21.5 II Appellate Body panel concluded that the
United States (1) failed to implement all of the DSB recommendations and rulings, (2) did not meet its obligation to withdraw fully
the prohibited subsidies, and (3) continues to be under an obligation to do so. 671 This conclusion clearly left the United States with
no option other than eliminating the transition provisions in the
JOBS Act.
The other main argument in the U.S. appeal was that the panel
had misinterpreted the function of an Article 21.5 panel. 672 Wholly
apart from the issue of actual compliance, the U.S. appeal here
represents an attempt to get a final ruling on how Article 21.5 panels are supposed to operate. Given the difficult compliance history
of the United States in impossible cases, seeking such an answer
makes sense for future U.S. litigation. The United States contended
w Id.
667 Id.
668 Id.
669 Id.

80.
81-83.
83.
84.

Id. 86 (citation omitted).
671 Id. 87.
672 Id. 90.
670
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that an Article 21.5 panel is not required (as suggested by the 21.5
II panel) to "fix the problem" of non-compliance. Such an interpretation would allow a panel to ignore the text of Articles 4.7 and
21.5.673 The Appellate Body panel first examined the functions of
an Article 21.5 panel. An Article 21.5 panel is supposed to determine whether a Member State's measures taken to comply actually
implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings. 674 In order to
do so, a 21.5 panel may examine whether a compliance measure
exists or, if one does, whether it is consistent with GATT/WTO
agreements, or both in situations where there has been only partial
compliance. 675 Conducting such a review requires a 21.5 panel to
examine all DSB recommendations and all measures covered by
them.676
With regard to this case, the 21.5 II Appellate Body panel examined the panel's reasoning regarding its mandate and concluded
that while the panel "could have used language more precise than
'fixing the problem,"' the panel had not only adequately described
its task but also acted within its authority. 677 What the 21.5 II panel
did was "examine[] whether the United States had removed fully
the subsidies found in the original and first Article. 21.5 proceedings to be prohibited as required by the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB."6 78 The 21.5 11 Appellate Body panel thus
found that by enacting the JOBS Act transition provisions the
United States had maintained prohibited export subsidies and con679
sequently had not fully implemented the DSB recommendations.
The United States had no option but to abandon the transition
provisions of the JOBS Act, since failure to do so would subject it to
the quick reinstatement of the DSB-authorized suspension of concessions by the EC.680 The EC made a point of noting that Boeing,
673

Id.

674

Id.

675

Id.

676

Id.

93.

677 Id.
678 Id.

95.

679 Id.

96.

680 See Press Release, European Union, WTO Condemns US Tax Subsidies:
EU Calls on US to End Illegal Tax Breaks for Boeing, Others (Feb. 13, 2006) ("On
31 January 2005 the EU Council adopted a regulation suspending sanctions ....
That 2005 Council Regulation provides for the reintroduction of customs duties at
a 14% level 60 days following a final WTO ruling that the Jobs Act is WTO incompatible.") (citation omitted).
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the main target of another trade dispute between the United States
and EC, was the major beneficiary of the now invalidated transition provisions of the JOBS Act.6 81 The EC had also made allegations regarding the FSC subsidies in its arguments in the Airbus/Boeing dispute. 682 On May 17, 2006 President Bush signed into
law the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005,683
which contains a provision repealing the transition periods. The
passage of the legislation on the eve of the EC plans to reintroduce
sanctions led the EC to drop that plan. 684
2.3.7. Section 301
2.3.7.1. Background
The Section 301 dispute, WT/DS/152, was the culmination of a
long struggle over the embodiment of United States unilateralism. 685 The EC had been in the forefront of the attack on the powerful U.S. trade statute before and during the Uruguay Round ne-

681 See Edward Alden et al., EU Threatens Sanctions over U.S. Tax Breaks WTO
RULING, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2006, at 6 (quoting EU trade commissioner Peter
Mandelson as saying "[tihe US now has three months to act to avoid the reimposition of retaliatory measures... The EU will not accept a system of tax benefits
which give US exporters, including Boeing, an unfair advantage."); see also Paul
Meller, World Trade Group Rules Tax Benefits by U.S. Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2006, at C6 ("European trade officials argue that Boeing is the single biggest beneficiary under the American Jobs Creation Act. If nothing is done to repeal the law,
Boeing will benefit from $615 million over the next 10 years, according to the
European Commission.").
682 See EU Seeks Negotiated Solution on FSC but Warns of Retaliation, 24 INSIDE
U.S. TRADE (Feb. 24, 2006) ("In its case against the U.S., the EU has charged Boeing
receives illegal subsidies through the FSC provisions."); Raphael Minder & Frances Williams, EU's FSC Warning, FIN. TIMES, March 15, 2006, at 11 ("The FSC issue
has also become entangled in the separate EU-US over aircraft subsidies because
Boeing is among the main beneficiaries of the FSC scheme.").
683 Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109222, § 513, 120 Stat. 345 (2006).
684 Rory Watson, Repeal Heals US-EU Rift, LONDON TIMES, May 13, 2006, at 54
("[T]he European Commission confirmed that it would now shelve the sanctions
which it was preparing to introduce against US exports ... ").
685 See Joseph Kahn, U.S. Wins Round in Trade War with Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1999, at C2 ("During trade battles with Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s,
for example, the United States used the law to retaliate against what it called Japan's predatory trade practices, prompting Japan to complain that Washington
was taking international trade rules into its own hands.").
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gotiations. 686 The EC position, supported by most other GATT
Contracting Parties, was that there had to be a ban in the new WTO
dispute settlement system on unilateral trade actions taken to address trade grievances. 687 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974688
was designed to allow the President to investigate and, if necessary, take retaliatory action against U.S. trading partners who engaged in "unjustifiable" (actions that are illegal under international
law or international agreements) or "unreasonable" (actions which
nullified or impaired benefits under a trade agreement or which
discriminated against or burdened U.S. commerce) 689 practices.
The legislative history of the statute made it clear that the United
States wanted to rely on its power rather than on the GATT690 to
get countries to comply with GATT objections. Given the size of
the United States' market, U.S. threats to use sanctions to limit access were credible. Moreover, the United States had used Section
301 to investigate trade barriers and has employed sanctions many
times when responses to its threats were regarded as inadequate. 691
Section 301 was modified by Congress in 1979, 1984, 1988,692
1994693 and 2000.694 The revised version of the statute 695 was challenged in the Section 301 dispute. The 1988 revisions passed during
the Uruguay Round negotiations for a new dispute system, however, were crucial because Congress created two new forms of Sec-

686 Croome, supra note 256, at 126-27, 225; see also THE GATT URUGUAY, supra
note 34, at 2762.
687 Croome, supra note 256, at 126-27.
688 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 301-302, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43
(1975).
689 See id. § 301(a)(1) (providing procedures for initiating a Section 301 investigation); S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 3-4 (1974), as reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186,
7301 (explaining the terms "unjustifiable" and "unreasonable").
690 See id. at 7304 ("[Tihe President ought to be able to act or threaten to act
under section 301, whether or not such action would be entirely consistent with
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.").
691 See generally Taylor, supra note 34, at 222-42.
692 Trade Agreement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 301-304, 93 Stat. 144317 (1979); Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304, 98 Stat. 2948,
3002 (1989); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100418, §§ 1301-1304, 102 Stat. 1107, 1107-1574 (1988).
693 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 314, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994).
694 Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251
(2000).
695 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (2000).
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tion 301696 and clearly delineated the types of actions the United
States would take: (1) "mandatory" cases where the United States
would take action against a country found to have violated Section
301, and (2) "discretionary" cases (those against unreasonable practices where retaliation was discretionary).697 With regard to the
mandatory category of cases, the United States was to take action
against violations of an international agreement unless there was a
settlement or a GATT dispute settlement panel ruled against the
United States. 698 The 1988 revisions actually strengthened the unilateral power of the United States. In the time period following
these revisions and leading up to the completion of the Uruguay
Round, the United States increased the number of Section 301 investigations, the number of threats, and the number of times it
brought sanctions against target countries. 699 The U.S. basis for the
heavy use of the statute were to push for increased compliance
with GATT rules and to get other countries to agree that new areas,
particularly intellectual property rights and trade in services,
should be part of the agenda of the Uruguay Round negotiations. 700 This use of unilateralism proved successful with regard to
both of these goals. There were negotiations and ultimately
agreements coming from the Uruguay Round on intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and trade in services (GATS). Section 301 was
also employed to impose sanctions after the losers in several GATT
cases against the United States blocked the panel reports. 701 These
sanctions were justified by the United States in those instances as
self-help made necessary because of the flaws in the GATT dispute
696 See 102 Stat. 1107, supra note 692, at 1164-81. The new provisions were entitled "Special 301" and "Super 301." Under Special 301, the USTR was required
to initiate investigations of countries that offered inadequate intellectual property
rights protection. Under Super 301, the USTR was required to identify trading
partners with the most significant barriers to U.S. goods. See Taylor, supra note 34,
at 228-42 (discussing the U.S. use of Special 301 and Super 301).
697 102 Stat. 1107, supra note 692, at 1164-79.
698 Id.

699 See Taylor, supra note 34, at 221-25 (discussing the frequency with which
the United States brought Section 301 cases, and the attendant changes in U.S.
trade goals).
700 See id. at 224 (noting that the shift in the use of the statute reflected the
United States' increasing concern over "areas of U.S. trade advantage left completely outside the GATT").
701 See id. at 222-28 (describing U.S. retaliatory action taken to deal with
"problems reaching its goals because of the limitations of the GATT dispute settlement system").
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settlement system. 702 Other GATT Contracting Parties began to
adopt the U.S. position that there needed to be major reform to the
GATT dispute settlement system. 703 In large part, however, they
were motivated not only by the desire to obtain a rules-based adjudicative system, but also to obtain one that provided multilateral
responses to trade violations. In other words, most of the negotiating countries wanted to rein in the United States. 7 4 Those countries also agreed that negotiations on trade-related intellectual
property rights and trade in services were preferable to experienc705
ing the threat or reality of the U.S. unilateral trade statute.
The 1994 revisions were made to bring Section 301 into compliance with U.S. Uruguay Round obligations. According to those revisions, all Section 301 cases initiated and pursued by the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) regarding an international
(GATT/WTO) violation had to be taken through the entire
WTO/DSU process. 7 6 The discretionary category of cases, those
involving unreasonable practices, was left alone. The United States
did not believe it was required to alter its unilateral power regarding such matters because there was no correction to GATT/WTO
707
disputes.
The Uruguay Round negotiations produced the DSU, which
was designed to correct the flaws of the GATT dispute system.
The United States prevailed on its push for a system designed to
"establish right and wrong: to deliver a legal judgment with which

702 See id. at 222 ("One of the reasons the United States considered itself justified in using unilateral economic power to coerce 'appropriate' trade behavior
from other countries was because the multilateral system was not addressing its
concerns."). See also Croome, supra note 256, at 125 ("Justified or not, the muchcriticized 'Section 301' powers given by law to the President of the United States
to take trade action against unfair behaviour by other countries were partly inspired by the American desire to provide enforcement powers missing from the
GATT system.").
703 See id. at 125-29 (discussing the various proposals put forth by participants in dispute settlement negotiations for procedural improvements or fundamental change).
704 See id. at 127 ("Reform of the GATT dispute settlement procedures...
must include an explicit ban on any country taking unilateral action to redress
what it judged to be the trade wrongs of others.").
705 See Taylor, supra note 34, at 234-35 ("[Tihe developing countries ultimately accepted a U.S.-style TRIPs Agreement as a method for limiting Section
301 threats and sanctions.").
706 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, supra note 693, § 314(c).
707 See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 591, at 1018, 1034-35.
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the losing party ought obviously to comply." 708 The DSU, however, was not completed without inclusion of a provision, Article
23, entitled "Strengthening the Multilateral System." Article 23
clearly mandates that all determinations made and actions taken in
response to trade violations are to be taken through the DSU system. 709 The provision was pushed by the EC and many other countries in order to restrain the use of Section 301.710 During the negotiations, the United States was able, however, to fight off another
EC proposal that all countries be required to bring their domestic
legislation into compliance with Article 23.711 The United States
was thus allowed to retain Section 301, but with the understanding
that its provisions would have to be applied in keeping with Article 23.712
2.3.7.2. The Section 301 Dispute
The EC requested consultations on Section 301 in November
1998.713 The legislation was a strategic response to actions taken by
the United States in its first case against the EC. The EC filed its action one month after the United States used Section 301 with regard to the Bananas III dispute. 714 The United States had invoked
Section 301's retaliation powers while seeking authorization from
the DSB to suspend concessions due to the EC's failure to implement.715 The EC argued that Section 306 was inconsistent with Ar708

Croome, supra note 256, at 125.

709 DSU art. 23.
710 See Croome, supra note 256, at 126-27 (describing the proposed reform as a
"highly controversial demand... aimed squarely at the United States and its Section 301 powers").
711 See id. at 127 (discussing how the initial set of improvements to be put
forth at the Uruguay Round were limited to mostly procedural issues).
712 See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 591, at 1018-19, 103435.
713 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/1 (Nov. 30, 1998) [hereinafter
Consultation Notice].
714 See Guy de Jonquie'res, U.S. May Face Trade War With EU Over Beef and Bananas, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at 16 (quoting an EU official at the time declaring
that "[i]t
is not for the US to lay down the law. There are formal WTO procedures
for dealing with this kind of issue.").
715 See Implementation of WTO Recommendations Concerning the European
Communities' Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 63
Fed. Reg. 56,687-89 (Oct. 22, 1998) (concluding that "certain acts, policies and
practices of the EC violate, or otherwise deny benefits to which the United States
is entitled under, GATT 1994 and the GATS."). See also Seung Wha Chang, Taming
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ticles 3, 21, 22 and 23 of the DSU, Article XVI(4) of the WTO Agreement and Articles I, II, III, VIII and XI of the GATT. 716 When consultations failed, the EC requested a panel. 717 Sixteen other countries, among them major trading partners like Japan and Canada,
joined as third parties to the dispute, clearly indicating intense interest by WTO Member States about the United States' use of Section 301.718
The panel issued a report in December 1999 that was not appealed. This result seemed surprising given the litigation history
of the parties and the strong positions asserted before the panel.
The EC argued that the United States, in adopting, maintaining
and applying Section 301, had undercut the deal of the Uruguay
Round. In exchange for the DSB adoption of panel and AB reports,
and the authorization of the suspension of concessions, the United
States was supposed to abandon its "long standing policy of unilateral action." 719 The United States countered that the EC had
"brought a political case that is in search of a legal argument." 720
The panel was well aware of the daunting task it faced. It began with a "Panel's Mandate" stating that "[t]he political sensitivity of this case is self-evident." 721 The panel also went on to note
that the United States itself volunteered that Section 301 is "an unpopular piece of legislation" and that all of the third parties that
had provided opinions held "highly critical views of this legislation."722
It is important to note at the outset that the EC's framing of the
case and the U.S. defense of it led to a certain type of legal analysis
by the panel. The EC did not attack the United States' use of Sec-

Unilateralism Under the Multilateral Trading System: Unfinished Job in the WATO Panel
Ruling on U.S. Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1151 (2000) (discussing extensively U.S. use of Section 301 and the Section 301
panel decision).
716 Consultation Notice, supra note 713.
717 Request for Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities,
United States -Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/11 (Feb. 2,
1999).
1.6,
718 Panel Report, United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report].
719 Id.
7.2.
7.9.
720 Id.
721 Id.
7.11.
722 Id.; id. n.630.
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tion 301 in a particular trade action. 723 Rather, the EC argued that
portions of the statute on its face violated Article 23. The United
States, in turn, argued that the Section 301 provisions were discretionary in the sense that they allowed the United States to act con724
sistently with its WTO obligations in each case.
The three portions of the statute under attack were Section 304,
Section 305 and Section 306. Each of the provisions has strict time
frames for the USTR to take certain steps regarding GATT/WTOviolative actions of other governments. The provisions also rest on
the idea that the United States will pursue each of these cases
through the DSU system. Section 304 requires the USTR to make a
determination about whether U.S. rights are being denied on or before the earlier of (1) thirty days after the conclusion of dispute settlement, or (2) eighteen months after the initiation of a Section 301
investigation. 725 If the USTR finds that U.S. rights are being denied, it must determine what action it will take under the statute,
including the suspension of concessions or the imposition of import duties or other restrictions. 726 If the DSB issues a ruling favorable to the United States and the losing country implements its
recommendations within a reasonable time, the USTR can determine that U.S. rights are denied but that "satisfactory" measures
are being taken that justify going no further with Section 301.727
Section 306 requires the USTR to monitor the implementation of
measures taken by the losing government to comply. If on the basis of that review, the USTR "considers" that the other government
is not complying, it is required to make a determination (as provided for in Section 304) for what further action to take. Section
305 requires the USTR to implement the action it considers necessary no later than "30 days after the date on which such determination is made." 728 Section 305 allows a delay of this timing require723 The EC did have a view that the United States' use of Section 301 in Bananas III was illegal but the issue was an open one at the time. The panel noted in
its introductory section on its mandate that, "We are not asked to make an overall
assessment of the compatibility of Sections 301-310 with the WTO agreements ...
. We are, in particular, not called upon to examine the WTO compatibility of US
actions taken in individual cases in which Sections 301-310 have been applied."
Id. 7.13.
724 Id.
725 Id.

7.9.

2.15.

726

Id.

727

Id.

2.16.

728

Id.

2.19.
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ment if the USTR determines "that substantial progress is being
made, or that a delay is necessary or desirable to obtain U.S. rights
or satisfactory solution with respect to the acts, policies or practices
729
that are the subject of the action."
Before undertaking a review of the EC arguments about each of
these provisions, the panel stated that Section 301 is a piece of
"complex economic and regulatory legislation" and that it had to
be aware of the "multi-layered character of the national law under
consideration which includes statutory language as well as other
institutional and administrative elements." 730 This declaration
proved to be the most important one of the case. It meant that the
panel was going to examine not just the text of Section 301, but also
statements that the United States had made about its intentions regarding the statute. Nevertheless, the panel did begin by examining the actual language of the Section 304 time frames and contrasting them with what happens in the DSU process. Section 304
with its eighteen month time frame was found to be mandatory,
leaving no discretion for the Executive Branch to do anything but
take action since DSU proceedings take longer than this time
frame. 731 Section 304, therefore, gives the USTR the right to "make
a unilateral determination of in consistency even prior to the exhaustion of DSU proceedings." 732
The United States defended the statute as a discretionary one
under the established GATT doctrine that only mandatory laws
can be violative. 733 The EC counter was that certain discretionary
measures could violate GATT obligations.73 4 The panel refused to
use this distinction about the nature of government statutes 735 as
the basis for determining the case. Instead, the panel decided the
case by taking a textual approach stating that whether Section 304
violated Article 23 depended on the "precise obligations contained
in Article 23."736 Article 23 has two types of obligations that a
729

Id.

73 Id.

2.20.

T 7.25-.26.

731Id. TT 7.31-.32.
732 Id.

7.33.

733 Id.

7.51.

7M Id. 7.52.
735 See Yoshiko Naiki, The Mandatory/DiscretionaryDistinction in WTO Law:
The US-Section 301 Case and its Aftermath, 7 J.INT'L ECON. L. 23, 53 (2004) (concluding that the panel was not trying to reinterpret the GATT doctrine, but instead was carving out an exception for this case).
736 Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 718, 7.53.
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Member State must assume: those with regard to case specific actions and those about pursuing DSU proceedings to the exclusion
of unilateral actions. In addition, the panel examined Section 304
in light of the object and purpose of Article 23.737 In performing
both functions, the panel found that the provision violates the text
of Article 23, which prohibits unilateral action. The fact that Section 304 provides discretion to the USTR not to act condemns,
rather than saves, the provision. 738 The panel also noted that a
government's obligation to act in good faith also limits a Member's
739
power to adopt national laws that threaten prohibited conduct.
Finally, the panel concluded that the legislation itself, wholly apart
from its use in a particular case, could produce a "chilling effect"
and thus damage other Member States and the market itself.740
Given the role of Article 23 in the DSU - as a central element of
providing confidence in the DSU System--Section 304 on its face
precludes compliance with Article 23.741
The examination of the statute, however, did not end there.
The panel also looked at the non-statutory elements - the institutional and administrative elements -of the statute. 742 After an examination of how the United States actually implemented Section
304, the panel found that the United States had lawfully removed
the prima facie violation of Section 304.743 At issue was the United
States' promise in the Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA")
that accompanied the United States' implementing legislation for
the Uruguay Round. The SAA promise was that the United States
would render determinations under Section 304 in conformity with
U.S. obligations under the WTO.744 The Panel found this curtailment of discretion to be lawful and effective because it represented
the view of the President and the Congress that adopted it, and it
contained a commitment for future U.S. administrations. 745 In addition, credence was accorded to the representations made by the
United States before the panel itself in which it "explicitly, repeat737 Id.

7.59-.61.

738

Id.

739
740
742

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

7.68.
7.67-.68.
7.93-.96.
7.98.

743

Id.

7.104.
7.109.
7.111.

741

744 Id.
745

Id.
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edly and unconditionally confirmed" its commitment to base a Section 304 determination only on a DSB-adopted finding. 746 Although it was making this determination based on unilateral
statements, the panel was willing to do so with the understanding
that they represented the "unambiguous and official position of the
...[United States] that the discretion of the USTR has been limited
so as to prevent a determination of inconsistency [with Article
23]."747 The SAA promise was found to constitute an undertaking
at an international level concerning how the United States had implemented Article 23.748 Consequently, the USTR was precluded
from making a determination of WTO inconsistency contrary to
Article 23.749 If the United States were to repudiate or remove the
promise, the United States would be in violation of its Article 23
75 0
obligations.
The panel then went on to examine the EC argument that Section 306 violated Article 23. The argument here was that Section
306 directs the USTR to make a determination of whether another
Member State has failed to adequately implement a DSB ruling in a
shorter time frame (thirty days after the expiration of the reasonable period to comply) than the DSU procedures under Article
21.5. 751 The United States argued that the statute actually relates to
the time frame regarding the right to suspend concessions under
Article 22.752 The panel faced a problem because the United States
and EC already had conflicting views on the timing of actions regarding the issues of adequate compliance (under Article 21.5) and
when a Member State can seek sanctions (under Article 22). Rather
than resolve this issue, the panel looked at Section 306 based on
each party's interpretation. When viewed under the U.S. interpretation, Section 306 was consistent with Article 23.753 However,
when viewed under the EC view, there was a prima facie violation
of Article 23 that was removed by the U.S. undertakings in the

746

Id.

747 Id.
748

Id.

749 Id.
75o

7.115-.116.

7.125.
7.126.

Id.

751 Id.

7.144.
See supra Section 2.3.2.3 (discussing the "sequencing" controversy between
the EC and the United States).
753 Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 718,
7.159-.163.
752
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SAA.75 4 The panel refused to judge the U.S. action in Bananas III as
a violation since it was based on a U.S. interpretation of how to interpret the interrelationship or sequencing between Articles 21.5
and 22. 755 Ultimately, this meant that Section 306 was found to be
consistent with Article 23 and subject to the same limitations noted
by the panel with regard to Section 304.756
The final EC attack on the statute involved the Section 305 requirement that the USTR determine within thirty days after expiration of the reasonable period what further action to take and then
implement that action within sixty days. 757 Examining this argument also required the panel to look at it from the competing views
of each party regarding how Articles 21.5 and 22 operated. When
this was done, the statute was again found consistent with Article
23 under the U.S. view and inconsistent under the EC interpretation. As with the other provisions of Section 301, however, the
panel found this inconsistency curtailed by the U.S. undertakings
in the SAA and before the panel. 758 After looking at all of the elements of Section 305, the panel concluded that the USTR was "precluded from exercising his or her discretion under Section 305 in a
way that results in implementation of action before DSB authoriza759
tion [to suspend concessions] has been obtained."
The Section 301 dispute, therefore, ended with a panel decision
that allowed the United States to keep its statute. The dispute also
ended with a decision foreclosing any future use of Section 301 in a
way that would contradict the U.S. commitments in the SAA and
in the DSU proceedings relied upon by the panel. The panel repeatedly noted that any future alteration in the U.S. view and use
of its statute would expose the country to a violation argument.

754
755
756

Id.
Id.
Id.

757 Id.
758
759

Id.
Id.

7.164-.167.
7.168.
7.169.
7.171.
7.179.
7.184.
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2.3.8. GMOs
2.3.8.1. Background
The GMOs dispute arose out of a disagreement, primarily
waged between the EC and the United States, 760 over how to regulate products produced by, or consisting of, genetically modified
organisms. The dispute reenacts the same pattern of regulatory
divergence that occurred in Hormones, 761 with the United States
having no trouble with food products that deeply concern the
EC.762 The United States has generally approved of the use of biotechnology to produce food goods and crops. Consequently, the
United States does not require special procedures for the approval
or marketing of genetically modified ("GM") products. 763 By contrast, since 1990, the EC has adopted, struggled with, and reconsidered several legislative approaches to the regulation of such products. 764 In addition, the EC, acting through the Commission and

760 See Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
WT/DS291/1 (May 20, 2003) [hereinafter U.S. Request]. The other complainants
to the dispute are Canada and Argentina, both of whom filed separate complaints.
See Request for Consultations by Canada, European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS292/1 (May 20, 2003)
[hereinafter Canadian Request]; Request for Consultations by Argentina, European
Communities -Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
WT/DS293/1 (May 21, 2003) [hereinafter Argentinean Request]. In addition, fifteen other countries have been participating in all three cases as third parties: Brazil, Chile, China, Chinese, Taipei, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, New
Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, and Uruguay.
761 See supra Section 2.3.2.1 (discussing this regulatory divergence in the Hormones dispute).
762 See Petersmann, supra note 90, at 254 ("[T]he EC's labeling requirements
are motivated by environmental and consumer concerns about GMOs....");
Serina Vandegrift & Christine Gould, Issues Surrounding the InternationalRegulation of Adventitious Presence and Biotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 81, 89 (2003) (discussing the differing views of the United States and the EU).
763 See Mark A. Pollack, The Political Economy of TransatlanticTrade Disputes, in
TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIc DISPUTES, supra note 163, at 65, 77 (pointing out that in
the early 1990s the FDA decided "that genetically modified foods were not substantially different from conventional foods, and therefore required no special
procedures for approval or marketing").
764 See Sara Poli, The Overhaul of the European Legislation on GMOs, Genetically
Modified Food and Feed: Mission Accomplished. What Now?, 11 MAASTRICHT J. EuR. &
COMP. L. 13 (2004) (examining the reform of European Legislation on GMOs);
Joanne Scott, European Regulation of GMOs and the IATO, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 213
(2003) (discussing the background to the GMOs dispute and the EC review and
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Council, does not have sole control over the regulatory issue.765
The EC Member States have powers that they have used to limit
severely the introduction of GM products into the EC.766 The end
result was an EC regulatory process that negatively affected the
trade interests of the United States and other major GM producer
countries such as Canada and Argentina 767 by not allowing them
access to the EC market. As a result, all three countries filed for
consultations 768 and ultimately invoked their right to a panel in
GMOs.

769

Despite the regulatory divergence similarity with Hormones,
this case differs from the earlier case in several ways that might
suggest the beginning of an even more prolonged dispute. Given
the novel nature of the technology, the GMOs case lacks the long
history that preceded the Hormones dispute. 770 The first use and
then greater adoption of biotechnology to produce food crops did
not begin until the mid-1990s.771 Once the United States had approved of GM soybeans, however, it not only focused on domestic
revision of its legislative approach in light of the controversy over introducing
GM products into the EC).
765 See Pollack, supra note 763, at 75 (stating that food safety regulatory power
being held by the EC nations as well as the EU's political bodies produced a
"patchwork regulatory process" that was deficient).
766 See Poli, supra note 764, at 15-18 (discussing how pressure from the Member States can cause the Council of the European Union to act against use of
GMOs).
767 The United States, Canada and Argentina are among the major producers
of GM products. See John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and
the Environmental Law of Genetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 807, 812-13 (2001)
(citing statistics of Canadian GM production); Henrique Freire de Oliveira Souza,
Genetically Modified Plants:A Need for InternationalRegulation, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L &
COMP. L. 129, 141 (2000) (citing statistics of Argentina's GM production).
768 See U.S. Request, supra note 760; Canadian Request, supra note 760; Argentinean Request, supra note 760. The three requests for consultations are based on
the same claims of SPS violations. They vary based on the products each country
argued was being negatively affected by the EC's lack of action on GM product
approvals and EC Member State bans.
769 See U.S. Request, supra note 760 (complaining that since 1998, "the EC has
applied a moratorium on the approval of biotech products," and in addition, that
EC Member States were maintaining "national marketing and import bans on biotech products even though those products have already been approved by the EC
for import and marketing in the EC"). The Canadian and Argentinean requests
complain about the same practices.
770 See supra Section 2.3.2.1 (discussing the history of Hormones).
771 See Kunich, supra note 767, at 812 (discussing the emergence of transgenic
crops); Poli, supra note 764, at 15-17 (discussing the emergence of the commercial
GM industry and the resultant increase in production).
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production but also sought the right to export into the EC. The
United States procured regulatory approval through an EC Commission decision in 1996.772 The EC decision to allow market access
provoked opposition by European retailers and wholesalers.773
Growing public opposition in the EC Member States at around the
same time clearly indicated that several states were quite worried
about the use of biotechnology. 774 When another GM product
(maize) was approved at the EC level even after various national
authorities raised concerns about potential health and environmental problems, it was clear that obvious dissatisfaction existed
with the EC regulatory scheme. 775 The EC process at the time required review of any GM product by scientific advisory commissions. Despite this requirement and use of this process, several
Member States-Austria, Italy and Luxembourg- enacted safeguard measures (bans) under Article 16 of the existing regulatory
measure, Directive 90/220.776 The EC scientific advisory committees later reviewed these bans and found them unjustified since
there was no new scientific evidence. 777 Nevertheless, the Member
States left their bans in place. Moreover, many states 778 announced
at a 1999 meeting of the Council of Environmental Ministers that
they would block any new authorizations of GM products until Directive 90/220/EEC was revised to deal with the issues of labeling
and traceability. 779 This led to a suspension of the EC authorization
72 David Winickoff et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and
Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 81, 87-88 (2005).
73 See id. (noting that European retailers and wholesalers (EuroCommerce
and EuroCoop) immediately protested the EC approval of the first GM product
(GM soybeans) and any GM product; these retailers and wholesalers also called
for labeling and segregation rules for GM products).
774 See George Gaskell et al., Worlds Apart? Public Opinion in Europe and the
USA, in BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE MAKING OF A GLOBAL CoNTRovERsY 351 (Martin W.
Bauer & George Gaskell eds., 2002) (noting widespread EC citizen disapproval of
GM products).
775 See Poli, supra note 764, at 15-17, 17 n.19 (noting that, during the time of
the BSE Crisis, there was actually widespread concern over whether the EC had
the proper approach to food safety).
776 Council Directive 90/220/EEC, art. 16, 1990 O.J. (L 116) (EC).
777 Poli, supra note 764, at 16 n.11.
778 See Winickoff et al., supra note 772, at 88 (identifying France, Denmark,
Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg as countries that took the hard line against new
authorizations). Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and
Sweden also said that they would adopt precautionary approach on the issue. Id.
779 Press Release, Council of Environmental Ministers, Declarations Regarding the Proposal to Amend Directive 90/220/EEC on Genetically Modified Or-
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procedure and ultimately to a moratorium on GM product approvals. 780 The de facto moratorium and the Member State safeguards formed the basis for the U.S., Canadian, and Argentine
781
complaints about violations of the SPS Agreement.
Unlike the Hormones dispute, the dispute over EC (and Member State) actions regarding GM product approvals developed after
the United States and EC adopted the SPS Agreement and its discipline regarding food safety regulation. The SPS Agreement requires that government actions and measures regulating food
products be based on scientific evidence and risk assessments, respectively. Once the United States, Canada and Argentina were
convinced that the EC had, by means of a de facto moratorium,
stopped the approval process for GM products, 7 2 negotiations to
end the ban became inevitable. Where necessary, the negotiations
would be followed by a WTO case 783 to determine whether the EC
actions were appropriate.
The context for the GMOs dispute -pursuit of the EC and various Member States for not following their own regulatory procedures- suggests that this could merely be the first of several WTO
cases on biotechnology products and their regulation. The questions about how a country should regulate GM products in such
ganisms, U.N. Doc. C/99/203 (June 24-25, 1999), available at http://europa
.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/99/203&language=en.
780 See Poli, supra note 764, at 15 (explaining that the suspension was the result of the "rising of a consensus amongst the Member states..." and followed a
controversial approval of GM maize); Winickoff et al., supra note 772, at 88 (indicating concern amongst a number of EU member states about the potential harmful effects of GM crops as an impetus for a de facto moratorium on new approvals
of GMOs and a new GMO authorization process).
781 See U.S. Request, supra note 760, at 1 (alleging that the approvals moratorium and national marketing and import bans have restricted imports of agricultural and food products from the United States).
782 See Justin Gillis & Paul Blustein, WTO Ruling Backs Biotech Crops, WASH.
POST, Feb. 8, 2006, at D1 (noting that EC consumer and retailer opposition to GM
products led to an absence of GM products in the EC market); U.S. Request, supra
note 760, at 1 ("Since October 1998, the EC has applied a moratorium on the approval of biotech products. The EC has suspended consideration of applications
for, or granting of, approval of biotech products under the EC approval system.");
see also Elizabeth Becker, U.S.'Contests Europe's Ban on Some Food, N.Y. TIMES, May
14, 2003, at C1 (reporting that the EU had an informal moratorium on new varieties of GM food from 1998 to 2002, before implementing a new regulatory system).
783 See Pollack, supra note 763, at 77 (explaining that the United States and EC
had begun consultations over biotechnology issues, creating the EU-U.S. Biotechnology Forum and the Biotech Working Group under the Transatlantic Economic
Partnership).
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ways as to gain their benefits while limiting human health or environmental problems are just now being discussed. Consequently,
the responses of the EC citizenry and its government have thus far
been reactive. Countries with a different interpretation of the relative risks and benefits are bound to respond to the trade effects
caused by the EC's limiting access to its market. The United States,
Canada, and Argentina currently produce and export a high proportion of GM products, 7 4 almost all of which are still shut out of
the EC market. 785 From these countries' perspective a satisfactory
resolution of the case would require a smoothly functioning approvals process that would allow each product to be assessed
based on scientific information. Moreover, any steps taken by the
EC regarding the regulation of GM products has a major impact on
other countries. Those still considering their own GM-regulation
policies, as well as their ability to trade worldwide, have been and
may continue to be impacted by the EC.786 The GMOs dispute
deals only with the de facto moratorium, which has since been
lifted, 78 7 and the Member State safeguards that went into place in
1998. Since 1998, the EC has revised its regulatory framework to
include a new review agency-the European Food Safety Authority. 788 The EC has also articulated its commitment to the use of the
precautionary principle in regulating future approvals under its
new Directive 2001/18/EC and its implementing regulation. 789 EC
action on GM products in the future could therefore spark disputes
784 See Marc L. Busch & Robert Howse, A (Genetically Modified) Food Fight:
Canada'sWTO Challenge to Europe's Ban on GM Products, 186 C.D. HowE INSTITUTE
COMMENTARY 3 (2003), available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary
_186.pdf.
785 See Paul Geitner & Andrew Pollack, A Line in the Sand Over WTO's Modified-Food Ruling, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 9, 2006, at Al (noting that applications
filed in the 1990s have still not been approved and that recent approvals since the
ban was lifted have been solely for imports).
786 See id. (noting the U.S. belief that the WTO ruling would discourage others
from adopting similar barriers and from adopting biotechnology).
787 See id. (reporting that the current EC position is that the moratorium has
been lifted and that they have recently begun approving GM products).
788 See Council Regulation 178/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 31) 5 (EC) ("The establishment of a European Food Safety Authority... should reinforce the present system
of scientific and technical support which is no longer able to respond to increasing
demands on it.").
789 Council Directive 2001/18/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 106/1) 1. For subsequent EU
regulations on GM food and feed, and on traceability and labeling of GM products, see Council Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Regulation 18291 and Council Regulation 1830/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24 (EC).
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about whether the new legislation or its application complies with
SPS requirements. Such a later dispute might actually produce yet
another impossible case -one challenging the new EC regulatory
framework. It is possible this second generation case would provide a clearer picture of the limits actually placed on a WTO Member State's ability to provide the highest possible standard of protection under the terms of the SPS Agreement.
2.3.8.2. The GMOs Dispute
The three complainants in the dispute all set forth some variation on the same claims:790 (1) that there was suspension of the EC
approval system, (2) that there existed numerous product-specific
moratoria, 791 and (3) that measures enacted by some EC Member
States prohibited the importation and marketing of certain biotechnology products. The major legal arguments against the general and product-specific moratoria alleged by the United States
were that the moratoria were SPS measures that (1) violated the
procedural requirements of the SPS Agreement, which requires
that any procedure be "undertaken and completed without undue
delay" 792 and notified, 793 (2) constituted a SPS measure put in place
7 94
without a risk assessment and thus in violation of Article 5.1,
790 See U.S. Request, supra note 760, at 1-2 (alleging the suspension of the EC
approval system, the EC's failure to consider applications for approval, and national marketing and import bans maintained by member States as measures inconsistent with the SPS Agreement and GATT); see also Canadian Request, supra
note 760 (alleging that (1) due to measures taken by EC Member States, since
1998, "the EC has maintained a de facto moratorium on the approval of GM products," (2) this keeps GM products from accessing or proceeding through the EC's
approval process and (3) some Member States, including Austria, France, Greece,
and Italy "have prohibited" the importation and marketing of GM products despite those products having been approved by the EC for importation and marketing.); Argentine Request, supra note 760 (alleging that there had been (1) de facto
measures leading to the suspension/non-consideration of various applicators, (2)
undue delay in finalizing consideration of various applications, and (3) specific
prohibitions introduced by the Member States of the EC).
791 See U.S. Request, supra note 760, Annexes IA & IB (listing oilseed rape,
Monsanto beet, and cotton amongst the GM products subject to specific moratoria); Argentine Request, supra note 760, Annex I (listing various GM versions of
maize and cotton for which applications have been pending or rejected).
792 SPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 8, Annex C(1)(a).
793 Id. art. 7 & art. 8, Annex C(1)(b).
794 Id. art. 5.1. The argument goes on to state that a measure put in place
without a risk assessment therefore fails to satisfy the Article 2 SPS obligation that
an SPS measure must have a basis in science. Id. art. 2.2. See U.S. First Submission,
109-11.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 28:2

and (3) discriminated in establishing EC levels of SPS protection in
violation of Article 5.5.795 In regards to the EC Member State safeguards measures identified, the major legal claim charged that the
SPS measures were not based on a risk assessment and thereby
violated Article 5.1.796
The EC's first defense was that it had never adopted a general
moratorium, 797 that the complaints were really about delay and
omissions 798 and that if there was any pattern of activity regarding
individual applications it was not covered by the SPS Agreement. 799 The EC also argued that the SPS was not designed to
cover the issues raised by genetically modified organisms. 800 With
regard to the product specific moratoria, the EC said that many of
the claims were moot (because approval applications had been
withdrawn or abandoned), 801 and that the only relevant SPS discipline related to these specific approvals was Article 8.802 Finally,
the Member State safeguard measures were identified as falling
795 SPS Agreement, supra note 68, art. 5.5. "[A]void arbitrary or unjustifiable
distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if
such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade." Id. art. 5.5. The United States also argued that this violation of Article 5.5 constituted a violation of Article 2.3. See U.S. Request, supra note 760,
129.
796 See U.S. Request, supra note 760, at 99 167-73. Canada's arguments encompassed not only the U.S. violations, but also violations of the TBT Agreement.
See Communication from Canada to European Commission, First Written Submission of Canada, Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
WT/DS291-93 (Apr. 21, 2004) $$ 473-507 (alleging that none of the five EC Member State national measures meet the legitimacy threshold requirement of "credible evidence of a risk to the fulfillment of that objective") [hereinafter First Submission of Canada].
797 See First Written Submission by the European Communities, European
Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, $
371-73, WT/DS291-93 (May 17, 2004), [hereinafter EC First Submission] ("As set
forth in the factual part, the European Communities has not adopted any 'moratorium' on the approval of GMOs and nor has it suspended the application of its
GMO legislation.").
798 See id.
373-76 ("The Complainants' assertions about a 'moratorium', or
a 'suspension of procedures' or any 'failure to consider applications' are all in reality complaints about delay ....
Such obligations are 'procedural' in character,
and they concern the timely functioning of a defined process.").
799 Id. $T 541-43, 566-67 (reasoning that any patterns of stalling individual
applications are not challengeable under the WTO Agreement on the grounds that
such measures are neither formally nor informally specified in a document).
800 Id.
384-411.
801 Id. 462.
802

Id.

469.
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within the SI'S Article 5.7 provision on the precautionary principle,
and thus were not required to satisfy SPS Article 5.1.803
The three complaints by the United States, Canada, and Argentina were considered by one panel. 80 4 The panel issued an interim
report in February 2006 that was meant to be released only to the
parties to the dispute.8 05 Given the great interest in the case, the interim report was leaked and put on several websites. A review of
the panel report section on the interim report reveals exactly why it
should be confidential. All of the parties asked the panel to make
changes in almost every part of the report and the panel did make
80 6
significant changes.
The GMOs panel report is over 1000 pages long and covers
every argument raised by the three complainants, the EC, and
third parties.8 07 The length of the report and the lengthy period
taken to issue it (over three years from the establishment of the
panel) can be attributed to three factors. First, the complainants
and the EC disagreed over the crucial factual issues of whether any
moratoria existed and whether the moratoria were "measures"
within the meaning of the SPS Agreement. Second, there were
twenty-seven product moratoria and nine safeguard measures under attack and each one had to be analyzed for all legal claims.
Third, the parties had major disagreements over the scientific issues (particularly going to the issue of the use of the precautionary
principle under Article 5.7 of the Si'S Agreement) raised by the
dispute.
As a factual matter the GMOs panel found that from October
1998 to August 2003, the Member States and the EC had the ability
and opportunity to prevent or delay the approval of GM product
applications.8 08 The key event triggering the existence of a general
Id.
572-610.
Panel Report, European Communities -Measures Affecting the Approval and
7.14-19
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291-293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) at
[hereinafter GMOs Panel Report].
805 According to the DSU, the interim reports go to the parties so that they
can ask the panel to "review precise aspects of the interim report prior to circulation of the final report to the Members." DSU art. 15.2.
6.9-.194.
806 GMOs Panel Report, supra note 804,
807 The first six sections of the report cover all of the arguments made in written and oral form by the parties and third parties, and a discussion of the interim
report. Starting with Section 7, the report then goes on to deal with all of the factual and legal claims raised by the parties.
88 GMOs Panel Report, supra note 804, T 7.1271(a).
803
804
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moratorium was the position taken by five Member States in June
1999 that they would block further applications until the EC passed
new legislation.8 9 The panel thus sided with the complainants
finding that there was a de facto general moratorium that operated
from June 1999 to August 2003.810 However, while the panel found
that the general moratorium was a challengeable measure (one that
could be the subject of a WTO dispute settlement proceeding) it
also determined that it was not (like the EC approval legislation itself) an SPS measure.811 The basis for these determinations was
that the moratorium operated as a "procedural decision to delay
final substantive approval decisions." 812 Since the moratorium was
a decision "concerning the application, or operation, of the EC approval procedures," 813 it did not satisfy all of the elements for a
measure under Article 5 or Article 2.814
With regard to the major legal claim about procedural defaults
under the SPS Agreement, the panel reached a different conclusion. The Panel found that the major obligation in Article 8 is that
a WTO Member State observe the provision of Annex C which requires that "procedures are undertaken and completed without
undue delay." 815 Since the EC approval regulations had such procedures, it was obligated to complete them without undue delay.
According to the panel, any evaluation of whether this requirement was met had to be done on a case-by-case basis. 816 A WTO
Member is obligated, therefore, to act as promptly as possible in
following its procedures while taking into account its need to ensure the fulfillment of its SPS requirement. 817 The panel found that
the EC lacked any justification for the delays in this case 818 and
looked at its approval process for one product (as opposed to all
twenty-seven named in the complaints) in order to determine
whether there was a breach of Article 8 (and its Annex). 819 The
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819

Id. 7 7.1271(b).
Id. 7.1271(o.
Id.
7.1288-.95.
Id. T 7.1379.
Id. 7.1386.
Id.
7.1395-.1421 (Article 5), T
Id. 7.1468.
Id. 7.1497.
Id. 7.1498.
Id. 7.1532.
Id.
7.1541-.1546.
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panel found that the two year failure to complete the approval
process for oilseed rape could be attributed to the moratorium and
led to "undue delay" within the meaning of Article 8.820
The other SPS claim raised by Argentina was that the EC had
failed in its obligation under Article 10.1 to take into account the
special needs of developing country Members.8 21 Considering all
of Argentina's arguments the panel concluded that Argentina
failed to meet the burden of proof on this issue and thus rejected
822
this claim.
With regard to the product-specific moratoria, the panel examined the applications for final EC approval for twenty-seven products, the panel found undue delay in completion of the approval
procedure respect of twenty-four of the twenty-seven products,
and thus a violation of Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a). 823 The final set
of claims to the nine safeguard measures imposed by Argentina,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg. 824 The complainants had argued that the safeguards were SPS measures and
were inconsistent with the obligations in Article 5.1 (that the measures be based on a risk assessment) and Article 2.2 (based on scientific principles). The panel agreed, finding them to be "SPS measures" 825 that were not based on a risk assessment as required
under Article 5.1.826
The panel also rejected the EC argument that the Safeguard
measures could be justified under Article 5.7. The panel did accept
the EC argument that Article 5.7 was a conditional right rather
than an exception from the general obligation under Article 2.827
Similarly, the panel found that Article 5.7 "operates as a qualified
exemption" from the Article 5.1 obligation to base SPS measures on
a risk assessment. 828 The panel, however, found that these safeguards could not be justified as provisional measures under Article
5.7. In the case of each of the GM products concerned, the EC's
relevant scientific committee had already evaluated the potential
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

7.1569.
7.1605
77 7.1625-.1627
8.7.
8.8.
77 7.2923-.2924.
T 7.3056-.3213.
T 7.2973-.2977.
T 7.2997.
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risks before granting EC approval. Later, each scientific committee
had also reviewed the evidence submitted by each Member State to
justify its safeguard and found no reason to alter its earlier approval. 829 The EC-level review demonstrated that there was sufficient scientific evidence available to permit a risk assessment.
Consequently, the Member States could not invoke Article 5.7,
which allows a country to take action only "in cases where relevant
scientific evidence is sufficient."8 30 By maintaining the safeguards
in violation of Articles 5.1 and 5.7 the Member States also acted in831
consistently with their Article 2 obligations.
The GMOs panel made three separate recommendations given
its findings. First, with regard to the general de facto moratorium,
the panel recommended in the case of the United States and Canada 832 that the EC bring it into conformity with its obligations under the SPS Agreement "if and to the extent that, that measure has
not already closed to exist." 833 This marks a change from the interim report in which the panel found that the general moratorium
had ceased and therefore made no recommendation. The United
States and Canada had objected to that earlier finding, arguing that
since most of the applications pending in August 2003 were still in
the EC approvals process, there was a "very real possibility that a
general moratorium could subsequently be reintroduced."8 3 4 The
panel accepted these concerns and noted that given the informal de
facto nature of the moratorium it could be "reimposed just as soon
as it can be ended."8 35 The panel ultimately decided to avoid the
problem of making recommendations about measures that no
longer exist by making the qualified recommendation noted
above.836
The recommendation provides guidance for future conduct of
the EC in this area. Under its new procedure for GM approvals,
the EC will be unable to engage in a similar suspension or shut
down of all product approvals in order to satisfy its health/safety
829

Id.

8.9.

SPS Agreement art. 5(7).
GMOs Panel Report, supra note 804,
7.3996-.3998.
832 Argentina did not raise this issue and the panel did not offer a recommendation on the general de facto moratorium in their case.
833 GMOs Panel Report, supra note 804,
8.19, 8.36.
834 Id. 7.1310.
835 Id. 7.1311.
836 Id. 7.1317.
830
831
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concerns. 837 With regard to the product-specific moratoria, the EC
was recommended that it bring its measures into conformity as
well.838 As a practical matter, this means that the EC is now under
an obligation to process each application in a timely fashion
(avoiding "undue delays") in order to avoid further WTO scrutiny.
The final panel recommendation for all three cases was that the EC
deal with the Member State safeguard measures by bringing them
into conformity. 839 What this means is that the EC Member States
will have to withdraw each safeguard. No ban supported by a risk
assessment will be allowed to stand. In order to leave the safeguard in place, the Member State would have to provide an assessment showing the risk to be higher than that existing under the
current EC reports.
2.3.8.3. Implementation and Surveillance Phase
The EC decided not to appeal the panel report. The EC considers the general moratorium to be over and has pointed out that the
EC approvals process is currently reviewing and approving some
applications for GM products. 840 Meanwhile it will receive a reasonable period of time to comply with the other panel recommendations. From the perspective of the complainants the issue of
compliance will remain open and they will be watching to see
whether the safeguard measures are lifted and whether the GM
products already in the pipeline and any new applications receive
timely review. Given the history of United States-EC trade disputes, there will be at the very least a request for a compliance review under Article 21.5 should these steps not be taken. Beyond
this likelihood, there is also every reason to believe that the GMOs
case is the first, but not the last, WTO dispute on this issue. The
EC's new approvals process and its regulations on traceability and
labeling of biotech products will come under close scrutiny, if not
attack.
837 Scott, supra note 764, at 218 (contending that the EC experience with the de
facto moratorium led the EC to revise its legislation in such a way as to clarify
"the obligations of the various actors in the authorization process, in particular
whether or not these actors have an obligation to act").
8.20.
838 See GMOs Panel Report, supra note 804,
839 Id.
8.32, 8.48, 8.64.
840 Final GMO Panel Limits Application of MEAs in the Future WTO Disputes,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Oct. 13, 2006) (stating that, according to an EC spokesman, ten
GM applications have been approved since the GMOs panel was established in
2003 and thirty more are currently being examined).
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3. CONCLUSION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

After examining these cases, two conclusions emerge. First,
impossible cases tend to arise for the same reasons. Second, impossible cases are resolved, or fail to be resolved, for very dissimilar reasons having to do not only with the choices made by the
disputing parties, but also with the contribution of the WTO panels
and AB panels.
Impossible cases arise because they involve powerful states
with politically sensitive problems, symbolic issues, or a perceived
sovereign concern. The impossible cases also tend to involve large
trade volumes (or lost market access), past history, and one, if not
several, politically empowered domestic groups. Given the nature
of the cases, the regulatory powers under attack, and the internal
politics at work, it is unsurprising that the defending party will begin by fighting for, rather than relinquishing, its measure. Inevitably, the cases also tend to be strategically useful for scoring against
another major power.
What leads the impossible cases to be resolved or to resist resolution appears to be a combination of how the panel/AB panel decides (or might decide) the case, and the internal difficulties posed
by compliance. Half of the impossible cases were actually resolved
without protracted litigation. In other words, although they had
the makings of a legal failure, the parties and the panel/AB Panel
managed to avoid that result. The Helms-Burton dispute was kept
out of the system and settled as a political rather than a trade matter. As a result, a chance to interpret Article XXI was foregone, but
the DSU system avoided an early attack on its legitimacy. In the
Film case, the complainant lost on factual rather than legal grounds
and wisely resisted the impulse to appeal. The losing party in
Shrimp/Turtle (in a decision noted for the leeway it provided to
governments) was found justified in using its power. Consequently the United States only faced having to alter how it applied
the environmental measure. The Section 301 Panel crafted a political interpretation and solution (finding the sin but constraining the
chance to sin further) that allowed both parties to claim victory
without appeals.
By contrast, three of the other impossible cases, Bananas III,
Hormones, and FSC, illustrate what happens when the parties fight
over not only the underlying trade issues but what the dispute settlement system itself can deliver. In each case the continued fight
was prompted by decisions of the AB Panel that left the winning
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party determined to reap the expected benefit -the withdrawal of
the offending measure. The decisions, however, also left the losing
party believing itself compelled to exhaust the DSU process to
avoid the adverse result. In Bananas III, the major parties settled
the dispute only after failed attempts at implementation and the
use of sanctions. Even this negotiated and politically brokered solution left other complainants dissatisfied with, and therefore looking to change, the results. The Hormones dispute resulted in the AB
Panel giving a realistic reading to a new agreement but posing an
inevitable compliance problem for the losing party. The EC had
already provided a distrustful public with the maximum protection available and was loath to back down from its position. The
dispute culminated in a complete breakdown between the parties
over what constitutes compliance both before and after the use of
sanctions. It is fair to say that the Hormones dispute has never been
resolved. Instead, the parties entered into a "second generation"
dispute-a DSU dispute created by an earlier DSU litigation.
While the Continued Suspension dispute could resolve the important
procedural issue at stake, it may still pose yet another compliance
problem for the EC (if the EC loses) or the basis for a third dispute
filed by the United States (if the United States loses). Finally, the
FSC dispute illustrates how a country anxious to keep its law will
use every litigation option offered by the DSU to avoid withdrawing the law for as long as possible. The FSC dispute ended only
when the United States repealed the last GATT violation posed by
its second attempt to comply with the original AB decision.
The different litigation histories and outcomes prove that the
WTO's DSU system is different from the GATT's system. The
more adjudicative system continues to produce impossible cases
but offers ways to resolve them that range from acceptance to political settlement to extended and even new litigation. While the
United States and EC may be the major disputants, there is another
active and influential player-the panels and AB panels. Having
negotiated and accepted a dispute settlement system in which the
decisions are final adjudications on the law, the parties feel constrained to fight within that system. The United States/EC trade
wars have turned into litigation battles.
What does all of this mean for the creators of impossible cases
and for the WTO's DSU system? For the disputing parties several
lessons present themselves. Studying the impossible cases as a
phenomenon has a predictive value. If one can see how impossible
cases arise, the United States and EC can negotiate solutions or de-
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fer immediate or strategic action and consider which disputes will
be fruitful. Similarly, the ability to predict which disputes will entail political difficulty or overly costly compliance should inspire
the complainant to plan for and expect prolonged litigation. In a
dispute system that relies on bilateral enforcement, the winning
party must either continue to press for complete compliance or accept a settlement. If an active defense still leads to defeat, the losing party should be planning a compliance strategy that allows for
testing of all legal issues without abusing every procedural gap.
As for what these cases mean for the WTO and the DSU system, again several lessons surface. Given the scope of GATT/WTO
law and the regulatory power at stake, there will always be impossible cases. There is a problem of less compliance by the major
states and the reality of differential compliance: the major powers
are in a position to refuse to comply while the smaller/less powerful cannot. No doubt the problems created by the truly impossible
cases erode the legitimacy of the system. However, it is not clear
that there is an easy fix, such as the often-argued-for reform of the
DSU remedies. All of the impossible cases, even the unlitigated
Helms-Burton dispute, were useful in revealing the limits of the
DSU system. In each dispute the major parties used their extensive
resources and expertise to pursue disputes that resulted in valuable legal interpretations of the relevant GATT/WTO agreement
and/or uncovered major defects and design flaws in the DSU procedures. Whether these issues and design flaws would have been
revealed as early, or canvassed as thoroughly, in the absence of the
major parties is unclear. The answer for the evil of sustained noncompliance may lie in reforming that portion of the DSU that is the
weakest-the implementation and surveillance phase. The impossible cases have revealed that some alterations to the DSU, such as
changing the recommendation power of panels, solving the sequencing problem, and defining how to proceed after sanctions,
are necessary. Another prescription would be to increase the multilateral oversight and comment by the DSB on cases where the losing party has announced its intention to comply. The major powers will continue, in some truly impossible cases, to litigate and
resist. The WTO would benefit the most from anticipating this reality and limiting the options of the powerful while simultaneously
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encouraging or shaming them into being good complainants and
defendants.841

841 Three Year Overview, supra note 4, at 14-15. It seems only fitting to offer
the final word to Professor Hudec, who argued that the best ways to counter outbreaks of noncompliant behavior are to (1) keep the disputed matter in the DSB
agenda, (2) be patient and keep the matter there, even if for a long time, and (3)
fashion "accommodations that produce a result" that would be "consistent with
long-term respect for GATT/WTO law." Id. at 15.
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